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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, an unstable funding environment for state higher education 
systems has led to a trend of increasing institutional fiscal autonomy in exchange for 
reductions in appropriations.  With the growing concern that reducing state oversight will 
result in increased tuition and spending levels, this study was designed to provide a 
clearer understanding of how fiscal autonomy at public institutions impacts measures 
important to the state public policy goals of affordability, operating efficiency, and 
access. 
To accommodate the diversity and hierarchical structure of public institutions, 
this study used multilevel modeling techniques to integrate complex, interrelated 
institution- and state-level data.  Institution-level data were provided primarily by the 
Delta Cost Project and State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO) in the 
analysis of 395 public four-year institutions across sectors in 43 states.  The three 
dependent variables measured changes in tuition revenue net of institutional grants, 
education and general spending, and minority student enrollment for academic years 
ending 2003 through 2009.  In addition to other institution- and state-level characteristics 
and performance measures, explanatory variables included three regulatory or political 
descriptors: institutional tuition-setting authority, resource control, and state governance 
structure. 
 ix 
Prior to this study, there was little empirical evidence to either support or counter 
claims that reducing state oversight would lead to increases that could threaten access, 
particularly for students in low-income and minority populations.  This analysis did find 
evidence of a relationship between tuition-setting authority and institutional outcomes, 
however, statistical significance varied by outcome measure as well as category of 
tuition-setting authority.  There were also other important factors related to the outcomes 
including level of appropriations, extent of reliance on state funding, and regional 
compact affiliation.  Although results were mixed, this effort serves as a starting point for 
future research to help inform state and institutional decision-makers as they search for 
ways to address funding gaps without sacrificing their public agenda.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
In the 21
st
 Century, postsecondary education has become increasingly important 
in ensuring the financial security of individuals as well as the global competitiveness of 
the nation.  In 2008, participation in higher education was at an all-time high with over 18 
million students enrolled (Desrochers, Lenihan, & Wellman, 2010).  While the purview 
of individual states, public higher education systems have long been charged with a 
responsibility to support nationwide public policy goals of access, affordability, quality, 
and workforce development.  Government financing of these efforts comes primarily 
from the states which have funding and policy authority.  Although public investment has 
grown overall, when measured by full-time equivalent student or share of state budgets, 
state government financial support often falls short of institutional operating costs.  
According to the State Higher Education Executive Officers, between 1994 and 2008 
state and local governments increased their funding to higher education institutions from 
$39.9 billion to $88.7 billion.  However, adjusted for inflation, for each full-time 
equivalent student, state and local educational appropriations fell to a 25-year low in 
2005 before recovering in 2008, then dropping 4.0% in 2009 (SHEEO, 2010).  With state 
budgets straining to meet increased enrollment demand and accommodate competing 
public priorities, some states have allowed tuition levels at public institutions to increase 
(Zemsky, 2004); the cost to students is increasing faster than the rate of inflation or the 
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growth in household income (College Board, 2008).  This reduction in state funding and 
its effect on the rising price of attendance has created a maelstrom of debate around the 
consequence to student access and success.  With little hope that state appropriations will 
return to more generous levels and most state governments restricting tuition levels and 
spending discretion, many public institutions are attempting to wrest tuition-setting 
authority and control of their own revenue from the state.  Critics are concerned that 
granting institutions tuition-setting authority and management of cash flow will send the 
price of college attendance even higher and remove controls that limit spending, 
effectively pricing college education out of reach for the most price-sensitive (Berdahl, 
1978; Sabloff, 1997; Berdahl & MacTaggert, 2000).  Although there is no shortage of 
rhetoric, there is little empirical evidence to either support or counter these criticisms.  
The purpose of this study was to provide a better understanding of how fiscal autonomy 
at public institutions impacts important outcomes that affect articulated state goals.   
While there are a few states where significant fiscal autonomy has been delegated 
to institutions, most research in this area has investigated the decision-making process 
and only a few empirical studies have examined outcomes at the state level.  There has 
been little research that has studied the relationship between an institution’s fiscal 
autonomy and its long-term performance on indicators that influence public policy 
outcomes.  Using data across states and sectors, this study applied multilevel modeling 
techniques in a longitudinal analysis to understand the relationship of institutional fiscal 
autonomy to measures of affordability, operating efficiency, and minority student access. 
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This dissertation is organized as follows.  Background information supporting the 
conceptual framework of the research is provided in Chapter One, followed by a review 
of related case literature and empirical research in Chapter Two.  The third chapter 
discusses the research method, data sources, and operationally defines the selected 
dependent and explanatory variables.  Data preparation methods and descriptive statistics 
for each of the outcome variables are also detailed in this section.  Chapter Four provides 
the detailed results of the analysis for each of the three dependent variables and the final 
chapter summarizes key findings. 
Conceptual Framework 
Decision-making at public four-year colleges and universities is influenced by a 
variety of interest groups – state policymakers, lay boards, administrators, faculty, 
students, alumni, business partners, and donors.  In an environment of limited state 
funding, institutional leaders and state policymakers are forced to navigate a tightrope 
between the conflicting goals of a diverse group of stakeholders and state needs, a 
situation that has spawned a variety of policy initiatives as well an active research 
agenda.  Researchers often study this dilemma within the context of rational economic 
theory, yet in the politically-charged environment of public higher education a rational 
approach cannot fully explain the behavior of these complex organizations (Cohen, 
March, & Olsen, 1972; James, 1990; Winston, 2000; Santos, 2007; Van de ven, 1983).  
Instead, explaining institutional outcomes demands a more behavioral perspective to 
frame how the institution, its sociopolitical environment, and the economy influence each 
other and how the institution affects changes beneficial to the interest of its stakeholders.  
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Resource Dependency Theory 
 Resource dependence theory is a model of organizational behavior that provides 
one explanation of how an organization accommodates changes in its environment when 
resources are limited (Johnson, 1995; Pfeffer & Salanik, 1978).  In the case of higher 
education, public institutions to varying extent are dependent on the state and other 
stakeholders, not only for political and financial capital, but other critical inputs that 
include qualified students and faculty.  There are two dimensions of resource dependence 
theory: power imbalance and mutual dependence (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).  In the 
realm of public colleges and universities, vertical imbalance of power describes the quasi 
superior-subordinate relationship (Zusman, 1986) between the state and the institution as 
well as between the institution’s leadership and academic departments.  There may also 
be horizontal differences in power characterized by naturally-occurring coalitions among 
institutions within a state or sector that may compete or collude to obtain political, 
financial, or quality-related resources (Salanik & Pfeffer, 1974). 
There are three factors that determine the degree an organization is dependent on 
another: 1) the importance of the resource in meeting goals, 2) the extent to which there 
is control over the allocation and use of the resource, and 3) the extent to which 
alternatives are available (Pfeffer & Salanik, 1978).  Resource importance refers not only 
to the extent of supply but also how crucial the resource is to organizational success.  For 
public colleges and universities, the supply of resources includes the level of state 
funding, available pool of quality high-school graduates, and availability of quality 
faculty, but in addition, the institution’s ability to continue to achieve its mission if a 
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resource becomes scarce.  For example, institutions that receive smaller percentages of 
their operating income from state appropriations will be able to overcome fluctuations in 
funding levels more easily than institutions that are more reliant on public funds.  Control 
refers to the ability of an organization to use its discretion in allocating and using a 
resource.  Public institutions that receive lump sum allocations and manage their own 
revenue have more control of their finances than institutions that must abide by state-
mandated line item budgets. Finally, the availability of alternatives may contribute to the 
degree to which both parties are dependent on each other.  Public institutions are reliant 
to varying degree on the states for operating capital and decision-making authority and 
their institutional missions may constrain their ability to develop alternative sources of 
funding.  On the other hand, a state’s dependence on the services of public institutions to 
educate its population and spur economic growth relies on its relationship with 
institutional leaders and the presence of competitive providers, conditions that may well 
influence the ability of public institutions to negotiate concessions. 
To be successful, an organization must be able to strategically manage the flow of 
resources, maneuver the system that controls the exchange of resources, use its authority 
to address constraints and limitations, and minimize the effect of any external influence 
(Pfeffer & Salanik, 1978; Bozeman & Straussman, 1983).  Although resource 
management strategies have long been used in business organizations to maximize 
revenue streams, recent unpredictability in state funding has created conditions that make 
these concepts appropriate for public institutions as well (Silver, 1993; Benson, 1975; 
Johnson, 1995).  Bozeman and Straussman (1983) elaborate on the dependency 
dimension by describing five factors that influence strategy: 1) resource mix, 2) resource 
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flexibility, 3) resource predictability, 4) locus of resource control, and 5) control of 
external demands for resources.  These factors can be adapted to describe the 
environment in which public postsecondary institutions operate. 
 Resource mix – An institution’s ability to diversify its revenue can be used to 
describe its “publicness” (p. 81) or its dependence on state appropriations for 
operating revenue.  In higher education it is often institutional prestige and 
mission that gives an institution the power to raise revenue from non-
governmental sources, including tuition and fees, grants, auxiliary income, and 
endowments.  Any decisions to alter the resource mix are constrained by the 
institution’s decision-making authority, demands of its stakeholders, the degree of 
certainty in government subsidy, its institutional mission, as well as the 
competitive environment. 
 Resource flexibility – An organization’s fiscal autonomy, or the extent it controls 
the management and flow of resources, is one of the most important determinants 
of its ability to effectively make decisions (p. 84).  In public institutions, the 
budget cycle, allotment controls, and discretionary spending limits imposed by the 
state governance structure often impede an institution’s ability to manage its cash 
flow.  Quite often these external controls are imposed under the auspices of public 
accountability. 
 Resource predictability once differentiated public institutions from private.  An 
institution’s willingness to innovate depends not only on the level of funding but 
on the stability of the flow of resources.  When public funding is relatively stable 
with small yet dependable incremental increases, there is less motivation to 
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change and adapt to market conditions (Pfeffer & Salanik, 1978).  State budget 
constraints have left many public institutions in an uncertain funding environment 
with limited authority to manage resources to quickly adapt to new conditions.   
 Locus of resource control – Although an institution’s discretionary authority in 
managing its resources is provided under state authority, as with any complex 
organization, its ability to make decisions is complicated by its allegiance to a 
diverse group of stakeholders. 
 Control of external demand – A public institution’s ability to respond to changes 
in student demand depends on the institution’s ability to increase market share by 
taking advantage of technological advances, geographic growth, and decision 
autonomy in creating new programs. 
To address the funding gap resulting from reductions in state financial support, 
institutions may attempt to transfer the cost burden to students and their families but can 
do so only when political and competitive pressures permit.  They may also seek 
innovative ways to increase sources of revenue and/or reduce costs.  A public 
institution’s ability to effect change and manage resources depends on the complex 
interplay of political and economic forces that frame institutional budgeting.  Clark 
(1979) described four areas that must be balanced to effectively coordinate four-year 
public colleges and universities: bureaucratic, professional, political, and the market.  The 
bureaucratic environment consists of the decision-making hierarchy of the individual 
institution within the structure of the state system.  Professional coordination must 
accommodate a diverse faculty and affiliated professional and academic accrediting 
agencies.  The political environment includes local, state, and federal government; special 
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interest groups; the internal political system of institutional governing boards; and 
administrative as well as faculty governance structures.  Market coordination requires 
consideration of the needs and demands of students, consumers of institutional services, 
employers, and competitive providers.  Effective policymaking becomes a matter of 
compromise, and although one of the biggest hurdles facing institutional leaders is the 
need to satisfy multiple stakeholders, the ability of postsecondary institutions to 
strategically manage their organization depends on their legitimate decision-making 
authority – a condition that has evolved over time. 
Background 
The Evolution of Higher Education Governance 
The modern concept of institutional autonomy is rooted in the long-standing 
traditions of academia (Brubacher, 1967).  Tenure, academic freedom, and shared 
governance are all well-entrenched tenets of the academic community (Glenny & 
Dalglish, 1973).  Thelin (2004) described how early colonial governments followed the 
English custom that granted academic charters to colleges with the promise of long term 
financial support in exchange for significant responsibility.  Following the Revolutionary 
War, under the federalist authority of the Constitution, the power to grant academic 
charters became the purview of state governments and although much easier to obtain, 
state charters did not have the funding guarantees of the colonial system.  This 
unpredictable state support led to early reliance on tuition revenue and donations to fund 
operations and more than half of these state institutions failed by the mid-19
th
 Century 
(Thelin, 2004).  Several states granted constitutional autonomy to flagship universities to 
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shield institutions from political intrusion.  However, over time, in most cases these 
powers have been restricted by constitutional provisions or legislation attached to 
appropriations that impose greater public accountability (Chambers, 1968; Glenny & 
Daglish, 1973; Zusman, 1986; McLendon, 2003).  By the late 19th Century there were 
over 300 colleges and universities in the United States.  Although state support was still 
limited, it became more predictable relying primarily on the stability of ad valorem 
property taxes (Chambers, 1968).  With the dynamic growth of the Industrial Revolution, 
businesses and philanthropic organizations increased both financial support and 
organizational expertise and a corporate-like hierarchy soon became the model for 
institutional administration (Thelin, 2004).  Despite this external influence, most public 
colleges and universities remained relatively independent of political interference until 
severe economic conditions led to calls for greater centralization.  By 1932, 11 states had 
organized their higher education systems under a single governing board (Chambers, 
1968). 
During the mid-20th Century, opportunities exploded during higher education’s 
“Golden Age” with federal funding of research programs, creation of student financial 
aid programs, and expansion of the low-cost option of the community college system 
(Carnegie Foundation, 1976, p. iv).  By the 1970s, the growing complexity and 
competition for financial resources, as well as implementation of the federal Higher 
Education Acts, led to state-level coordination of postsecondary education in almost 
every state (McGuinness, 1997).  This centralization of planning and oversight raised 
concerns that institutional autonomy would be threatened and campus autonomy reduced 
(Moos & Rourke, 1959; McConnell, 1962).  In The States and Higher Education, the 
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Carnegie Foundation (1976) challenged the trend of increasing regulatory control 
claiming “states which allowed their public universities the greatest freedom were the 
ones with the strongest universities” (p. 19).  Others reluctantly supported greater 
statewide coordination favoring the establishment of a formal coordinating agency to 
buffer the direct political influence of governors and state legislatures which had become 
increasingly professionalized (Berdahl, 1971; Glenny, 1959). 
State Governance Structures 
Defining and categorizing these state governance arrangements and their 
relationship to public institutions can be arduous given their complexity.  A system’s 
design is influenced by factors unique to each state including its constitution, history, 
political culture, educational traditions, population demographics, geography, and 
economy (Waller, Coble, Scharer, & Giamportone, 2000).  State approaches to 
management of their postsecondary systems vary from a highly regulated environment to 
an open-market system.  Differences exist in governing and coordinating roles, regulatory 
and advisory powers, depth of functional powers, and span of control (Hearn & Griswold, 
1994).  Among a number of classification schemes, McGuinness’ (1997) typology is 
representative of modern state governance structures: consolidated governing boards, 
regulatory coordinating boards, advisory coordinating boards, and planning agencies. 
Governing boards consolidate control to provide both statewide coordination of 
higher education policy as well as management of the operations of institutions under 
their authority.  A state may have a single consolidated governing board for the entire 
postsecondary system or separate boards for public two- and four-year institutions.  
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Responsibilities include development and implementation of policy, advocating for 
institutional needs to legislators, allocating resources among institutions, personnel 
decisions for administrators and faculty, academic program management, and levying 
tuition and fees.  Coordinating boards, the predominant form of organization, may have 
either regulatory or advisory authority.  State-level coordination is decentralized with 
separate institutional or sector governing boards managing the day-to-day operations of 
their respective institutions.  Regulatory authority implies the ability to regulate and 
approve functions, while advisory boards focus more on system-wide planning of state 
needs with authority often limited to reviewing, monitoring, and providing guidance to 
institutional governing boards.  Planning agencies are the least effective form in an 
advisory capacity that relies on voluntary cooperation by state institutions (McGuinness, 
1997). 
Bracco, Richardson, Callan, & Finney (1999) extended McGuinness’ 
classification of the structural system to include a new dimension: the state’s policy 
environment.  Although the needs of the state, institutions, and the market may shift over 
time, the authors contend that the system design and state policy environment must 
remain compatible to balance the often competing interests of academic and public goals.  
Effective coordination of state higher education requires long-term planning, assessment 
of institutional performance, coordination of articulation and transfer between 
institutions, and information-sharing strategies.  Their model describes four strategic state 
roles – regulating, providing resources, consumer advocacy, and steering (p. 29).  As a 
regulator, the state assumes a controlling role in regulating tuition and fees and limits 
institutional discretion in using both financial and operational resources.  In the provider 
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role, the state funds higher education but defers to institutions to develop the means to 
achieve public goals.  As a consumer advocate, the state may provide financial incentives 
directly to students to underwrite their ability to influence institutional behavior through 
market choice.  Finally, in the steering role state policy decisions attempt to motivate 
institutions to act in a manner that will further its public objectives.   
The incorporation of steering mechanisms in state policy appears to be on the 
increase in both the United States and abroad as public institutions negotiate greater 
institutional autonomy in exchange for increased accountability to public needs 
(Jongbloed, 2003; Salmi, 2007).  Jongbloed (2003) attributes this trend to the 
“heterogeneous and unpredictable behavior” of diverse student populations in a 
knowledge-driven economy that has created an environment too complex to be managed 
by regulation (p. 130).  Instead of describing this change as yet another phase of 
decentralization or devolution of powers, Jongbloed speculates that governments are in 
the midst of creating a new paradigm of governance of higher education characterized by 
“a cleverly designed balance of government regulation, price signals, monitoring 
instruments, [and] quality assurance policies” (p. 134).  Burke (2004) describes this 
managed market accountability as “steering rather than rowing” (p. 17). 
Despite the promise of this new paradigm, Berdahl (1997) wrote of a natural 
tension that exists between institutions and the state.  Particularly among public 
universities with their diverse faculty, state demands that institutions be held accountable 
to public interests can be abrasive to ingrained institutional perceptions of academic 
freedom and institutional autonomy (Brubacher, 1967; Burke, 2004).  Berdahl (1997) 
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suggests that some participatory form of governance is required to reconcile competing 
interests.  In an ideal model, the state would respect the academic freedom and procedural 
autonomy of the institution and in turn, institutions would be constructive partners in the 
development of policies and procedures that protect the substantive nature of state 
concerns.  Empowering an effective state level agency would provide that bridge between 
the legislative process and individual institutions, buffering the academy from 
interference in the autonomous nature of their work (Clark, 1979; Berdahl, 1971; Glenny, 
1959).  However, research has been inconclusive in establishing that a state’s governance 
structure can be effective in balancing the often conflicting goals of the institution and the 
state (McLendon, 2003). 
Statement of the Problem 
The battle to balance institutional autonomy and traditional academic values with 
demands for accountability and transparency has increased in recent decades as public 
funding struggles to meet demand (Burke, 2004).  These pressures can result in what the 
Carnegie Foundation (1976) referred to as “guerilla warfare” between state government, 
oversight boards, and public institutions (p. 18).  Caught between state legislators and 
campus leadership, state-level oversight boards struggle to manage a diverse community 
of institutions.  Campuses cite a litany of grievances against state boards as 
“apprehensive of mistakes, consummate rational planners, unreceptive to innovation, 
antithetical to the process of change, distrustful of those capable of innovation, and 
conservative in use of data” (Hines, 1988, p. 2).  Legislatures and governors criticize 
inattention to underserved populations, lack of mission differentiation, program 
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duplication, and failure to address state workforce and economic development concerns.  
Institutions volley back citing inadequate funding, bureaucratic red tape, and intrusive 
state controls that threaten academic freedom and reduce educational effectiveness 
(Volkwein, 1986a; Burke, 2004).   
Despite the reduction and uncertainty in appropriations, many state leaders 
continue to hold public institutions to ever higher levels of performance and 
accountability, while at the same time, limiting increases for in-state undergraduate 
tuition and imposing restrictive line item budgets.  Changes in society, the economy, and 
technology continue to pressure the development of new goals and initiatives, yet 
widespread funding shortfalls and restrictions on raising tuition levels make 
implementation extremely difficult (Burke, 2004).  This unstable funding environment 
has forced public higher education systems to re-examine their structures and statewide 
priorities (Leslie & Berdahl, 2008) and has led public institutions to engage in activities 
that appear to be leading toward reducing dependency on the state.  When state policies 
and competitive pressures permit, there have been substantial increases in family 
contribution to the cost of attendance – a major concern for American families who fear a 
college education may be out of reach (NACUBO, 2002).  To supplement reductions in 
state appropriations, many institutions attempt to increase private giving, develop new 
relationships with corporate partners, and find new entrepreneurial sources of revenue.  In 
addition to reducing their financial reliance on state government, public institutions are 
calling for less regulation to allow them to operate more efficiently and encourage 
innovation to improve educational quality (Shaw, 1998; Volkwein, 1986a; Marcus, 1997; 
Berdahl & MacTaggart, 2000; Carnegie Foundation, 1976).  While these new revenue 
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sources and operating efficiencies may improve their financial coffers, four-year colleges 
and universities in particular may find their own often complex and ambiguous goals 
sandwiched between unfamiliar stakeholder agendas and compelling federal and state 
priorities that focus on affordability, accountability, access, and workforce development.   
The pattern of change in state and institutional relationships in the United States 
and abroad indicates a trend toward decreasing regulatory control in exchange for a 
reduction in public funding and/or an agreement with the state that defines an 
institution’s mission, funding, management authority, as well as its expected educational 
results (Joengblod, 2003; McLendon, 2003).  As the state decreases its regulatory 
authority, the influence of market forces should allow institutions, students, and other 
beneficiaries and consumers of academic services to coordinate demand and supply 
(Bracco et al., 1999; Clark, 1983).  Those in favor of decreased regulation argue that 
increasing institutional independence will provide positive outcomes: support the 
concepts of academic freedom; attract more effective leaders; improve responsiveness to 
student/consumer demands; improve educational quality; improve operating efficiency; 
and reduce tuition through increased competition (Moos & Rourke, 1959; Shaw, 1998; 
McPherson & Winston, 1993; Berdahl & MacTaggert, 2000).  Others acknowledge the 
constructive role of coordinating agencies in resolving inter-institutional conflicts and 
comprehensive planning for enrollment growth (Glenny, 1959; McConnell, 1962; 
Mingle, 1983; Sabloff, 1997).  Critics claim that granting institutional autonomy will 
reduce oversight and undermine the public interest; promote higher tuition levels that 
may reduce access for low-income and minority students; encourage mission creep and 
program duplication as institutions compete for market share; and reduce state procedural 
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controls that prevent abuse of public funds (Berdahl, 1978; Sabloff, 1997; Berdahl & 
MacTaggert, 2000).  Yet this high-stakes debate is primarily anecdotal as there has been 
little research that empirically examines the issue.  According to McLendon (2003): 
Researchers routinely ask what effect state socioeconomic conditions have on 
higher education policy outcomes, but they rarely inquire into the influence of 
state political or governmental attributes [on institutional outcomes].  This 
oversight is unfortunate, for any adequate explanation of governmental behavior 
(i.e., higher education policies adopted) surely must account for the distinct 
governmental context in which that behavior occurs. (p.183) 
The results of this study contributes to an understanding of how granting fiscal 
autonomy to public institutions impacts measures of affordability, operating efficiency, 
and access. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to compare the performance of public institutions 
according to their fiscal autonomy from state governance.  The outcomes of interest – 
affordability, operating efficiency, and access – were measured by institutional 
performance indicators that influence a state’s ability to achieve its public policy goals.  
Explanatory variables were suggested by prior research and Bozeman and Straussman’s 
(1983) factors of resource management to address how institutional outcomes are 
influenced by the fiscal autonomy of public four-year colleges and universities as well as 
other institutional and state characteristics.  
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Research Questions 
1. What is the nature and strength of the relationship between an institution’s 
fiscal autonomy, as well as other institutional and state factors, and the 
affordability of public four-year institutions? 
2. Do public four-year institutions with greater fiscal autonomy have higher 
education and general expenses than those in a more regulated environment? 
How do other institutional and state factors relate to education and general 
spending levels at public four-year institutions? 
3. Does minority student enrollment increase or decrease at public institutions 
with tuition-setting authority? How do other institutional and state factors 
affect minority student access at public four-year institutions? 
Over a seven-year period (2003-2009) institutional performance on three 
indicators were measured by changes in institutional tuition revenue and expenditures 
and student enrollment at public four-year institutions as illustrated in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1: Analytic Framework of Dissertation 
Fiscal autonomy is characterized by an institution’s tuition-setting authority, 
discretion in managing its cash flow, and reliance on state government funding.  Analysis 
includes both descriptive and inferential statistics.  Descriptive trend analyses illustrate 
changes in revenue, expenditures, and student enrollment.  Dependent variables for 
inferential analysis were measured by 1) tuition revenue, net of institutional aid, 2) 
education and general spending, and 3) minority enrollment.  Controlling and intervening 
variables include institutional tuition setting authority, spending authority, reliance on 
state government funding, sector, student enrollment, special status (i.e. flagship, 
Hispanic-serving, Historically Black), state appropriations, spending for student services, 
spending for institutional grants, state higher education governance structure, budget 
cycle, state tax collections, median household income, state education attainment, and 
membership in a regional planning compact.  The primary data sources for this study are 
the Delta Project on Postsecondary Education Costs, Productivity, and Accountability 
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and the State Higher Education Executive Officers’ (SHEEO) State Tuition, Fees, and 
Financial Assistance Policies, 2002-03 and 2005-06 Surveys. 
Significance of the Study 
By the 1980s, higher education entered an era of strategic planning as mid-
century growth gave way to slowing enrollments and state funding restrictions (St. John 
& Parsons, 2004; Zumeta, 2004; Hossler, 2004).  Some states followed federal reform 
initiatives that moved away from the centralization efforts of the post-World War II era 
toward greater deregulation and devolution of authority (Gilley, Fulmer, & 
Reithlingshoefer, 1986; Burke, 2004).  Although studies of decentralization are evident in 
the literature, most have been case examinations of the approaches and decision-making 
process states used to transfer authority to institutions rather than quantifiable results 
(McLendon, 2003); the decision-making process is often the research focus because of 
the difficulty in measuring the complex outcomes of strategic planning (March, 1981; 
Van de ven, 1983).  Two case studies were found that quantified institutional outcomes 
that are relevant to this study following changes in governance arrangements (Berdahl, 
1996; Marcus, Pratt, & Stevens, 1997). 
While no empirical research was found to specifically address the influence of 
fiscal autonomy measured at the institutional level, some have analyzed the influence of 
the state regulatory environment on institutional behavior (Volkwein, 1986a, 1986b, 
1987, 1989; DeGroot, McMahon, & Volkwein, 1991; Volkwein & Malik, 1997; Lowry, 
2001a, 2001b; Knott and Payne, 2004; Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003).  These studies 
have yielded little conclusive evidence of any direct effect of the regulatory climate on 
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institutional or state-level outcomes.  McLendon (2003) points out that conflicting 
findings and large gaps in the research may be due to methodological issues and the 
studies should be replicated using longitudinal data across larger samples of diverse 
institutions.  This analysis was designed to fill that gap in the literature by using 
longitudinal data from academic years 2002-03 through 2008-09 to examine institutional 
outcomes at public four-year colleges and universities.  This comparative inquiry across 
sectors and states may help to describe what relationship, if any, an institution’s 
regulatory climate and other institutional and state factors have on measures of 
affordability, operating efficiency, and access.  With the bleak expectation that future 
state funding for higher education will keep pace with enrollment and costs, the resulting 
data may help inform state and institutional decision-makers as they search for innovative 
ways address funding gaps without sacrificing their public agenda. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Review of the Literature 
 Both empirical research and case study research have examined the effect of state 
control on institutions in a variety of areas.  Unfortunately, while there have been 
multiple studies of the process of deregulation, there has been little research that has 
examined the implications of these changes.  Case literature that describes the process 
that states and institutions used in decision-making and implementation are not included 
in this analysis.  The first section of the review discusses two studies from case literature 
that describe institutional outcomes that occurred after state controls were loosened at 
institutions in Maryland and Delaware.  Empirical studies will follow focusing first on 
general determinants of each outcome, then on the effect of the regulatory environment 
on measures of affordability, operating efficiency, and access. 
Case Literature 
St. Mary’s College, MD 
Berdahl (1996) conducted a case study of St. Mary’s College in Maryland where 
leadership hoped to diversify its revenue stream, improve academic quality, and maintain 
access by increasing operating efficiency and academic effectiveness.  With state budget 
constraints and demographic demands straining resources, St. Mary’s, an honors college, 
was granted charter status by the legislature in 1992 exempting them from state 
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regulatory controls over procurement, personnel, and capital development funded by non-
state sources.  In exchange, St. Mary’s received a lump sum budget and agreed to future 
increases limited only to inflation.  Conversely, the agreement also included a floor in the 
level of funding that would theoretically prevent significant cutbacks in the event of a 
statewide fiscal crisis.  To supplement state funds, the college planned to dramatically 
double tuition in five years while sustaining access for low-income students in a high-
tuition/high-aid approach that committed a portion of tuition revenue and private 
donations to financial aid.  The college would also report annual progress to the 
legislature in a variety of areas including student quality, minority access, and faculty 
quality.   
Through confidential interviews four years after implementation, Berdahl found 
that there was widespread anecdotal approval of outcomes which were supported by a 
1995 report by the Middle States accreditation team.  Although St. Mary’s very powerful 
and politically well-connected Board of Trustees and campus leadership were influential 
in its ability to obtain charter status, most interviewees felt the institution’s new 
independence improved its ability to attract well-qualified lay leadership.   
Financially, lump sum budgeting and relief from state controls allowed campus 
leadership more discretion in allocating resources, a position that allowed them to 
demand greater accountability from academic and business units.  Even though there was 
an agreed-to cap on state appropriations, the college received an 11.2% increase in state 
funding between 1993 and 1997 compared to the average 10.5% increase for institutions 
in the University of Maryland system.  Relief from state procurement constraints allowed 
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the institution to save $2.3 million on a privately-funded campus construction project and 
25% on the purchase of computer systems.  Although St. Mary’s conformed to a state 
policy to suspend salary increases for the first two years of charter status, substantial 
increases followed under a new merit-based performance evaluation system forgoing the 
cost of living adjustments typical of state agencies. 
Faculty members had been supportive of the charter initiative with its plans to 
expand positions and increase salaries and faculty prestige improved with the college’s 
official status as a Public Honors College.  Additional faculty lines were added and by 
1994 student-faculty ratios had declined to 13.6:1 from 16:1 in the late 1980s; diversity 
of both gender and race improved as well as an increase in the number of faculty with 
terminal degrees.  Student quality and minority access continued to improve under St. 
Mary’s new status.  Minority student enrollment and retention increased 19% between 
1991 and 1994.  The average freshman SAT score improved as well, rising to 1,170 in 
1994 from 956 in 1983 (Berdahl, 1996).  A follow-up of results in 1999 found continued 
improvement in incoming freshman SAT scores (1,249 Fall 1996), minority enrollment 
(20%), graduation and retention rates (75%), faculty with terminal degrees (96%) as well 
as private giving (Berdahl & MacTaggart, 2000). 
While Berdahl’s case study revealed short term beneficial results that accrued to 
both the state and the institution, however due to the limitations of case analysis it is 
difficult to determine how much is due to deregulation alone or some other factors.   St. 
Mary’s is a small liberal arts college in a niche market and is organizationally less 
complex when compared to larger comprehensive and research universities.  Also, its 
 24 
success may have been influenced by the college’s strong management team; any 
changes in its powerful lay board or college leadership may affect future results (Berdahl, 
1996). 
State Colleges of New Jersey 
Marcus, Pratt and Stevens (1997) studied the events following the 1986 New 
Jersey legislation that provided nine state colleges with fiscal and operational autonomy 
from state control for specific administrative, financial, and personnel matters.  Their new 
status, with institutional boards of trustees assuming much of the responsibility 
previously held by state agencies, followed a transition process that included state and 
external review as well as approval of management plans, policies, and procedures.  With 
new lump sum appropriations from the state and dependent on the collection of tuition 
and fee revenues, respective boards became responsible for overseeing each institution’s 
budget and accounting system, improving administrative practices, building reserve 
accounts as well as providing annual audited financial statements.  In exchange, funds 
would be maintained by the institution with carry-forward privileges for unexpended 
amounts. 
Review of audited financial statements for the first five years under the new 
statutes revealed that among the nine state colleges there was significant variation in 
revenue and expenditure patterns, although as a group their behavior was not materially 
different from that of the other public institutions.  Although granted the freedom to set 
tuition, institutional boards were restricted by the New Jersey Board of Higher Education 
limitation that tuition levels not exceed 30% of education and general expenditures per 
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student.  During the first five years of autonomy, average annual increases in tuition 
ranged from 7.9% to 13.9% and all nine institutions remained within the 30% policy.  
The average cumulative increase for the nine state colleges over the first five years was 
48.5% which was in the median range for all public institutions in the state.  In 
comparing spending growth at the nine state colleges to other institutions in five major 
categories, student services (31.6%) and academic support (27.4%) were above the 
average for other institutions; instruction (19.6%) and physical plant (20.4%) were on 
average; instructional support (15.6%) was below average.  A 10% increase in personnel 
for the group over the five year period included an average 40% increase in 
administrative personnel to accommodate new responsibilities, 22% for non-faculty 
professionals in academic support and student services positions, and a 2% reduction in 
faculty.  Although the economic downturn between 1989 and 1991 reduced state funding 
by 8.3%, instead of restraining spending and staffing, expenditure increases at these nine 
institutions were funded by tuition growth and reserves.  However, despite this spending 
growth under restrictive economic conditions, overall the researchers found little 
difference in administrative growth between institutions that had more fiscal autonomy 
and others that were highly regulated. 
Empirical Research 
While case studies can provide rich detail, quantitative techniques are more useful 
in examining long term trends across sectors and states.  General determinants of each 
outcome – affordability, operating efficiency, and access – will be discussed first, 
followed by research that examines the effect of the regulatory environment on relevant 
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outcomes.  Researchers have measured the level of state control in a variety of ways: by 
the number and composition of oversight boards (Lowry, 2001; Knott & Payne, 2004; 
Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003), the state’s political climate and professionalism of the 
legislature (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003), as well as by assigning a value based on 
self-reported survey data (Volkwien, 1986a, 1986b, 1989; DeGroot et al., 1991; 
Volkwein & Malik, 1997). 
Affordability 
Rapid increases in the price of college attendance that began in the early 1980s 
have generated an active research agenda to explore the reasons for postsecondary price 
increases.  As illustrated in Figure 2 the average published tuition and fees at four-year 
institutions has risen dramatically in the last three decades.  Adjusting for inflation, the 
average published charge at public institutions grew 329% from $2,137 to $7,020 while 
the average price at private four-year institutions grew 272% from $9,670 in 1981 to 
$26,273 in 2009 (College Board, 2009). 
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Figure 2: Average Published Tuition and Fees at Four-Year Institutions, 1981 to 2009 
(2009 dollars, enrollment-weighted). Adapted from "Trends in College Pricing 2009" 
(Table 4). Retrieved from http://www.trends_collegeboard.com 
 
Coinciding with generous federal spending on student financial aid and an 
explosion of institutional spending in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Secretary of 
Education William Bennett (1987) described higher education as “under-accountable and 
under-productive” (para. 7) suggesting that creative pricing strategies designed to take 
advantage of federal largess and wasteful spending practices were the reasons for 
spiraling tuition.  Since that time, this pattern of rising prices has provoked efforts to 
understand the drivers of tuition increases (St. John & Parsons, 2004; Hauptman, 2001; 
Mumper, 2001).   
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General Determinants of Tuition Pricing 
There is empirical evidence that state funding levels are the primary determinant 
of tuition pricing at public institutions (Hauptman & Merisotis, 1997; Kane, 1994; 
Griswold & Marine, 1997).  Instead of raising taxes, when states face budget shortfalls 
some allow tuition to increase at public institutions, particularly universities (Zemsky, 
2004; Jones, 2001; Rusk & Leslie, 1978; Lowry, 2001a, Koshal & Koshal, 2001).  With 
economic conditions and competing priorities painting a grim forecast for the foreseeable 
future, state policymakers are understandably concerned about the effect that reductions 
in appropriations have on tuition levels and the implications for student access 
(Hauptman, 2001).  State appropriations per student tend to decline during recessionary 
periods and slowly increase with economic recovery (Desrochers et al., 2010).  Levels of 
state funding for public colleges and universities also fluctuate according to other factors: 
the political backlash to governors and legislators when limited resources are allocated to 
higher education instead of other public services; institutional mission; the extent to 
which the institution provides public benefits such as research, extension services, and 
public service (Lowry, 2001a); and the re-emphasis on the private, rather than the public, 
benefits of higher education (St. John & Parsons, 2004).  Interestingly, although research 
has shown that reductions in state government funding will typically cause tuition levels 
to rise, the reverse is less clear.  Universities that hold down the price of attendance 
should not expect an increase in state appropriations to cover any shortfall (Lowry, 
2001a; Koshal & Koshal, 2001).  The long-term effect of fluctuating funding levels on 
tuition is also unclear.  Cuts in state appropriations after the 2001 recession did in fact 
lead to increases in tuition at public institutions.  However, when funding levels were 
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restored, tuition continued to rise at public four-year institutions, although at a much 
slower rate (Desrochers et al., 2010). 
Rusk & Leslie (1978) found that in addition to state appropriations, tuition and 
fees at public universities were influenced by four other factors: 1) regional tuition rates, 
2) the market share of other regional institutions, 3) state per capita income, and 4) the 
level of state-sponsored student aid.  The authors found distinct regional patterns in 
tuition pricing and, in states where students are more likely to enroll in private 
institutions or public community college, the average tuition rate of four-year public 
institutions was likely to be higher.  Although hypothesized as influencing factors, the 
research found little evidence that linked tuition levels to faculty personnel costs or 
institutional quality.   
Koshal & Koshal (2000) confirmed an interdependent relationship between the 
level of state appropriations and tuition at public institutions in 47 states.  While the 
greatest determinant of an institution’s tuition was the level of state appropriations, the 
authors found a variety of socio-economic and political factors were also influential.  
Other factors included geographic region, median family income, and percentage of out-
of-state students enrolled.  Of the eight geographic regions, institutions in the New 
England, Mid-Atlantic, and East North Central regions were most affected by geographic 
influence; West South Central and Mountain regions were least affected.  The level of 
state appropriations to higher education was most influenced by the percentage of 
students enrolled in two-year institutions, per capita state tax revenue, enrollment rates of 
recent high school graduates, and state democratic leadership.  To illustrate the effects of 
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their findings, controlling for other factors across regions, the authors implied that in a 
state where appropriations were 10% higher, tuition levels were 10% lower.  Inversely, in 
a state where tuition was 10% higher, state appropriations were 7.14% lower. 
The Effect of the Regulatory Environment on Affordability 
Although tuition-setting authority for public four-year institutions typically 
resides with one or more actors at the state level – the legislature, governor’s office, 
statewide oversight agency, and system governing boards (Jones, 2001; Badolato, 2008), 
in times of economic stress the trend appears to turn toward increasing the flexibility of 
institutional trustees in setting their own tuition levels to compensate for reduced state 
appropriations (Jones, 2001).  Several have argued against this practice citing that active 
government intervention is necessary to manage affordability concerns to protect the 
public interest (Paulsen, 2001; Winston, 2000; Perna, Steele, Woda, & Hibbert, 2005).  
Bowen (1980) was a vocal critic of the self-serving nature of the academy writing: 
The incentives inherent in the goals of excellence, prestige, and influence are not 
counteracted within the higher educational system by incentives leading to 
parsimony or efficiency…. The duty of setting limits thus falls, by default, upon 
those who provide the money, mostly legislators and students and their families. 
(pp. 19-20) 
Lowry (2001a) hypothesized that tuition rates at public universities would differ 
depending on the political context; net tuition and fees (gross revenue reduced by 
institutional financial aid) would be lower at universities where state oversight is greater 
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and boards of trustees were under greater political influence.  Lowry’s measure of state 
oversight included the type of postsecondary state board as well as the number of 
governing boards in the state; the more governing boards, the more decentralized the 
authority.  Boards of trustees with more members that were popularly elected or 
appointed by elected officials were under greater political influence that those selected by 
the academic community.  In his study of 407 public universities across 47 states, holding 
state appropriations and enrollment constant, Lowry found that public universities in 
states that had more centralized governance and more politically-influenced boards 
charged lower prices than more autonomous universities.  To illustrate these effects, 
Lowry predicted that the average university tuition in a decentralized state would be 
approximately 50% higher than one with more state oversight.  Students could expect a 
37% higher tuition at institutions where half of the trustees are selected by the academic 
community over institutions where all of the trustees had greater political accountability.  
In a slightly larger study Lowry (2001b) combined his governing board measure with the 
autonomy index created by Volkwein & Malik (1997) and found similar results: net 
tuition and fee revenues were higher at institutions with greater fiscal autonomy. 
Knott and Payne (2004) examined the effect of the state regulatory environment 
on research and comprehensive universities from 1987 to 1998.  States were assigned to 
high, moderate, and low regulatory environments based on the presence of a statewide 
consolidated governing or regulatory coordinating board; advisory coordinating board; or 
planning agency, respectively.  Controlling for various state- and institution-level factors 
such as institutional characteristics, undergraduate enrollment, size of faculty, as well as 
variables for the state’s political, economic, and demographic characteristics, researchers 
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examined total revenue, tuition revenue, and state appropriations within the context of the 
state regulatory environment.  Although they found the average level of tuition revenue 
for all institutions was lower in states that were highly-regulated there was no difference 
in total revenue among institutions based on state governance structure.  There was 
significantly lower total revenue at flagship institutions in high- and moderately-regulated 
states than low-regulation states.  Flagship institutions in highly regulated states also 
received significantly fewer research dollars which could explain this finding.  Analysis 
of state appropriations found little difference between regulatory environments.  While 
institutions in low-regulatory environments were likely to fare better overall than 
institutions in highly-regulated states, the researchers found that other state factors 
including political and economic measures were more likely to impact university 
revenue. 
Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003) hypothesized that governance structure will 
affect the state’s total cost of higher education, tuition charges, state and local 
appropriations, and state need-based financial aid per student.  The researchers examined 
time series data for 47 states from 1989 to 1996.  When controlling for other variables, in 
states with coordinating boards the total cost of higher education was 40% lower and 
tuition charges 52% lower than states with consolidated governing boards.  The influence 
of governance structure on state appropriations and financial aid was not significant.  
Other influential factors that decreased total costs and tuition charges included 
professionalism of the legislature and presence of a liberal ideology.  Total costs and 
tuition charges tended to increase in states where the board’s authority was statutory 
versus constitutional and per capita income was higher.  Although the researchers 
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concluded that governance structure does matter, their findings are inconsistent with 
other research that found tuition levels were lower in more restrictive environments 
(Lowry, 2001a, 2001b; Knott & Payne, 2004).  However, values were aggregated at the 
state level and the study did not allow for control by institutional type, therefore, states 
with higher enrollment in low cost options such as community colleges would generally 
reflect lower total costs and tuition charges.  
Operating Efficiency 
Throughout the 1980s much of the speculation on rising tuitions focused on the 
growth in administrative spending (Bennett, 1987; Bergmann, 1991).  During that 
decade, spending for administration at both public and private institutions grew 46% 
nationwide (Leslie & Rhoads, 1995).  Administrative costs, although not consistently 
defined, typically include non-instructional costs for institutional and academic support 
as well as student services.  Education and related spending at public institutions, which 
includes spending on instruction and student services and the instructional share of 
central administration, academic support, and operations and maintenance showed steady 
growth between 1995 and 2005 but at a much slower rate (see Figure 3).  During that 10 
year period, adjusted for inflation, education and related spending at public institutions 
increased 10.6% at doctoral-granting, 9.6% at masters, and 19.21% at baccalaureate 
institutions.  Spending at private institutions rose more dramatically, 51.7%, 36%, and 
38% respectively. 
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Figure 3: Total Education Costs per FTE Public and Private Institutions, 2005 dollars. 
Adapted from "Trends in College Pricing College Board 2009" (Figure 15). Retrieved 
from http://www.trends_collegeboard.com/college_pricing 
 
General Determinants of Operating Costs 
At public institutions, any increase in revenue has been shown to promote cost 
inefficiencies and reducing state appropriations has not been effective in restraining 
spending (Bowen, 1980; Robst, 2001).  State appropriations are primarily allocated to 
instructional costs and, at institutions where appropriations increased there have been 
significant increases in instructional spending (McPherson & Schapiro, 1993b).  With 
states slowing the rate of increase or reducing funding, colleges and universities must 
reduce costs and/or seek additional sources of revenue to supplement an unstable funding 
base.  Since institutions often expand administrative structures to manage new sources of 
revenue (Zemsky, 1990; Leslie & Rhoads, 1995), funding these innovative practices may 
come at the expense of instruction.  For all types of institutions, direct instructional costs 
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declined slightly between 1998 and 2008 while spending increased for academic support, 
administration, and student services (Desrochers et al., 2010).  There are numerous 
theories that attempt to explain why administrative costs in particular have increased. 
Zemsky (1990) described this expansion as the “administrative lattice” (p. 2) 
citing the increased burden of federal and state regulation, micromanagement by state 
boards, and accountability to institutional boards of trustees as institutions add 
administrative capacity to support compliance.  With the increased focus on non-
governmental revenue sources such as private donors, alumni, and private enterprise, new 
administrative offices such as development, communication liaison, and technology 
transfer have also been created to manage these activities (Leslie & Rhoads, 1995).  
Administrative growth has also been credited to changes in faculty incentives which have 
refocused from teaching, mentoring, and curriculum development to research and 
publication (Zemsky, 1990). 
Cost increases may also be due to greater institutional complexity brought on by 
expanding enrollment.  To examine the effect of organizational size and complexity on 
economies of scale, Brinkman and Leslie (1986) reviewed 60 years of research on costs 
at higher education institutions.  Size was measured by the number of students, number of 
student credit hours, or number of degrees.  Institutional mission served as a proxy for 
complexity.  Average costs were expressed in enrollment intervals and aggregated by 
function: educational and general, instruction, administration, operation and maintenance, 
and library.  The review found that at four-year institutions that experienced a 300-400% 
increase in enrollment, the average cost per full-time equivalent student fell in all 
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expenditure categories with the largest reduction in administrative costs.  However, 
institutions in these studies were predominantly private and where economies of scale 
were found, there was no consistency in enrollment interval by type of institution. 
A contributing factor to administrative cost inflation may also lie in who has 
discretion in financial decisions, the familiarity of decision-makers to the needs and 
concerns of subordinate units (Leslie & Rhoads, 1995), and the subordinate unit’s 
contribution to the goals of the institution (Pfeffer & Salanik, 1974).  As organizations 
expand, more attention at the executive level is shifted to administrative matters and 
fewer resources may be allocated to subordinate units as executives become less familiar 
or physically removed from production.  Using this logic, administrative spending has 
increased because institutional administrators who control the budget become more 
accustomed to administrative needs and may tend to favor greater administrative 
spending over the needs of less familiar departments (Leslie & Rhoads, 1995).  This is 
similar to arguments that institutions have made when trying to wrest control of tuition-
setting authority and resource allocation from state agencies citing their inability to 
effectively manage institutional resources from afar (Volkwein, 1986a; Mingle, 1983; 
Berdahl & MacTaggart, 2000). 
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The Effect of the Regulatory Environment on Operating Costs 
Institutional leaders argue that the administrative costs that result from mandated 
state regulations and other external controls could be reduced significantly if relieved of 
regulatory burdens and allowed to manage resources more efficiently (Zemsky, 1990; 
Leslie & Rhoads, 1995).  While research findings have been mixed, it is difficult to 
identify whether this is a reflection of the inconsistency in the measure of autonomy or if 
left to their own devices, institutions will do little to control spending. 
Instead of measuring the regulatory environment based on state governance 
structure, Volkwein (1986a) assigned a campus autonomy score using a combination of 
academic and financial flexibility factors.  The academic flexibility measures were 
derived from the results of a 1982 Carnegie Foundation survey that assessed the effective 
locus of decision-making authority for academic, personnel, and administrative decisions.  
Financial flexibility incorporated measures of state budgeting and control practices based 
on 1982 survey data compiled in a pilot study of 15 public universities in 15 states 
(Volkwein, 1986a).  The final index contained 16 items designed to reflect a campus’ 
authority in managing financial and personnel affairs.  Using this measure and data for 88 
public research universities, Volkwein (1986a, 1989) found that autonomy was not a 
factor in reducing administrative costs, finding little difference between autonomous 
universities and those in a more centralized regulatory environment.  Instead, 
expenditures for administrative and institutional support were positively related to the 
proportion of academic vs. professional degrees awarded, amount of private giving per 
student, and level of employee unionization.  Administrative salaries were most 
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influenced by institutional size and private giving.  Older and larger institutions with 
greater graduate enrollment tended to have greater numbers of academic administrators.   
De Groot, McMahon, & Volkwein (1991) examined the effect of the regulatory 
environment on the cost structures of 147 public and private doctoral granting research 
universities in 49 states.  This study also found that the level of campus autonomy did not 
influence costs.  The study used expenditure data from fiscal year 1983 and institutions 
were classified as lightly, moderately or heavily regulated based on the Volkwein 
measure.  The study could not explain the variations in education and general 
expenditures according to the level of autonomy and public or private control.  However, 
the researchers assumed that the same regulatory level would apply to all public 
institutions within a state and the aggregation of data did not allow for institutional or 
state level comparisons. 
Lowry (2001a) studied the effects of the regulatory environment and the political 
nature of trustee selection on revenue and costs.  At public universities with greater 
autonomy and fewer political appointees, institutional leadership favored raising revenues 
to support spending that Lowry speculated would increase prestige and influence.  
Spending increased in areas that provided direct benefits to university administrators and 
faculty: instruction, student services, academic support, and institutional support.  
However, the suggested self-serving nature of these expenditures would also benefit 
students and may well be driven by student demand.  In states with a single governing 
board (i.e. more regulated), public universities were predicted to spend 7.5% less on 
instruction, 23% less on student services, and 21% less on academic support than public 
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universities with less state oversight.  However, less spending was likely the result of 
lower revenues; in exchange for lower tuition students at these institutions would also 
likely have fewer amenities (Lowry, 2001a). 
Others have credited cost increases to elaborate spending to attract students by 
adding amenities that have little to do with the educational mission (Finn, 1988; Finn & 
Manno, 1996).  Lowry (2001a) found increased spending at autonomous institutions that 
some have referred to as prestige maximization (James, 1990; Bowen, 1980; Winston, 
2000).  Accordingly, there should be a relationship between institutional autonomy and 
academic quality.  Several studies by Volkwein (1986a, 1986b, 1989, 1991; Volkwein & 
Malik, 1997) studied the effect of campus autonomy on measures including faculty 
quality, undergraduate student quality, government grant revenue per FTE student, and 
private giving per FTE student.  The study found little support for claims that institutional 
autonomy in academic and financial matters improved institutional quality.  Instead, the 
level of state appropriations and the size of the campus were more likely to influence 
quality measures.  
Minority Student Access 
In the ten-year period from 1998 to 2008, enrollment in postsecondary institutions 
grew almost 26% to 18.6 million students with the majority of students enrolling in 
public institutions (Desrochers et al., 2010).  Public policies and practices that impact 
tuition pricing have broad implications, particularly for students who are the most price-
sensitive.  As illustrated in Figure 4, while the growth in minority student populations is 
outpacing that of white students, the lag in postsecondary enrollment and completion 
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rates of low-income and minority students at four-year institutions is a compelling 
concern.   
 
Figure 4: Fall Enrollment, All Degree-Granting Institutions 1998-2007 by 
Race/Ethnicity. Adapted from U.S. Department of Education, National Center for 
Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, "Fall Enrollment 
Survey" (IPEDS-EF: 93-99) and Spring 2001 through Spring 2008; and Enrollment in 
Degree-Granting Institutions by Race/Ethnicity Model, 1980-2007. Retrieved from 
http://nces.ed.gov           
 
The particular needs of minorities as well as other low-income populations 
demand the attention of those with tuition-setting and funding authority - state 
policymakers and institutional leaders (Brinkman, 1988; Heller, 1999; Paulsen & St. 
John, 2002).  However, with state budget shortfalls, finding the financial resources to 
address this and other needs is problematic. 
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State Tuition Philosophy 
States formulate tuition policy to expand access and provide equal opportunity 
(Leslie & Brinkman, 1987).  Although many states have no formal doctrine for setting 
tuition levels, Badolato (2008) described the three tuition-setting philosophies that impact 
student access: low-tuition/low-aid, moderate-tuition/moderate-aid, and high-
tuition/high-aid.  States that adopt a low tuition philosophy set levels below the national 
average which effectively subsidizes all students regardless of financial need.  In the 19th 
Century when communities were largely agricultural, this philosophy was instrumental in 
promoting economic growth by providing educational opportunities to the few students 
who completed secondary schooling.  Given today’s level of college attendance, states 
adopting this approach face a daunting task to provide adequate funding to institutions to 
compensate for reduced tuition revenue.  “It would be a major error of public policy to 
implement universal access with primary reliance upon a regressive tax structure.” 
(Carnegie Commission, 1973, p. 102)  At the other extreme, states that adopt a high-
tuition/high-aid policy set published prices close to the actual cost of attendance then 
minimize the financial obstacle by providing assistance to those with the most need.  The 
goal of this approach is to reduce or eliminate tuition costs for low-income families and 
phase out benefits as family incomes rise.  The growth of these high tuition policies may 
have contributed to the upward spiral in the cost of attendance.  
The success of the high tuition model requires the state or institutions provide 
adequate funding for need-based aid which can be problematic during recessionary 
periods (Zumeta, 2004).  In a survey of 25 high-tuition/high-aid states, Lenth (1993) 
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found only 15 had adequately funded state-run financial aid programs undermining their 
ability to provide access to low-income students.  Between 1998 and 2008, state need-
based grant aid grew more than 50% from $3.97 billion to $6.01 billion.  In 2008-09, 
although all 50 states reported state-funded need-based aid programs, two-thirds of the 
total need-based grant aid awarded was provided by only 10 states (NASSGAP, 2009).  
Finding resources to provide institutional aid also presents a dilemma.  Revenue sources 
for institutional aid may include private giving, income from endowments, state 
allocations for student aid, and general revenues (Baum & Lapovsky, 2006).  When 
allocated from discretionary education and general revenues, campus-based aid must 
compete with other institutional priorities.  Between 1980 and 1997, public institutions 
allocated an average 4.3% of their budgets to institutional financial aid (Hossler, 2004).  
Although allocations increased to 5.8% in 2008 and 6.3% in 2009 (SHEEO, 2010), 
institutional reporting practices provide no clear distinction between merit-based and 
need-based programs making it difficult to determine the adequacy of institutional need-
based funding (Baum & Lapovsky, 2006). 
Tuition Discounting 
 The practice of charging different prices to different students has long been used 
to attract students to private institutions. At public colleges and universities, other than 
for athletic ability, strategically granting non-need-based aid to certain students has only 
recently become standard practice.  In the 1992-93 academic year 16% of full-time 
undergraduates at four-year institutions received some type of institutional grant aid.  By 
2003-04, 28% received a tuition discount (Baum & Lapovksy, 2006).  
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In their examination of tuition discounting practices at postsecondary institutions 
over a ten year period (1994-95 through 2004-05), Baum & Lapovksy (2006) found that 
at four-year public institutions, the average tuition discount rate (institutional grant 
aid/gross tuition and fees) rose from 11.7% in 1994-95 to 14.7% in 2004-05, peaking at 
15.4% in 2002-03.   During that same time, the average published tuition and fees at four-
year public institutions rose from $3,925 to $5,439, an increase of 38% (College Board, 
2009).  This suggests that the increase in the discount rate may be due to greater unmet 
need caused by rising tuition prices.   
Baum and Lapovsky also attempted to differentiate between need-based versus 
non-need-based aid.  The authors used the Common Data Set which, for this ten-year 
period, defined need-based aid as any award that satisfied the financial gap between the 
price of attendance and a student’s ability to pay regardless of qualification – athletic, 
academic, or financial circumstances.  This may distort results since all or a portion of the 
merit aid awarded to affluent students who attend expensive schools may be categorized 
as need-based.  The researchers attribute this practice to strategic leveraging of financial 
aid to improve an institution’s academic profile, increase net revenue, or address excess 
capacity issues (Baum & Lapovsky, 2006, p. 3).  Due to reporting changes, for academic 
years 2000-01 to 2004-05 Baum and Lapovsky were able to differentiate between the two 
types of aid and found that during those five years, public flagship institutions distributed 
an average of less than 45% of their institutional aid based on need.  Other public four-
year colleges and universities distributed less than 40%.  Enrollment-weighted averages 
revealed need-based aid increased from 2000-01 to 2004-05 at public institutions with a 
more than seven percentage point increase for flagship institutions and more than eight 
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percentage points for other public four-year institutions.  Although these results may 
appear encouraging in support of state public policy, the authors found that the highest 
discount rates were at four-year public institutions with larger enrollment of out-of-state 
students; they were unable to determine how the grant aid was distributed among in-state 
versus out-of-state students. 
Student Price Response 
Although students are subject to costs in excess of tuition (e.g. room and board, 
commuting expenses, and foregone wages) they are more sensitive to changes in tuition.  
Leslie & Brinkman (1987) asked three questions that get to the heart of the problem: 
“What happens to enrollments when colleges and universities raise their prices? Who, if 
anyone, is sent away? What is the net impact of higher prices and reduced enrollments 
upon institutional financial ledgers?” (p. 181).  Economic demand theory suggests that as 
tuitions rise, enrollment will decrease or shift to lower-price institutions; student financial 
aid awards that reduce net price, will tend to increase enrollment.  Heller (1999) studied 
the effect of net tuition on undergraduate enrollment at public institutions and as 
expected, increases in tuition led to declines in enrollment, particularly at community 
colleges where students appeared to be the most price-sensitive.  Students at four-year 
comprehensive universities were least price-sensitive.   
Implementation of Basic Educational Opportunity Grants in 1972 (later named 
Pell Grants) allowed researchers to study the effects of grant aid on enrollment of low-
income students on a national scale.  Although findings confirmed that overall enrollment 
increased as net tuition decreased, results were inconclusive when stratified by income 
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level.  Literature surveys by Leslie and Brinkman (1987) and McPherson & Schapiro 
(1991) found that in some cases grant aid increased enrollment of low-income students 
while others (Hansen, 1983; Kane, 1994) found little improvement after the program was 
implemented.  McPherson and Schapiro (1993a) argued that studies that measured 
enrollment levels at only two points in time are less effective in detecting differences than 
studies that compare changes in net cost to changes in enrollment over time.  Their study 
found that increases in the net cost had a statistically significant negative effect on 
aggregated enrollment for low-income White students.  However, when their sample was 
limited to public institutions, the results were not significant. 
Linsenmeier, Rosen, & Rouse, (2002) studied enrollment at a northeastern public 
university where a policy change in 1998 replaced the loan component of institutional aid 
with up to $4,000 in grant aid to low-income students.  Overall, the results indicated that 
the new program had little impact on enrollment of low-income students.  The authors 
suggest that the relatively small amount of loan replacement compared to the total 
financial aid package for low-income students may have diluted the effects of the policy 
change.  However, the study did find a significant improvement in minority enrollment 
(10%) during the study period.   
Student price response research that focused on race/ethnicity rather than income 
found that without financial aid, Black and Hispanic students were less likely to enroll in 
college than White students.  Researchers posit that this may be primarily due to 
disadvantaged socioeconomic and academic backgrounds (Jackson, 1990; Heller, 1999; 
Zumeta, 2004; McPherson & Schapiro, 1991) and lowered expectations of future 
 46 
earnings (Linsenmeier et al., 2002).  Jackson (1990) found that Black students (11%) and 
White students (6%) were more likely to enroll with scholarship awards.  Scholarship 
awards had little effect on Hispanic students which may be consistent with cultural 
characteristics of the Hispanic community (Jackson, 1990; Heller, 1999).  Consistently 
Hispanic students have been found to be the most price sensitive, followed by Black, then 
White students suggesting that targeted financial aid policies would improve minority 
participation with Black students more likely to benefit than Hispanic students 
(Linsenmeier et al., 2002; Jackson, 1990; Heller, 1999).  Kane (1994), however, pointed 
out that the effect of dramatic gains in the education level of parents of Black students 
which may contribute to the gap between Black and Hispanic enrollment. 
Summary 
While the general determinants of tuition pricing, operating cost, and minority 
access has been more widely researched, this review of the literature discovered few 
studies that examined the influence of institutional autonomy on the three outcomes.  
Typically, institutional autonomy has been measured at the state level with the state’s 
regulatory or political environment serving as a proxy.  Measures have included the 
number and composition of oversight boards (Lowry, 2001a; Knott & Payne, 2004; 
Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003), the state’s political climate and professionalism of the 
legislature (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003), and an index of academic and financial 
flexibility based on survey data (Volkwein, 1986a, 1986b, 1989; DeGroot et al., 1991; 
Volkwein & Malik, 1997). 
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Studies that investigated the general explanations for tuition increases have 
revealed that the level of state funding is a primary determinant of tuition pricing at 
public institutions (Hauptman & Merisotis, 1997; Kane, 1994; Griswold & Marine, 1997; 
Rusk & Leslie, 1978; Lowry, 2001a; Koshal & Koshal, 2001).  During recessionary 
periods, states moderate budget shortfalls by reducing funding to public institutions, 
preferring tuition increases to tax increases (Zemsky, 2004; Jones, 2001).  Other 
influential determinants include tuition charged by regional competitors, institutional 
market share, state per capita income, level of state-sponsored student aid, and enrollment 
mix (Rusk & Leslie, 1978; Lowry, 2001a; Koshal & Koshal, 2001).  Four studies 
examined the effect of the regulatory environment on tuition charges.  All but one, 
Nicholson-Crotty & Meier (2003), found lower tuition rates at public universities with 
more state oversight (Lowry, 2001a, 2001b; Knott & Payne, 2004). 
There is general agreement that institutional spending has climbed, led by 
increases in academic support, administration, and student services (Desrochers et al., 
2010).  These increases in administrative and non-instructional costs have been attributed 
to the growth in administrative structures to support compliance (Leslie & Rhoads, 1995), 
changes that have shifted faculty work from academic administration to research and 
publication (Zemsky, 1990), and the budget allocation preferences of administrative 
decision makers (Leslie & Rhoads, 1995).  Research that examined the effect of the 
regulatory environment on the cost structures of public research universities found no 
evidence to link institutional autonomy to either administrative costs or education and 
general spending levels (Volkwein, 1986a, 1989; DeGroot et al., 1991).  Others have 
speculated that institutions with greater autonomy will support spending that contributes 
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to institutional prestige and influence (Bowen, 1980; Finn, 1988; James, 1990; Winston, 
2000; Lowry, 2001a).  However, efforts to link institutional autonomy to improvements 
in academic quality have failed.  Instead, the level of state appropriations and the size of 
the campus were more likely to influence quality measures (Volkwein, 1986b, 1987, 
1989; Volkwein & Malik, 1997). 
With reductions in state appropriations contributing to rising tuition levels, there 
are serious implications to access and success for the most price-sensitive students – low-
income and minority populations.  With the future growth in demand expected from this 
demographic, state policymakers and institutional leaders must consider the unique needs 
of this student population when framing tuition policies and practices.  Based on 
institutional reporting practices, it is difficult to clearly segregate need-based from non-
need-based aid as well as identify the distribution of grant aid among in-state and out-of-
state students (Baum & Lapovsky, 2006).  At the national level, research that studied the 
effect of federal grant aid on enrollment rates found inconsistencies in describing 
enrollment behaviors based on race/ethnicity and income (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987; 
McPherson & Schapiro, 1991; Hansen, 1983; Kane, 1994).  McPherson & Schapiro 
(1993a) attributed this inconsistency to methods that failed to systematically relate 
changes in net cost to changes in enrollment.  Additionally, findings for studies that focus 
on minority enrollment have implications for low-income populations since they typically 
have a larger percentage of minority students than other higher income groups (Paulsen 
& St. John, 2002).  Research that controlled for socioeconomic and academic 
background, found that Black students, followed by White students, are more likely than 
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Hispanic students to benefit from targeted financial aid that reduces the net cost of 
attendance (Jackson, 1990; Heller, 1999; Linsenmeier et al., 2002).  
While there is considerable research that has studied the general determinants of 
tuition pricing, institutional spending, and student response to rising prices, review of the 
literature found that, for other than tuition pricing, few studies were able to establish a 
link between the regulatory environment and institutional outcomes.  With no shortage of 
opinion and speculation on the pros and cons of institutional autonomy, more research is 
needed to provide empirical evidence to inform the debate.  As suggested by McLendon 
(2003) and McPherson & Schapiro (1993a), the design of this seven-year longitudinal 
study incorporated institutional- and state-level data to address deficiencies in 
methodology that fail to account for changes over time across sectors and states. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology 
Johnson (1995) suggested “a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics 
of resource dependence among organizations is to be found in examining multiple 
resources and relationships at both the organizational set and organizational network 
levels” (p. 15).  Accordingly, this study used multilevel analysis to examine institutional 
and state level data to address each of the following research questions concerning the 
issues of affordability, operating efficiency, and access. 
1. What is the nature and strength of the relationship between an institution’s 
fiscal autonomy, as well as other institutional and state factors, and tuition 
levels at public four-year institutions? 
2. Do public four-year institutions with greater fiscal autonomy have higher 
education and general expenses than those in a more regulated environment? 
How do other institutional and state factors relate to education and general 
spending levels at public four-year institutions? 
3. Does minority student enrollment increase or decrease at public institutions 
with tuition-setting authority? How do other institutional and state factors 
relate to minority student access at public four-year institutions? 
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The public higher education enterprise is a natural hierarchical structure that is a 
“complex, variegated, multilevel phenomenon” (Benson, 1975, p. 229).  Institutions are 
grouped within sectors, which are nested within states, which in turn are influenced by 
regional factors.  Characteristics at each level of the hierarchy may influence outcomes at 
higher or lower levels.  For example, public policy goals are unique to the history, 
traditions, population demographics, and economy of each state.  Institutions within a 
state are likely to influence each other and institutional outcomes are likely to vary by 
state.  The same could be said for the relationships of institutions within sectors and 
regions.  This hierarchical structure often creates within-group interdependence that 
violates an important assumption of traditional analytical techniques (Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992).  Discounting this hierarchical nature when conducting social science 
research invites "potentially serious misrepresentations" (Paterson & Goldstein, 1991, p. 
378).  To compensate for the diversity and hierarchical structure of public four-year 
colleges and universities, this study used multilevel modeling techniques (Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992).  These techniques allow the complex, interrelated factors of 
institutional and state level data to be incorporated to better understand how each 
contributes to measures of affordability, operating efficiency, and access.   
Paterson & Goldstein (1991) discussed the advantages to using multilevel 
analysis.  In the highly complex environment of postsecondary education, frequently used 
statistical techniques, such as ordinary multiple regression, aggregate data at the macro 
(i.e. national or state) level and do not allow differences to be preserved at the micro (i.e. 
sector or institutional) level.  Aggregation of data distances the outcome from the causal 
effect and group means are used to explain relationships between dependent and 
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independent variables.  This aggregation of data, particularly at the national level, is 
problematic given the variation in state systems.  As illustrated in Figure 5, for academic 
year 2008-09, while the mean net tuition among four-year public institutions at the 
national level was $6,062, there was about a $10,000 range among the states.  Traditional 
regression analysis based on national or even state averages forces generalizations that 
fail to take into account the distinct differences in states’ economic, demographic, and 
political environments as well as a state’s investment across institutional sectors.  
Multilevel modeling preserves differences at each level making regression 
relationships more evident.  Each level in the hierarchical structure is represented by its 
own sub-model to clearly explain how and where effects occur.  Each sub-model can 
illustrate the relationship among the variables at that level as well as how the variables 
influence relationships at other levels (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992).  In addition to 
explaining vertical relationships, the influence of horizontal power which Salanik & 
Pfeffer (1974) describe as the “influence among co-acting peers to obtain benefits for 
themselves” (p. 453) may also be revealed. 
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Figure 5:  Mean Net Tuition 2008-09 for Four-Year Public Institutions by State 
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Population 
The population of interest was four-year public colleges and universities in the 
fifty states; institutions in the District of Columbia and the American territories were 
excluded.  Two-year colleges, technical, and trade schools as well as single discipline 
institutions such as military and merchant marine academies were also eliminated from 
consideration.  These institutions have significant funding differences and are less 
complex.  In addition, their more focused missions allow them to respond better to the 
needs of their markets than four-year colleges and universities (Salmi, 2007).  The 
analysis included the remaining public four-year institutions for which data was available 
across academic years 2003-2009 (N=458).  Institutions were categorized based on their 
2005 Carnegie classification of degree-granting activities during academic year 2003-04.  
Primary Data Sources 
This study utilized institutional data provided primarily by two sources: the Delta 
Project on Postsecondary Education Costs, Productivity, and Accountability located in 
Washington, D.C. and the State Higher Education Executive Officers located in Boulder, 
CO. 
The Delta Cost Project is an independent, non-profit organization whose mission 
is to help improve cost management within higher education and document trends in 
college spending.  With support from the Lumina Foundation for Education, the 
organization has translated technical accounting information from the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) into spending and 
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revenues by full-time equivalent student, adjusted for inflation by the Consumer Price 
Index in 2009 dollars.  This longitudinal revenue and spending database allows 
examination of changes in institutional behavior over time across sectors and states.  
IPEDS is a system of interrelated surveys conducted annually by the U.S. Department of 
Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) that gathers information 
from every college, university, and technical and vocational institution that participates in 
federal student financial aid programs.  The Delta Cost Project database includes over 
500 IPEDS variables reported by more than 6,000 institutions over a 22-year period from 
1987-2009.  Data include institutional characteristics, institutional finances, enrollment, 
student financial aid, completions, and staffing. 
State Higher Education Executive Officers is a non-profit, nationwide member 
organization of the executive officers of statewide higher education boards.  The 
association assists members and state agencies in the pursuit of excellence in their higher 
education systems.  SHEEO projects are supported by member dues, the National Center 
for Education Statistics, and grants from the Ford Foundation, Lumina Foundation for 
Education, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, and 
TIAA-CREF.  The SHEEO Triennial Surveys of State Tuition, Fee, and Financial 
Assistance Policies elicit information on state-level policies and procedures governing 
public college and university tuition, fees, and student financial assistance.  These 
surveys have been administered periodically since 1988 to state higher education 
agencies and consist of questions to discern state philosophies and policies that drive 
decision making.  Responses from the State Higher Education Executive Officers State 
Tuition and Fees Surveys for 2002-03 (Rasmussen, 2003) and 2005-06 (Boatman & 
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L’Orange, 2006) were examined to identify institutional and state-level authority to 
establish tuition and fee levels for undergraduate students as well as the entity in control 
of tuition revenue
1
.   
Variables of Interest 
Bozeman and Straussman (1983) suggest that resource mix, resource flexibility, 
resource predictability, locus of resource control, and control of external demand are all 
factors that influence an organization’s ability to achieve stable growth, decision-making 
autonomy, and control.  These factors as well as prior research and the objectives of this 
study guided the selection of variables of interest.  All dollar values were CPI-adjusted to 
2009 and expressed per full-time equivalent student unless noted otherwise.   
Dependent Variables 
Framed by the purpose of this study – to examine the relationship of institutional 
fiscal autonomy and institutional outcomes that impact public policy goals – the 
dependent variables of interest were extracted for each year from 2003 to 2009 from the 
Delta Cost Project IPEDS database. 
Net Tuition: Tuition pricing was measured by receipts of tuition and fees, net of 
institutional grants, per full-time equivalent student.  Net tuition was selected as the 
outcome variable of interest instead of gross tuition because of the increase in the practice 
of tuition discounting among public institutions. 
                                                 
1
 See Appendix Tables A1 and B1 for a compilation of survey responses used in this study. 
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Education and General Expense: Operating costs were measured by education 
and general spending per full-time equivalent student. 
  Minority Access: Access was expressed as the percent of enrollment of under-
represented minority populations. Institutions classified as Historically Black colleges 
and universities (HBCU) and Hispanic-speaking (HSI) institutions typically have very 
high enrollment of minority populations and were removed from analysis for this model.  
The ratio of minority enrollment was calculated by dividing the sum of total enrollment 
of Black, Hispanic, and American Indian students by total institutional enrollment.  For 
the purposes of this study, Asians are not considered an under-represented minority 
population.  According to the U.S. 2000 Census, 44% of the Asian population had at least 
a bachelor’s degree compared to 24% of the total U.S. population. 
Explanatory Variables 
Independent, explanatory variables at the institutional level were also drawn 
primarily from the Delta Cost Project IPEDS database as well as the SHEEO tuition 
survey responses.  Three institutional level categorical variables were considered time-
invariant.   The special institution status identifies flagship, historically Black college or 
university, or Hispanic-serving institutions.  Tuition-setting authority and revenue 
control, although expected to be stable over time, may vary in some cases if a policy 
change occurred during the study period.  The SHEEO survey responses from 2005/2006 
were used to identify those states or institutions where changes occurred.  Other 
institutional variables are time-varying - degree of government reliance or “publicness” 
(Bozeman & Straussman, 2003), enrollment, revenue, and spending.   
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Tuition Authority: This classification variable represents the entity – institution (or 
institutional board of trustees), individual system governing board, statewide agency, or 
governor/legislature – with primary authority to establish undergraduate tuition and fee 
levels as well as the degree of influence at the institution level.  Responses for three 
SHEEO survey questions were the primary focus: 
 Question 4a: Describe the role of each of the following individuals or entities in 
establishing tuition rates and/or policies in your state (advisory/consultative role, 
decision making authority, no role, etc.): Governor; Legislature; state 
coordinating/governing board(s); individual system governing board(s); local 
district governing board(s) (two year only); individual institutions; other. 
 Question 4b: Which of the entities [in Q4a] has primary authority for establishing 
tuition? 
 Question 4c: If institutions have primary [or some] authority what is the nature of 
their authority? 
In the 2002-03 survey, 145 institutions or institutional boards of trustees were 
identified as having primary authority.  Despite this authority, a state-level entity – a 
system or statewide agency or board or the state legislature - often exerts influence in the 
tuition-setting process by issuing specific guidelines or restrictions.   For those 
institutions identified as having primary authority, three sub-classifications were created 
to specify the reported degree of control – within very strict guidelines, within moderate 
or limited guidelines, and with no external restrictions.  The resulting segmentation by 
tuition-setting authority included six levels – Full Control institutions (N=47), Moderate 
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Control institutions (N=81), Strict Control institutions (N=17), Individual System 
Governing Board institutions (N=140), Statewide Agency institutions (N=110), and 
Governor/Legislature institutions (N=64).  Four states did not respond to the 2002-03 
survey – California, Michigan, Montana, and Oregon.  For these four states, state higher 
education and legislature websites were examined and the appropriate tuition-setting 
authority was included in the dataset.  See Appendix Table A1.  Responses to the 2005-
06 survey were also examined to identify inconsistencies or discrepancies between the 
two surveys.  Where discrepancies existed, in addition to comments and responses to 
additional SHEEO survey questions, other sources, such as the Southern Regional 
Education Board (SREB) and Education Commission of the States (ECS), were 
investigated to identify the appropriate the tuition authority.  
Resource Control: Responses to a single question from the SHEEO survey 
determined whether tuition revenue was controlled at the institution or state level.   
 Q6:  Indicate which of the following tuition revenue appropriation policies are in 
place in your state:  
a. Tuition revenues are controlled and retained by an institution or campus; 
b. Tuition revenues are deposited into separate, institutionally designated 
state tuition accounts from which all funds must be appropriated prior to 
expenditure; 
c. Tuition is appropriated and is a direct offset of the state general revenue 
appropriation; 
d. Tuition revenues are retained at the state level but under the direct control 
of a state governing or coordinating board; 
e. Tuition revenues are deposited into state general funds, with their return to 
higher education only inferred; 
f. Other.   
 60 
Although multiple response levels were provided in the survey, this study was 
only concerned about where tuition revenue was retained and constructively controlled, 
either the institution or state level.  Accordingly, responses were recorded in an 
institutional-level dichotomous variable where any control at the state level was coded 
“S” and where revenue is retained and controlled at the institution level, responses were 
coded “I”. 
Sector: A three-level classification variable represents the broad institutional 
mission as derived by Delta Cost Project from the Carnegie 2005 classification.  This 
classification is based on institutional activities in the academic year ending 2003. 
 Universities = Research/Doctoral institutions 
 Masters = Master's institutions 
 Bachelors = Bachelor's institutions 
Special Institution Status: A classification variable that identifies three unique 
types of institutions. 
 Flagship = May be either the oldest campus in a public higher education 
system or one of the larger and better-known campuses 
 HBCU = Historically Black college or university 
 HSI = Hispanic-serving institution 
 None = Institution is not recognized as one of the three aforementioned 
categories 
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Publicness: The degree to which the institution relies on state and local 
government funding which is typically allocated to education and general expenses.  The 
ratio was calculated by dividing state and local appropriations per FTE by total revenue 
per FTE excluding income from auxiliary, hospital, and other independent operations.  
Total revenue includes the sum of tuition; federal, state, and local appropriations; grants 
and contracts; affiliated entities; private gifts, grants, and contracts; investment return; 
and endowment earnings.  
Institutional Size: Total fall full-time equivalent student enrollment  
In-State Enrollment: Percentage of fall enrollment for full-time, first-time 
degree/certificate-seeking undergraduates who are legal residents of the state 
Out-of-State Enrollment: Percentage of fall enrollment for full-time, first-time 
degree/certificate-seeking undergraduates who are not legal residents of the state 
Gross Tuition: Gross tuition and fee revenue per FTE student including student 
aid applied to tuition and fees 
Appropriations: State and local appropriations per FTE student 
E&G Spending: Education and general spending per FTE student. 
Institutional Grant: Spending for institutional grants per FTE student. 
Student Services: Spending for student services per FTE student.  This expense 
category includes admissions, registrar activities, and activities designed to contribute to 
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students’ emotional and physical well-being and to their intellectual, cultural, and social 
development outside the context of the formal instructional program.  Examples include 
student activities, cultural events, student newspapers, intramural athletics, student 
organizations, supplemental instruction outside the normal administration, and student 
records.  Intercollegiate athletics and student health services that are not auxiliary 
enterprises may also be included. 
Not all institution-level explanatory variables were included in all three models.  
A one year lag in education and general expense was included as an independent variable 
in the model for net tuition since growth in spending has long been posited a major driver 
of tuition increases (Bennett, 1987; Bergmann, 1991).  The enrollment of in-state and 
out-of-state students are unique to the net tuition model since enrollment mix was 
suggested as an influential factor in tuition pricing (Koshal & Koshal, 2000).  In addition 
to education and general expense, student services spending and institutional grant aid 
were added to the minority enrollment model to examine if there is a relationship 
between current spending in those specific areas and the level of minority student 
enrollment.  The allocation of institutional variables among each of the models is 
illustrated in Figure 6.  All state-level variables were included in all three models. 
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Explanatory Variables Dependent Variables 
Institution Level Variables Net Tuition E&G Expense 
Minority 
Enrollment 
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Figure 6: Allocation of Institution-Level Explanatory Variables by Model 
At the state level, time-invariant variables included higher education governance 
structure, postsecondary regional planning agency, existence of a prepaid tuition plan 
during the study period, and budget cycle.  State level economic data was downloaded 
from the U.S. Census Bureau website for each year and included state tax collections, 
median household income, and education attainment.  All values were CPI-adjusted to 
2009 dollars.  Assuming that tuition decisions would be based on prior year economic 
data, one year lagged values for state tax collections and household income were retained 
for analysis. 
Governance Structure: Each state’s postsecondary education governance structure 
was recorded from data provided by the Education Commission of the States (2011a; 
2011b).  States were classified as having either a governing board, coordinating board, or 
planning agency.  Governing board states have significant academic program and 
budgetary authority over institutions within their purview.  States with more than one 
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governing board are typically organized as sector- or system-level boards.  Coordinating 
boards may have either regulatory or advisory authority over postsecondary institutions.  
Planning agencies serve in an advisory role and have little or no authority in the budget 
process or academic program approval (McGuinness, 2002). 
Region: Classification variable representing state membership in a regional 
planning compact (Delta Project, 2010) 
 MHEC: Midwestern Higher Education Compact 
 NEBHE: New England Board of Higher Education 
 SREB: Southern Regional Education Board 
 WICHE: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education 
 None: No affiliation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Education Attainment: Percent of population, age 25 and over, with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau 
Budget Cycle: Classification variable that identifies the state budget cycle, annual 
or biennial, as reported by the National Conference of State Legislators (Snell, 2010) 
Household Income: Median household income as reported by the U.S. Census 
Bureau 
 State Tax Collections: Taxes collected per capita at the state level as reported by 
the U.S. Census Bureau.  Property tax, income tax, and sales tax were collected for each 
year from 2002 to 2009, expressed per $1,000 and CPI-adjusted to 2009.   
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 Property Tax = Taxes assessed on ownership of property as measured by its 
value 
 Sales Tax = Taxes based on volume or value of transfers of goods or services 
or upon gross receipts 
 Income Tax = Taxes on individuals and corporations measured by net income 
or imposed on special types of income (e.g., interest, dividends, income from 
intangibles, etc.) 
Prepaid Tuition Plan: This dichotomous variable represents the existence of a 
state-sponsored prepaid tuition plan.  The primary data source for this variable is the 
College Savings Plans Network, an affiliate of the National Association of State 
Treasurers (http://www.collegesavings.org). 
The Multilevel Model for Change 
An institutional growth model was constructed for each of the three dependent 
variables at two levels: within-institution and between institutions and states.  Multilevel 
model fitting is an iterative process and may include both fixed and random effects.  
Following the recommendations of Singer and Willett (2003), an unconditional means 
model was fit initially to estimate the variance components.  Using the institution as unit 
of analysis, fitting each model without covariates allowed the amount of systemic 
variation in each outcome to be assessed.  In these unconditional models, the intercept is 
the grand mean of the outcome variable across all academic years for all institutions in 
the population. The component residuals represent the amount of deviation from the 
mean that is related to the variation within institutions as well as the differences between 
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institutions and states.  Some of this variation can be captured by including independent 
variables in the Level-1 and Level-2 sub-models to identify the amount of variance 
explained by institutional and state characteristics. 
Level-1 Sub-model for Within Institution Change 
The next iteration introduces the effects of time to create an unconditional growth 
model.  For each response variable, net tuition, education and general expense, and 
minority enrollment, the Level 1 sub-model represents the institutional growth trajectory 
over the seven-year period without any institution- or state-level characteristics that may 
be related to changes over time.  
Y = [Initial Status + Rate of Change + Residuals]  
The intercept, or the initial value of the outcome, and the slope, or the rate of 
change, define the institutional growth trajectory.  The residuals represent the variance 
from the change trajectory, not the grand mean as in the unconditional means model. 
Level-2 Sub-model for Change between Institutions 
The Level 2 sub-models represent the relationship between the institutional 
growth trajectory and characteristics of the institutions and states.  As conditions are 
added to the model, the starting point for the dependent variable is estimated.  The term 
associated with each independent variable estimates the magnitude and direction of any 
correlation to the outcome. 
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Net Tuition =   
[Intercept + β10(Academic Year) + β20(Tuition Authority) + β30(Resource Control) 
+ β40(Special Institution) + β50(Sector) + β60(Publicness) + β70(Size) + β80(In-
State) + β90(Out-of-State) + β100(Appropriations) + β110(E&G Expense Lag) + 
β120(Governance Structure) + β130 (Region) + β140(Budget Cycle) + 
β150(Household Income) + β160(Property Tax) + β170(Sales Tax) + β180(Income 
Tax) + β190(Prepaid Plan) + β200(Education Attainment)]; 
E&G Expense =   
[Intercept + β10(Academic Year) + β20(Tuition Authority) + β30(Resource Control) 
+ β40(Special Institution) + β50(Sector) + β60(Publicness) + β70(Size) + β80(Gross 
Tuition) + β90(Appropriations) + β100(Governance Structure) + β110 (Region) + 
β120(Budget Cycle) + β130(Household Income) + β140(Property Tax) + β150(Sales 
Tax) + β160(Income Tax) + β170(Prepaid Plan) + β180(Education Attainment)]; 
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Minority Enrollment = 
 [Intercept + β10(Academic Year) + β20(Tuition Authority) + β30(Resource 
Control) + β40(Special Institution) + β50(Sector) + β60(Publicness) + β70(Size) + 
β80(Gross Tuition) + β90(Appropriations) +  β100 (E&G Expense) + β110(Student 
Services) + β120(Institutional Grants) + β130(Governance Structure) + β140 (Region) 
+ β150(Budget Cycle) + β160(Household Income) + β170(Property Tax) + β180(Sales 
Tax) + β190(Income Tax) + β200(Prepaid Plan) + β210(Education Attainment)] 
Data Preparation 
The foundation dataset of institutional variables was downloaded from the Delta 
Project on Postsecondary Education Costs website
2
 in MS Excel format and imported 
into SAS 9.2 for analysis.  The data were filtered to include only the population of 
interest: four-year public colleges and universities in the fifty states according to the 2005 
Carnegie classification.  This classification was selected because it is based on the 
institution’s degree-granting activities during academic year 2003-04.  Several 
institutions were excluded including those in the District of Columbia and the American 
territories as well as tribal colleges, technical and trade schools, and single discipline 
institutions, such as military and maritime academies.  In addition, institutions where 
changes in tuition-setting authority occurred during the study period were removed from 
the dataset in five states: Indiana, Kentucky, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Texas.  
Institutions in two more states, Colorado and Alaska, were also removed from the dataset.  
                                                 
2
 http://www.deltacostproject.org 
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In Colorado, with passage of the Colorado Opportunity Fund Act in 2004, direct state 
appropriations to institutions were replaced with undergraduate student stipends in the 
form of tuition vouchers and “fee-for-services” contracts for additional services such as 
graduate and professional school support.  With this unique funding arrangement, 
Colorado was eliminated from the dataset
3
.  Alaska was also eliminated because the 
University of Alaska, its sole institution, includes both two-and four-year campuses 
including trade and technical schools which are not within the scope of this study.  The 
resulting study population consisted of 395 four-year public institutions including 76 
bachelor’s institutions, 191 master’s institutions, and 128 universities.  See Table 1 for a 
complete listing of the number of institutions by sector and state. 
                                                 
3
  CRS §23-18-101-23-18-208 http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/sl2004a/sl_215.htm 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Institutions by Sector and State 
State Bachelors Masters Universities Total 
Alabama 1 9 4 14 
Arkansas 3 5 2 10 
Arizona 0 2 3 5 
California 2 19 9 30 
Connecticut 1 4 1 6 
Delaware 0 1 1 2 
Florida 1 2 8 11 
Georgia 3 13 4 20 
Hawaii 2 0 1 3 
Iowa 0 1 2 3 
Idaho 1 1 2 4 
Illinois 0 6 4 10 
Kansas 0 4 3 7 
Louisiana 1 9 3 13 
Massachusetts 1 6 1 8 
Maryland 1 8 3 12 
Maine 0 0 1 1 
Michigan 1 7 7 15 
Minnesota 2 8 1 11 
Missouri 3 6 1 10 
Mississippi 0 4 4 8 
Montana 3 1 2 6 
North Carolina 3 6 6 15 
North Dakota 3 0 2 5 
Nebraska 2 2 1 5 
New Hampshire 0 0 1 1 
Nevada 2 0 2 4 
New York 8 13 5 26 
Ohio 2 1 10 13 
Oklahoma 5 6 2 13 
Oregon 1 3 3 7 
Pennsylvania 1 14 4 19 
Rhode Island 0 1 1 2 
South Carolina 4 4 3 11 
South Dakota 3 0 2 5 
Tennessee 0 3 4 7 
Utah 2 2 2 6 
Virginia 3 6 6 15 
Vermont 1 0 1 2 
Washington 0 4 2 6 
Wisconsin 2 9 2 13 
West Virginia 8 1 1 10 
Wyoming 0 0 1 1 
Grand Total 76 191 128 395 
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Variables were extracted from the Delta Cost Project database for each academic 
year 2002-03 to 2008-09 by IPEDS identification number.  Data included institution 
name; state; special institution status (flagship, Hispanic-speaking, Historically Black 
college or university); membership in regional planning compact; institutional size 
measured by count of full-time equivalent students (FTE); total enrollment for Black, 
Hispanic, and American Indian students; total enrollment for all students; total revenue 
without auxiliary income; published tuition and fees; tuition and fee revenue net of 
institutional grants; education and general expenses; state and local appropriations; 
student services expenses; institutional grant aid; percent of fall enrollment for first-time, 
full-time undergraduate in-state students and percent of fall enrollment for first-time, full-
time undergraduate out-of-state students.  All dollar values were expressed per full-time 
equivalent student and adjusted to the 2009 Consumer Price Index.  
Following initial review of the data, single-year observations were removed for 
six institutions.  Four observations were considered suspect due to invalid values for the 
response variable and at two institutions, their first year of operation in academic year 
2002-03 resulted in extreme outliers.  
Profile of Outcome Measures 
To visualize whether tuition authority and/or time have an observable influence 
on net tuition, education and general expenses, and minority enrollment, a profile plot 
was constructed for each outcome variable across time, grouped by tuition authority.  
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Net Tuition: Examination of the profile plot illustrated in Figure 7 reveals that, in 
2003, the average net tuition per FTE clearly differs among four of the six categories of 
tuition authority.  At institutions with primary control, particularly Full or Strict Control 
institutions, the average net tuition was the highest over the study period.  For the first 
three years, there appears to be little difference in the average net tuition at Moderate 
Control or Individual System Board institutions, although the trajectory digressed at 
academic year 2005-06.  At Individual System Board institutions, the trajectory appeared 
to flatten in the last four years of the study period. Except for Full Control and Individual 
System Board institutions, there does not appear to be any remarkable difference in the 
direction or rate of change in average net tuition throughout the seven year period.  At 
institutions with primary control of tuition levels, the average net tuition is the highest 
across all seven years. 
 
Figure 7: Historical Net Tuition per FTE by Tuition Authority 2003-2009 
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Education and General Expense:  As illustrated in Figure 8, there appears to be a 
wide range in average education and general expenses among the six classifications of 
tuition authority in the first year.  For Moderate Control, Individual System Board, and 
Statewide Agency institutions, initial values for education and general spending fell 
within a narrow range.  Full Control and Strict Control institutions had the highest 
average E&G expenses while institutions where the Governor/Legislature has tuition-
setting authority appeared to have the lowest average E&G spending across all years.  
Except for the Governor/Legislature group, expenses rose modestly over the study 
period.  At Full Control or Strict Control institutions, expense levels appeared to decline 
from 2004 to 2007 before returning to, then surpassing previous levels of spending.  In 
the Governor/Legislature group, expense levels were fairly flat during the first four years 
before accelerating during the last three years of the study.  
 
 
Figure 8: Historical E&G Expense per FTE by Tuition Authority 2003-2009 
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Minority Enrollment: Examination of the profile plot for minority enrollment in 
Figure 9 reveals that, excluding HBCU and HSI, at institutions where the 
Governor/Legislature has tuition-setting authority, the average percent of minority 
enrollment is significantly higher than the other five classifications.  There is little 
observable difference in the average percent of minority enrollment at Full Control and 
Moderate Control institutions.  There does not appear to be a remarkable difference in the 
rate of change over the seven year period among any of the six groups. 
 
 
Figure 9: Historical Minority Enrollment by Tuition Authority 2003-2009 
(Excludes HBCU & HSI institutions) 
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authority.  Average net tuition and education and general expense appear to be among the 
highest of the six groups at Full Control and Strict Control institutions while Moderate 
Control institutions tend to behave similarly to Statewide Agency and Individual System 
Board institutions.  However, these visualizations do not explain whether these outcomes 
are related to tuition-setting authority or some other institution- or state-level factor. 
Data Analysis Plan 
This study followed a four-stage data analysis plan (Diggle, 1988; Wolfinger, 1993; 
Littel, Milliken et al, 2000). 
1. Examine the data for compliance with statistical assumptions, transform 
variables as necessary, and specify the mean model; 
2. Select the appropriate covariance structure based on informal visual analysis and 
formal statistical techniques; 
3. Iteratively compare models using maximum likelihood (ML) to re-estimate the 
parameters and re-specify the model; 
4. Fit the final model using restricted maximum likelihood (REML). Conduct 
influence analysis to assess the impact of observations on the overall analysis 
and refit as necessary. 
Initially, the data was evaluated for compliance with statistical assumptions of 
univariate and multivariate analysis: independence of measured variables, normality of 
outcome measures, linearity, and homogeneity of covariance matrices.   
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Evaluation of Statistical Assumptions 
 Collinearity occurs when two independent variables are correlated, indicating 
redundancy in the model.  Highly correlated independent variables can bias estimates of 
standard errors which influence the size of the associated regression coefficient and 
probability statistics.  Distortion of these statistics may result in inaccurate interpretation 
of the strength and direction of the relationship of an individual independent variable to 
the dependent variable.  In Table 2, examination of the correlation of independent 
variables revealed some collinearity among both institutional and state level variables.  
At the institutional level, correlation between E&G expense and appropriations and 
institutional grants were 0.70 and 0.51, respectively.  Correlation between in-state and 
out-of-state enrollment was -0.79.  At the state level, the correlation between household 
income and education attainment was considered high at 0.84 and a decision was made to 
remove household income from the model.  Correlation among the tax collections 
variables were moderate, ranging from 0.52 to 0.70.  Although the effect of any shared 
variance on the accuracy of estimates may be mitigated by the size of the final study 
population (N=395), caution should be exercised in interpreting their relationship to the 
outcome variables (Mason & Perreault, 1991).
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Table 2 
Correlation Coefficients for Independent Variables 
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Appropriations 1.00              
E&G Expense 0.70 1.00             
E&G Expense (lag) 0.70 0.98 1.00            
Institutional Grant 0.25 0.51 0.50 1.00           
Student Services 0.20 0.26 0.26 0.20 1.00          
Publicness 0.29 -0.35 -0.25 -0.32 -0.08 1.00         
HH Income 0.09 0.11 0.10 -0.03 0.23 -0.01 1.00        
Property Tax  0.09 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.28 1.00       
Sales Tax 0.28 0.14 0.11 -0.06 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.65 1.00      
Income Tax 0.25 0.11 0.12 -0.12 0.19 0.22 0.33 0.57 0.70 1.00     
In State Enrollment -0.04 -0.16 -0.13 -0.29 -0.12 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.35 0.31 1.00    
Out of State Enrollment 0.05 0.23 0.22 0.38 0.18 -0.31 -0.02 -0.21 -0.38 -0.34 -0.79 1.00   
Institutional Size 0.18 0.37 0.37 0.19 -0.07 -0.26 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.14 0.04 -0.02 1.00  
Education Attainment 0.15 0.10 0.10 -0.08 0.19 0.05 0.84 0.14 0.27 0.38 0.07 -0.07 0.08 1.00 
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Normality: Univariate descriptive statistics for outcome variables by sector and 
academic year are displayed below in Tables 3 through 5.  The distribution of the 
minority enrollment outcome variable excludes Historically Black colleges and 
universities (HBCU) and Hispanic-speaking institutions (HSI) which typically have very 
high enrollment of minority populations.  Skewness and kurtosis values by sector and 
year suggested the distribution of the outcome measures may violate assumptions of 
normality.  
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics Net Tuition per FTE 
Sector Year N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Bachelors 2003 74       3,873        3,669        1,661  1.44 3.34 
 2004 76       4,297        3,869        1,823  1.16 1.72 
 2005 76       4,523        4,280        1,885  1.12 1.87 
 2006 76       4,634        4,382        1,946  1.30 2.31 
 2007 76       4,780        4,396        1,946  1.40 2.75 
 2008 76       4,918        4,618        1,975  1.37 2.70 
 2009 76       5,084        4,695        2,016  1.57 3.30 
Masters 2003 190       4,521        4,206        1,609  2.53 14.43 
 2004 190       5,013        4,750        1,637  1.93 8.34 
 2005 191       5,232        5,124        1,646  1.66 7.15 
 2006 190       5,348        5,113        1,655  1.74 6.43 
 2007 191       5,421        5,144        1,596  1.43 3.68 
 2008 189       5,481        5,206        1,674  1.67 5.35 
 2009 189       5,699        5,382        1,733  1.55 3.98 
Universities 2003 128       6,088        5,535        2,271  1.43 2.94 
 2004 128       6,686        6,260        2,348  1.30 2.29 
 2005 128       7,048        6,554        2,447  1.09 1.63 
 2006 128       7,234        6,765        2,519  1.12 1.54 
 2007 128       7,428        7,094        2,640  1.13 1.49 
 2008 128       7,558        7,140        2,731  1.09 1.31 
 2009 128       7,941        7,393        2,827  1.11 1.29 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics E&G Expense per FTE 
Sector Year N Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Bachelors 2003 74      13,820       12,789         5,058  1.48 2.83 
 2004 76      13,790       12,632         5,233  1.79 4.73 
 2005 76      13,849       12,943         4,884  1.16 1.27 
 2006 76      14,216       13,001         4,891  1.19 1.41 
 2007 76      14,561       13,253         4,844  1.19 1.35 
 2008 76      15,065       14,024         4,881  1.18 1.71 
 2009 76      14,889       13,542         4,869  1.43 2.68 
Masters 2003 191      13,819       13,248         3,320  1.27 2.33 
 2004 191      13,706       13,091         3,335  1.40 2.82 
 2005 191      13,701       13,196         3,078  0.98 0.84 
 2006 190      13,844       13,360         3,153  1.20 1.62 
 2007 191      14,217       13,617         3,181  1.12 1.41 
 2008 189      14,647       13,966         3,192  1.22 2.02 
 2009 189      14,635       13,982         3,165  1.28 2.01 
Universities 2003 128      25,365       22,585       11,472  1.49 2.09 
 2004 128      25,586       22,691       11,565  1.54 2.69 
 2005 128      25,918       23,152       11,534  1.35 1.64 
 2006 128      26,139       23,655       11,600  1.32 1.61 
 2007 128      26,866       24,102       11,731  1.32 1.73 
 2008 128      27,649       25,022       12,863  1.93 5.81 
 2009 128      27,967       24,999       13,225  1.87 5.02 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics Minority Enrollment, excluding HBCU & HSI Institutions 
Sector Year N Means Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Bachelors 2003 65 11.46 7.87 9.68 1.69 3.06 
 2004 67 12.08 8.82 9.89 1.72 3.50 
 2005 67 12.57 9.73 10.16 1.73 3.58 
 2006 67 13.05 9.68 10.51 1.84 4.10 
 2007 67 13.71 10.85 10.86 1.79 3.87 
 2008 67 13.87 11.61 10.76 1.88 4.60 
 2009 67 14.14 11.87 10.68 1.82 4.49 
Masters 2003 160 13.46 9.19 11.70 2.33 9.36 
 2004 160 13.79 9.31 11.88 2.24 8.45 
 2005 160 14.27 9.96 12.18 2.17 7.71 
 2006 160 14.67 10.33 12.24 2.12 7.35 
 2007 160 14.95 10.37 12.19 2.07 6.88 
 2008 160 15.29 11.07 12.20 2.10 7.22 
 2009 158 15.58 11.28 12.34 2.06 6.81 
Universities 2003 121 12.32 10.71 7.08 0.85 0.26 
 2004 121 12.51 11.16 7.22 0.90 0.48 
 2005 121 12.73 11.36 7.33 0.96 0.70 
 2006 121 12.97 11.58 7.33 0.93 0.64 
 2007 121 13.15 11.74 7.31 0.92 0.61 
 2008 121 13.37 11.60 7.31 0.92 0.63 
 2009 121 13.67 11.77 7.39 0.94 0.64 
 
For the population of institutions over this seven year period, skewness and 
kurtosis values for the outcome measures were consistently non-normal: net tuition 
(skew=1.45; kurt=3.24), education and general expense (skew=2.51; kurt=8.69), and 
minority enrollment (skew=2.09; kurt=7.93).  Examination of histograms and normal 
probability plots provided visual evidence of non-normality.  Natural log transformation 
of the outcome measures was carried out to induce normality to meet the statistical 
assumption.  Skewness and kurtosis values and probability plots for the natural log of 
each outcome variable were examined.  Transforming the raw values to their natural log 
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resulted in significant improvement for net tuition (skew=0.08; kurt=0.39) and minority 
enrollment (skew=-0.04; kurt=-0.39) and moderate improvement for E&G expense 
(skew=0.97; kurt=0.94).  See Tables 6 through 8 for univariate descriptive statistics for 
the transformed measures by sector and year. 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics LN Net Tuition (in log units) 
Sector Year N Means Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Bachelors 2003 74 8.18 8.21 0.40 0.23 -0.28 
 2004 76 8.28 8.26 0.41 0.08 -0.25 
 2005 76 8.34 8.36 0.41 -0.05 -0.10 
 2006 76 8.36 8.39 0.40 0.04 0.24 
 2007 76 8.40 8.39 0.38 0.12 0.38 
 2008 76 8.43 8.44 0.38 0.03 0.42 
 2009 76 8.47 8.45 0.36 0.27 0.54 
Masters 2003 190 8.37 8.34 0.31 0.42 1.10 
 2004 190 8.47 8.47 0.30 0.35 0.68 
 2005 191 8.52 8.54 0.30 0.00 1.17 
 2006 190 8.54 8.54 0.28 0.34 0.75 
 2007 191 8.56 8.55 0.27 0.34 0.48 
 2008 189 8.57 8.56 0.28 0.40 0.74 
 2009 189 8.61 8.59 0.28 0.40 0.70 
Universities 2003 128 8.65 8.62 0.35 0.19 0.48 
 2004 128 8.75 8.74 0.33 0.26 0.18 
 2005 128 8.80 8.79 0.34 -0.05 0.64 
 2006 128 8.83 8.82 0.33 0.23 -0.26 
 2007 128 8.86 8.87 0.34 0.23 -0.28 
 2008 128 8.87 8.87 0.34 0.21 -0.36 
 2009 128 8.92 8.91 0.34 0.25 -0.34 
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics LN E&G Expense (in log units) 
Sector Year N Means Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Bachelors 2003 74 9.48 9.46 0.33 0.51 0.07 
 2004 76 9.47 9.44 0.34 0.56 0.48 
 2005 76 9.48 9.47 0.33 0.30 -0.10 
 2006 76 9.51 9.47 0.32 0.42 -0.27 
 2007 76 9.54 9.49 0.31 0.42 -0.14 
 2008 76 9.57 9.55 0.30 0.34 -0.08 
 2009 76 9.56 9.51 0.30 0.55 0.13 
Masters 2003 191 9.51 9.49 0.22 0.47 0.57 
 2004 191 9.50 9.48 0.22 0.56 0.73 
 2005 191 9.50 9.49 0.21 0.40 0.03 
 2006 190 9.51 9.50 0.21 0.54 0.38 
 2007 191 9.54 9.52 0.21 0.50 0.19 
 2008 189 9.57 9.54 0.20 0.56 0.34 
 2009 189 9.57 9.55 0.20 0.67 0.39 
Universities 2003 128 10.06 10.03 0.40 0.48 -0.09 
 2004 128 10.06 10.03 0.41 0.40 0.03 
 2005 128 10.08 10.05 0.41 0.35 -0.14 
 2006 128 10.09 10.07 0.41 0.31 -0.18 
 2007 128 10.12 10.09 0.40 0.31 -0.21 
 2008 128 10.14 10.13 0.41 0.50 0.17 
 2009 128 10.15 10.13 0.41 0.56 0.09 
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Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics LN Minority Enrollment (in log units) excluding HBCU & HSI 
Institutions 
Sector Year N Means Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Bachelors 2003 65 2.13 2.06 0.80 0.10 -0.61 
 2004 67 2.20 2.18 0.78 0.05 -0.55 
 2005 67 2.25 2.28 0.76 0.07 -0.45 
 2006 67 2.30 2.27 0.74 0.13 -0.46 
 2007 67 2.35 2.38 0.74 0.09 -0.45 
 2008 67 2.37 2.45 0.73 0.04 -0.44 
 2009 67 2.40 2.47 0.71 0.05 -0.58 
Masters 2003 160 2.28 2.22 0.81 0.00 -0.48 
 2004 160 2.31 2.23 0.80 0.03 -0.47 
 2005 160 2.36 2.30 0.78 0.12 -0.56 
 2006 160 2.39 2.34 0.77 0.11 -0.55 
 2007 160 2.43 2.34 0.75 0.12 -0.53 
 2008 160 2.46 2.40 0.73 0.11 -0.51 
 2009 158 2.48 2.42 0.72 0.12 -0.47 
Universities 2003 121 2.33 2.37 0.62 -0.37 -0.41 
 2004 121 2.35 2.41 0.62 -0.32 -0.50 
 2005 121 2.37 2.43 0.61 -0.27 -0.56 
 2006 121 2.40 2.45 0.60 -0.33 -0.47 
 2007 121 2.42 2.46 0.59 -0.33 -0.41 
 2008 121 2.44 2.45 0.58 -0.32 -0.39 
 2009 121 2.47 2.47 0.56 -0.28 -0.38 
 
Linearity: Regression analysis of repeated measures data assumes that the change 
trajectories of subjects are linear.  To examine the trajectories, a residual probability plot 
for each transformed outcome variable was constructed.  The residual is the difference 
between the observed value and its corresponding estimated value.  To account for the 
unequal variance of residuals that often occurs with repeated measures data, studentized 
residuals were examined.   A studentized residual is scaled by an estimate of its standard 
deviation (Schabenberger, 2004).  Visual analysis of each plot suggested a nonlinear 
trajectory.  Although nonlinear modeling methods can be employed, “analysis is often 
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clearer if you fit a linear model to transformed variables instead of a nonlinear model to 
raw variables” (Singer and Willett, 2003, p. 76).   
Following analysis of influence and set deletion diagnostics, three models of 
increasing polynomial complexity were fit to identify the highest order polynomial 
required to summarize the population trajectory of each transformed outcome variable.  
Goodness-of-fit statistics were evaluated by comparing the corrected Akaike (AICC) and 
Baysian (BIC) Information Criteria for each model and fit statistics for each outcome 
variable are summarized in Tables 9 through 11.  For the natural log of net tuition, 
although the quadratic trajectory was a slightly better fit, there was little gain over the 
linear form.  For the natural log of education and general expense, the linear trajectory 
was the best fit and for the natural log of minority enrollment, the fit statistics indicated 
that the cubic trajectory was the highest order polynomial required to fit the model.  
Ultimately however, for each outcome variable, time was treated categorically to capture 
the variation related to each year of the time period under study.  For complex 
trajectories, identifying the specific years during which changes in trajectory occurred 
may provide additional information and opportunities for future research. 
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Table 9 
 Polynomial Model Comparison LN Net Tuition (in log units) 
Effect Linear Change    Quadratic Change Cubic Change 
Intercept 8.6736*** 8.6438*** 8.5444*** 
Year  0.0317*** 0.0468*** 0.1319*** 
Year2   -0.0017*** -0.0255*** 
Year3   0.0019*** 
    
Fit Statistics:    
-2 Res Log Likelihood -5119.2 -5116.6 -5155.2 
AIC -5063.2 -5060.6 -5099.2 
AICC -5062.6 -5060.0 -5098.6 
BIC -4952.0 -4949.4    -4988.0 
***p<.001 
 
Table 10 
Polynomial Model Comparison LN E&G Expense (in log units) 
Effect Linear Change    Quadratic Change Cubic Change 
Intercept 9.3113*** 9.3240*** 9.3100*** 
Year  0.0027 * -0.0170*** 0.0053  ns 
Year2   0.0024*** -0.0042  ** 
Year3   0.0005*** 
    
Fit Statistics:    
-2 Res Log Likelihood -6729.0 -6760.1 -6752.8 
AIC -6673.0 -6704.1 -6696.8 
AICC -6672.4 -6703.5 -6696.2 
BIC -6561.5 -6592.7    -6585.4 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 
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Table 11 
 Polynomial Model Comparison LN Minority Enrollment (in log units) 
Effect Linear Change Quadratic Change Cubic Change 
Intercept 2.1008*** 2.1042*** 2.1119*** 
Year  0.0321*** 0.0364***                0.0254 * 
Year2   -0.0005  ns    0.0026  ns 
Year3          -0.0003  ns 
    
Fit Statistics:    
-2 Res Log Likelihood -4123.8 -4111.5    -4098.1 
AIC -4067.8 -4055.5 -4042.1 
AICC -4067.1 -4054.8  -4041.4 
BIC -3959.9 -3947.6        -3934.2        
***p<.0001; *p<.05 
 
Selection of Covariance Model   
In growth curve analysis, repeated measures of the outcome variable for the same 
subject are recorded over a period of time.  As such, measurements taken from the same 
subject are more likely to be similar than measurements taken from different subjects.  In 
addition, measurements from a single subject at adjacent points in time are likely to be 
more closely correlated than measurements taken farther apart.  This correlation of 
observations and the likelihood of unequal covariance over time often violate the 
independence and homogeneity of variance assumptions.  Selection of an appropriate 
covariance structure can accommodate these conditions that frequently occur in repeated 
measure analysis (Littell, Milliken et al, 2006). Attempting to fit a model to an 
inappropriate structure could result in increased Type 1 error rate and underestimated 
standard errors.   
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To specify the appropriate covariance model for each outcome variable an 
unstructured covariance matrix, both within- and between-institutions, was estimated 
using restricted maximum likelihood (REML).  This method takes into account the 
degrees of freedom for the fixed effects to produce less biased estimates for the variance 
components.  The repeated measures factor, year, was treated as a classification variable 
(Littell, Pendergast, & Natarajan, 2000).  In addition to an unstructured model, three 
covariance structures were considered appropriate for repeated measures to accommodate 
within- and between-subject correlation:  first-order autoregressive, Toeplitz, and 
compound symmetric.  Variance, covariance, and correlation estimates for each 
covariance structure were then compared to those of the unstructured model.  Both visual 
analysis and statistical information criteria were used to evaluate competing models.  
Net Tuition: Examination of the unstructured covariance matrix revealed that the 
variance estimates were relatively constant, ranging from 0.036 to 0.043 with covariance 
estimates decreasing over time.  Visual examination of the covariance plot supported 
these observations.  Examination of the correlation matrices and plots revealed a similar 
trend of decreasing correlation as the number of years between pairs of observations 
increased, suggesting within-subject correlation as expected in repeated measures 
models.  As seen in Table 12, the matrices of the three competing models revealed that, 
when compared to the unstructured model, the autoregressive and Toeplitz models had 
similar declining correlation patterns.  The compound symmetric model, a univariate 
approach, was rejected as inappropriate.  This structure models the variation between 
subjects assuming equal covariance and correlation over time.   
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Table 12 
REML Variance, Covariance, and Correlation Estimates for LN Net Tuition 
Structure  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 
Unstructured Var / Covar 0.043 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.026 
 Correlation 1.0 0.879 0.814 0.752 0.732 0.695 0.667 
         
Autoregressive (1) Var / Covar 0.038 0.035 0.032 0.030 0.027 0.025 0.023 
 Correlation 1.0 0.917 0.846 0.778 0.716 0.658 0.605 
         
Toeplitz Var / Covar 0.038 0.035 0.032 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.025 
 Correlation 1.0 0.918 0.859 0.800 0.743 0.701 0.658 
         
Compound Symmetric Var / Covar 0.034 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 
 Correlation 1.0 0.812 0.812 0.812 0.812 0.812 0.812 
        
Fit Statistics      AICC    BIC      
Unstructured -5094.3 -4983.8      
Autoregressive (1) -4956.7 -4948.7      
Toeplitz -4968.1 -4940.4      
 
Fit statistics and residual plots were compared for the unstructured, Toeplitz, and 
autoregressive models.  For the natural log of net tuition, both the Toeplitz and 
autoregressive covariance structures appeared to be suitable.  The autoregressive 
structure was selected to account for the within-subject correlation without an excessive 
number of covariance parameters (Littell, Milliken et al, 2006). 
Education and General Expense: Examination of the unstructured covariance 
matrix revealed a pattern similar to that of net tuition.  The estimates of variance were 
relatively equal, ranging from 0.020 to 0.026.  The covariance estimates generally 
decreased over time with a pattern less consistent across time than that of net tuition.  
Visual examination of the covariance plot displayed that at distance 0, the variances 
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among the observations fell within a narrow range followed by a decline in covariance 
over time.   Examination of the correlation matrices and plots revealed a similar trend of 
decreasing correlation as the number of years between pairs of observations increased, 
suggesting within-subject correlation similar to the net tuition model.  As shown in Table 
13, compared to the unstructured model, the autoregressive and Toeplitz models had 
similar declining correlation patterns.  According to the information criteria, the 
autoregressive structure appeared to be the most appropriate fit for the E&G expense 
model.  
Table 13 
REML Variance, Covariance, and Correlation Estimates for LN E&G Expense 
Structure  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 
Unstructured Var / Covar 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.016 0.018 
 Correlation 1.0 0.907 0.897 0.867 0.806 0.766 0.761 
         
Autoregressive (1) Var / Covar 0.022 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.013 
 Correlation 1.0 0.912 0.831 0.758 0.691 0.630 0.574 
         
Toeplitz Var / Covar 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 
 Correlation 1.0 0.915 0.874 0.842 0.809 0.786 0.750 
         
Compound Symmetric Var / Covar 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
 Correlation 1.0 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 
         
Fit Statistics AICC BIC       
Unstructured -6685.3 -6574.5       
Autoregressive (1) -6537.3 -6529.3       
Toeplitz -6647.0 -6619.2       
 
Minority Enrollment: Examination of the unstructured covariance plot and matrix 
revealed a flatter trend over time.  At distance 0, the variances among the observations 
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fell within a range of 0.28 to 0.35 with a decline in covariance over time.   Examination 
of the correlation matrices and plots revealed relatively equal within-subject correlation 
values.  As shown in Table 14, comparison of the matrices of the four competing models 
revealed that the unstructured model appeared to be best fit. 
Table 14 
REML Variance, Covariance, and Correlation Estimates for LN minority enrollment 
Structure  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 
Unstructured Var / Covar 0.350 0.344 0.334 0.324 0.313 0.304 0.294 
 Correlation 1.0 0.993 0.981 0.972 0.959 0.946 0.937 
         
Autoregressive (1) Var / Covar 0.314 0.312 0.309 0.306 0.303 0.301 0.298 
 Correlation 1.0 0.991 0.982 0.974 0.965 0.957 0.948 
         
Toeplitz Var / Covar 0.312 0.309 0.306 0.302 0.298 0.294 0.290 
 Correlation 1.0 0.991 0.981 0.968 0.955 0.941 0.929 
         
Compound Symmetric Var / Covar 0.332 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.324 
 Correlation 1.0 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975 
        
Fit Statistics AICC BIC      
Unstructured -4022.9 -3915.7      
Autoregressive (1) -3976.8 -3969.1      
Toeplitz -3999.5 -3972.6      
  
Following selection of the appropriate covariance structure for each outcome, 
multilevel analysis was conducted separately for each of the dependent variables to 
address the three research questions.  Beginning with a saturated model, model fitting for 
each outcome was conducted in a sequential deletion process using maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimation; restricted maximum likelihood (REML) cannot be used to compare 
models with different fixed effect specifications.   The effect of each factor on the initial 
value was tested and insignificant parameters were removed until all remaining p-values 
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were significant at 0.10 or less.  Interactions were then introduced in a sequential manner 
to further explain variation suggested by visual evidence.  The goodness-of-fit statistics 
were compared for all iterations with final model selection for each outcome based on 
lowest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) as well as the intra-class correlation 
coefficient (ICC).  The ICC is the proportion of total variance related to between-
institution and -state factors included in the model and a high percentage of variance 
between subjects provides additional support for the selection of multilevel modeling as 
an appropriate research method.  
With selection of the most appropriate fit, the resulting models were re-estimated 
using REML and influence and set deletion diagnostics were again examined with the 
intention to “develop a model that fits the data, not develop a set of data that fits a 
particular model” (Littel, Milliken et al, 2006, p. 414).  Influence and set deletion 
diagnostics are useful to assess the importance of sets of observations on fixed effects 
and/or covariance parameters.  Using this analysis, informed decisions can be made to 
remove invalid or outlying observations and/or change the model to improve precision.  
As evidenced by Cook’s D, where institutions were influential in both the fixed effects 
solution as well as the covariance parameter estimates, the data were examined for 
validity.  Since this study employed a significant portion of the population of interest and 
the primary purpose of this analysis was to explain relationships between the independent 
and outcome variables, outliers that appeared to be valid based on the institution’s range 
of values over the study period were retained in the dataset.  One institution was removed 
from the dataset in its entirety where values for dependent variables were missing for 
multiple years.  Where observations were deleted or corrected, the model was re-
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specified and re-estimated.  The values describing selection of the covariance structure in 
Tables 12 through 14 represent that of the final model for each outcome variable.  The 
findings for the final models for each outcome variable are described in Chapter Four.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to inform the debate about the relationship of 
institutional autonomy to institutional measures that impact state public policy goals.  
During the last decade, unstable public funding for higher education has raised valid 
concerns about states’ willingness or ability to fund institutional operating costs and meet 
the high demand for enrollment.  While some states contemplate devolving tuition-setting 
and spending authority to institutional boards of trustees, critics argue that without state-
level oversight, institutional spending and tuition levels will rise even higher, pricing a 
college education out of reach for the most price sensitive (Berdahl, 1978; Sabloff, 1997; 
Berdahl & MacTaggert, 2000).  Although there is no shortage of rhetoric, there has been 
little empirical evidence to either support or counter these claims.  For other than tuition 
pricing, few studies have been able to establish a link between the regulatory or political 
environment and institutional outcomes.  However, institutional autonomy has typically 
been measured at the state level with the state’s regulatory or political environment 
serving as a proxy and many studies have failed to account for changes across sectors and 
over time.  To accommodate the distinct differences in states’ economic, demographic, 
and political environments as well as a state’s investment across institutional sectors, this 
longitudinal study incorporated seven years of institutional- and state-level data.  
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Multilevel modeling techniques (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) were used to examine the 
relationship of these complex, interrelated factors to the state public policy goals of 
affordability, operating efficiency, and access.  
Summary of Data Analysis Plan 
Separate analyses were conducted for each of the three outcome variables 
following the four-stage data analysis plan outlined in Chapter Three (Diggle, 1988; 
Wolfinger, 1993; Littel, Milliken et al, 2000).  Data were examined for compliance with 
statistical assumptions and the outcome measures were transformed to natural log units to 
improve linearity.  Model fitting for the natural log of each outcome variable was 
conducted in an iterative process using the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method 
to facilitate comparison.  In order to achieve a balance between complexity and accuracy, 
model selection was based on comparison of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) as 
well as the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) for all iterations.  The model with the 
best fit was then re-estimated using the restricted maximum likelihood (REML) method 
of estimation.  The findings for each outcome are discussed separately. 
Research Question 1: Affordability 
What is the nature and strength of the relationship between an institution’s fiscal 
autonomy, as well as other institutional and state factors, and tuition levels at public 
four-year institutions? 
During the model-fitting process for the net tuition outcome, there was little 
change in the intra-class correlation coefficient, approximately 0.96.  This indicated that 
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the proportion of variance in net tuition per FTE explained by the factors included in the 
model did not materially improve throughout the iterative process.  Although four 
variables were discarded during model fitting, resource control (p=0.284); education and 
general expenses (p=0.628); institutional size (p=0.962); and the existence of a prepaid 
plan (p=0.132), the fully parameterized model was selected as the best fit to explain the 
observed data.  Interaction effects were then explored based on visual examination of 
profile plots as well as review of F-statistics, keeping in mind the primary focus of the 
study.  Ultimately, five interactions, year*tuition authority, sector*tuition authority, 
publicness*tuition authority, appropriations*tuition authority, and region*tuition 
authority were added to create the final interpretive model.  The model fit statistics are 
included in Table B1 in the Appendix.  
One of the advantages of using multilevel modeling techniques is that it facilitates 
a greater understanding of the relationship of factors at different levels of analysis to the 
outcome.  In the first step in this multilevel analysis of net tuition, as illustrated in Table 
15, the unconditional means model revealed the amount of variance related to the various 
components in the model.  Most of the variation was between states (48.9%), followed by 
the between-institutions component (41.2%).  The variation related to changes over time 
was almost 5%.  Net tuition was measured per full-time equivalent student (FTE) and 
expressed in 2009 constant dollars. 
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Table 15  
Unconditional Means Model Net Tuition (in log units) 
  Estimate % of Variance 
Intercept              8.5978    
Within Institutions              0.0074  4.84% 
Between Institutions              0.0629  41.17% 
Between States              0.0747  48.91% 
Residual              0.0078  5.08% 
 
The next step, the Level-1 growth model, added time as a predictor to represent 
the average rate of change in net tuition over the seven-year period, unconditioned by 
either institutional- or state-level factors.  
Net Tuition = [Intercept + β01(Year) + Residual] 
Examination of the Level-1 unconditional estimates in Table 16 reveal that the 
intercept, or initial value for net tuition per FTE, was $4,539 (i.e., exp*8.4204).  On 
average, net tuition grew more than 30% over the seven academic year period from 2002-
03 to 2008-09.  Without other predictors in the model, the trend appeared to be non-linear 
with more than 30% of the overall growth occurring the first year (11%) and more than 
50% during the first two years (16%). 
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Table 16 
Level-1 Unconditional Growth Model LN Net Tuition (in log units) 
Effect Level Estimate SD DF t p 
Intercept     8.4204 0.0187 446 450.21 < .0001 
Year 2009 0.26250 0.0093 851 28.11 < .0001 
Year 2008 0.21950 0.0086 894 25.53 < .0001 
Year 2007 0.20410 0.0078 970 26.29 < .0001 
Year 2006 0.17980 0.0068 1128 26.37 < .0001 
Year 2005 0.15530 0.0057 1529 27.29 < .0001 
Year 2004 0.10480 0.0042 2314 24.75 < .0001 
Year 2003 0.00000     
       
Covariance Parameter Subject Estimate SD Z p  
Variance Unitid 0.13750 0.0093 14.85 < .0001   
AR(1) Unitid 0.97900 0.0019 519.53 < .0001  
Residual   0.00061 0.0002 3.60 < .0001   
 
In Level-2, the addition of institutional-level variables to the model expanded the 
unconditional growth model to include factors thought to explain the amount of 
variability around the intercept and slope that is related to between-institution 
characteristics.  
Net Tuition =  
[Intercept + β01(Year) + β10(Tuition Authority) + β20(Sector) + β30(Special 
Institution) + β40(Resource Control) + β50(Appropriations) + β60(E&G Expense) + 
β70(Publicness) + β80(In-State) + β90(Out-of-State) + β100(Size) + Residual] 
With the inclusion of institutional variables in the model, the intercept was 
estimated at $6,245, with all predictors set to zero.   This value represents the average net 
tuition per FTE in 2003 at an average university with no special status where tuition is 
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controlled by the Governor/Legislature.  For the overall population, the average first year 
growth rate was 7.7% and net tuition per FTE grew an average 22.9% over the seven year 
period.  Log unit estimates of the remaining factors and covariates represent deviation 
from the intercept, controlling for other factors.  For each categorical factor, the last level 
listed is the reference level for that factor.   
In this Level-2 sub-model, detailed in Table 17, examination of p-values for the 
other five levels of tuition authority indicate that, with other factors held constant, the 
estimated starting value for net tuition for each category of tuition authority were 
significantly different from that of  Governor/Legislature institutions.  There was a 
considerable range of differences in conditional estimates.  At Statewide Agency 
institutions, mean net tuition per FTE was an estimated 19.3% higher than the 
Governor/Legislature level. The largest difference was at Full Control institutions where 
the initial value was an estimated 68.6% higher than Governor/Legislature institutions. 
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Table 17 
Level-2 Sub-Model LN Net Tuition (in log units) including Institution-Level Parameters 
Effect Year Estimate SD DF t p 
Intercept  8.7395 0.0594 667 147.13 <.0001 
Year 2009 0.2066 0.0087 998 23.74 <.0001 
Year 2008 0.1701 0.0080 1025 21.14 <.0001 
Year 2007 0.1445 0.0075 1161 19.16 <.0001 
Year 2006 0.1290 0.0067 1306 19.23 <.0001 
Year 2005 0.1072 0.0058 1729 18.49 <.0001 
Year 2004 0.0746 0.0044 2185 16.91 <.0001 
Year 2003 0.0000     
Tuition Authority Institution – Full 0.5222 0.0493 346 10.60 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Institution – Moderate 0.2858 0.0416 349 6.87 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Institution – Strict 0.3506 0.0894 342 3.92 0.0001 
Tuition Authority Individual System Board 0.3230 0.0386 346 8.36 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Statewide Agency 0.1768 0.0399 343 4.43 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Governor/Legislature 0.0000     
Sector Bachelors -0.2371 0.0357 373 -6.63 <.0001 
Sector Masters -0.0981 0.0296 393 -3.31 0.0010 
Sector University 0.0000     
Special Institution FLAG 0.0607 0.0399 361 1.52 0.1286 
Special Institution HBCU -0.1758 0.0369 351 -4.76 <.0001 
Special Institution HSI -0.1150 0.0624 338 -1.84 0.0662 
Special Institution None 0.0000     
Resource Control Institution 0.0106 0.0256 347 0.42 0.6778 
Resource Control State 0.0000     
Appropriations  2.10E-05 2.26E-06 2587 9.41 <.0001 
E&G Expenses (Lag)  -1.14E-06 0.0000 0   
Publicness  -0.0129 0.0005 2589 -23.59 <.0001 
In State Enrollment  -0.0003 0.0002 1979 -2.05 0.0408 
Out of State Enrollment  0.0009 0.0003 2450 -2.76 0.0058 
Size   -2.69E-07 0.0000 0     
       
Covariance Parameter Subject Estimate SD Z  p   
Variance Unitid 0.04622 0.0032 14.58 <.0001  
AR(1) Unitid 0.94950 0.0046 204.59 <.0001  
Residual   0.00080 0.0002 4.86 <.0001   
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With the addition of the state-level factors and the five interaction effects the final 
model was created for the net tuition outcome.   See Table 18. 
Net Tuition =  
[Intercept + β01(Year) + β10(Tuition Authority) + β11(Year*Tuition Authority) +  
β20(Sector) + β21(Sector*Tuition Authority) + β30(Special Institution) + 
β40(Resource Control) + β50(Appropriations) + β51(Appropriations*Tuition 
Authority) + β60(E&G Expense) + β70(Publicness) + β71(Publicness*Tuition 
Authority) + β80(In-State) + β90(Out-of-State) + β100(Size) + β110(Governance) + 
β120(Region) + β121(Region*Tuition Authority) + β130(Budget) + β140(Property 
Tax) + β150(Sales Tax) + β160(Income Tax) + β170(Prepaid Plan) + β180(Education 
Attainment) + Residual] 
While inclusion of these additional factors in the final model helped explain 
observations in the data, not all fixed effects, nor levels within multilevel categories, were 
statistically significant and caution should be used when extrapolating these results 
beyond this population of institutions or time period. 
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Table 18 
Final Model LN Net Tuition (in log units) including Institution- and State-Level 
Parameters 
Effect Level Interaction  Estimate SD DF t p 
Intercept   8.93505 0.15 1023 61.50 <.0001 
Year 2009  0.22441 0.03 2510 7.63 <.0001 
Year 2008  0.16291 0.03 2534 5.77 <.0001 
Year 2007  0.14967 0.03 2556 5.70 <.0001 
Year 2006  0.11608 0.02 2463 5.00 <.0001 
Year 2005  0.09285 0.02 2339 4.83 <.0001 
Year 2004  0.06825 0.01 2188 4.91 <.0001 
Year 2003  0.00000     
Tuition Authority Institution - Full  0.16361 0.18 912 0.93 0.3506 
Tuition Authority Institution - Moderate  0.15385 0.11 1396 1.34 0.1805 
Tuition Authority Institution - Strict  -0.27084 0.59 2201 -0.46 0.6470 
Tuition Authority Individual System Bd  -0.08978 0.15 1406 -0.61 0.5405 
Tuition Authority Statewide Agency  -0.09694 0.13 1113 -0.77 0.4405 
Tuition Authority Governor / Leg  0.00000     
Sector Bachelors  -0.04483 0.09 347 -0.52 0.6021 
Sector Masters  0.08492 0.07 348 1.21 0.2260 
Sector University  0.00000     
Special Institution FLAG  0.05529 0.04 316 1.56 0.1205 
Special Institution HBCU  -0.16904 0.03 307 -5.18 <.0001 
Special Institution HSI  -0.03901 0.06 294 -0.67 0.5064 
Special Institution None  0.00000     
Resource Control Institution  0.07089 0.03 334 2.61 0.0094 
Resource Control State  0.00000     
Appropriations   0.00002 6.94E-06 1835 3.50 0.0005 
E&G Expenses (Lag)   -8.97E-07 0.00 0   
Publicness   -0.01806 0.00 2548 -10.33 <.0001 
In State Enrollment   -0.00025 0.00 2102 -1.61 0.1068 
Out of State Enrollment   0.00088 0.00 2512 2.74 0.0063 
Size   7.98E-08 0.00 0   
Governance Planning Agency  0.11198 0.07 356 1.50 0.1338 
Governance Coordinating Bd  -0.11088 0.05 317 -2.19 0.0291 
Governance Governing Bd  0.00000     
Region MHEC  0.06986 0.09 600 0.77 0.4393 
Region NEBHE  0.27262 0.11 470 2.43 0.0156 
Region SREB  -0.13894 0.09 605 -1.47 0.1425 
Region WICHE  -0.02684 0.08 744 -0.33 0.7379 
Region No Affiliation  0.00000     
Budget Annual  0.00065 0.03 326 0.02 0.9829 
Budget Biennial  0.00000     
Property Tax (Lag)   -8.50E-09 0.00 0   
Sales Tax (Lag)   3.64E-09 0.00 0   
Income Tax (Lag)   -7.46E-10 0.00 0   
Prepaid Plan N  -0.10633 0.03 377 -3.27 0.0012 
Prepaid Plan Y  0.00000     
Education Attainment   0.00561 0.00 2370 3.64 0.0003 
Tuition Authority*Sector Institution - Full Bachelors -0.13121 0.16 320 -0.81 0.4203 
Tuition Authority*Sector Institution - Full Masters -0.19356 0.10 340 -2.04 0.0424 
Tuition Authority*Sector Institution - Full University 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Sector Institution - Moderate Bachelors -0.39093 0.10 346 -3.87 0.0001 
Tuition Authority*Sector Institution - Moderate Masters -0.35900 0.09 351 -4.11 <.0001 
Tuition Authority*Sector Institution - Moderate University 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Sector Institution - Strict Masters -0.31502 0.30 1476 -1.07 0.2868 
Tuition Authority*Sector Institution - Strict University 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Sector Individual System Bd Bachelors -0.04234 0.10 347 -0.43 0.6666 
Tuition Authority*Sector Individual System Bd Masters -0.13130 0.08 359 -1.64 0.1028 
Tuition Authority*Sector Individual System Bd University 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Sector Statewide Agency Bachelors -0.08991 0.10 362 -0.91 0.3610 
Tuition Authority*Sector Statewide Agency Masters -0.07899 0.08 374 -0.96 0.3358 
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Table 18 (continued) 
Final Model LN Net Tuition (in log units) including Institution- and State-Level 
Parameters 
Effect Level Interaction  Estimate SD DF t p 
Tuition Authority*Sector Statewide Agency University 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Sector Governor / Leg Bachelors 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Sector Governor / Leg Masters 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Sector Governor / Leg University 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Institution-Full 0.03518 0.04 2533 0.82 0.4121 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Institution-Moderate 0.01300 0.04 2525 0.36 0.7163 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Institution-Strict -0.07729 0.08 2541 -1.01 0.3116 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Individual System Bd -0.05720 0.03 2516 -1.70 0.0892 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Statewide Agency -0.04501 0.03 2517 -1.30 0.1930 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Governor / Leg 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Institution-Full 0.03248 0.04 2554 0.80 0.4264 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Institution-Moderate 0.04582 0.03 2549 1.35 0.1776 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Institution-Strict -0.08180 0.07 2555 -1.11 0.2666 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Individual System Bd -0.02457 0.03 2545 -0.77 0.4429 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Statewide Agency -0.01334 0.03 2543 -0.41 0.6841 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Governor / Leg 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Institution-Full -0.01584 0.04 2543 -0.41 0.6842 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Institution-Moderate 0.01686 0.03 2551 0.53 0.5942 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Institution-Strict -0.05070 0.07 2538 -0.74 0.4618 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Individual System Bd -0.01664 0.03 2551 -0.57 0.5711 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Statewide Agency -0.02749 0.03 2555 -0.90 0.3670 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Governor / Leg 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Institution-Full 0.00315 0.03 2447 0.09 0.9257 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Institution-Moderate 0.02448 0.03 2451 0.87 0.3828 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Institution-Strict -0.04401 0.06 2493 -0.69 0.4880 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Individual System Bd 0.01998 0.03 2459 0.77 0.4395 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Statewide Agency -0.01232 0.03 2467 -0.46 0.6479 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Governor / Leg 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Institution-Full -0.00825 0.03 2416 -0.28 0.7763 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Institution-Moderate 0.03041 0.02 2338 1.29 0.1959 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Institution-Strict -0.03063 0.06 2536 -0.51 0.6114 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Individual System Bd 0.03285 0.02 2350 1.52 0.1281 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Statewide Agency -0.02900 0.02 2361 -1.29 0.1987 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Governor / Leg 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Institution-Full -0.00819 0.02 2278 -0.39 0.6941 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Institution-Moderate -0.00061 0.02 2186 -0.04 0.9711 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Institution-Strict -0.02251 0.05 2549 -0.45 0.6526 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Individual System Bd 0.02734 0.02 2199 1.75 0.0795 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Statewide Agency -0.03487 0.02 2200 -2.15 0.0316 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Governor / Leg 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Institution-Full 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Institution-Moderate 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Institution-Strict 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Individual System Bd 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Statewide Agency 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Governor / Leg 0.00000     
Publicness*Tuition Auth  Institution - Full 0.00834 2.50E-03 2539 3.33 0.0009 
Publicness*Tuition Auth  Institution - Moderate 0.00908 2.06E-03 2506 4.40 <0.0001 
Publicness*Tuition Auth  Institution - Strict 0.01559 5.68-E03 2548 2.74 0.0061 
Publicness*Tuition Auth  Individual System Bd 0.00665 1.93E-03 2545 3.45 0.0006 
Publicness*Tuition Auth  Statewide Agency 0.00053 2.10E-03 2494 0.25 0.8021 
Publicness*Tuition Auth  Governor / Leg 0.00000     
Appropriations*Tuit Auth  Institution - Full -0.00001 9.49E-06 2086 -0.56 0.5747 
Appropriations*Tuit Auth  Institution - Moderate -0.00002 8.52E-06 1608 -1.84 0.0659 
Appropriations*Tuit Auth  Institution - Strict 5.80E-07 5.43E-05 2455 0.01 0.9915 
Appropriations*Tuit Auth  Individual System B d -0.00001 7.45E-06 1822 -0.70 0.4831 
Appropriations*Tuit Auth  Statewide Agency 0.00001 8.22E-06 1774 1.62 0.1048 
Appropriations*Tuit Auth  Governor / Leg 0.00000     
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Table 18 (continued) 
Final Model LN Net Tuition (in log units) including Institution- and State-Level 
Parameters 
Effect Level Interaction  Estimate SD DF t p 
Tuition Authority*Region Institution - Full MHEC -0.37305 0.13 400 -2.92 0.0036 
Tuition Authority*Region Institution - Full SREB 0.23864 0.18 415 1.36 0.1757 
Tuition Authority*Region Institution - Full WICHE -0.74742 0.23 398 -3.28 0.0011 
Tuition Authority*Region Institution - Full No Affiliation 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Region Institution - Moderate MHEC -0.08226 0.08 337 -1.05 0.2956 
Tuition Authority*Region Institution - Moderate SREB 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Region Institution - Strict WICHE 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Region Individual System Bd MHEC -0.08325 0.11 750 -0.74 0.4574 
Tuition Authority*Region Individual System Bd NEBHE -0.03162 0.14 581 -0.23 0.8220 
Tuition Authority*Region Individual System Bd SREB 0.14179 0.12 765 1.23 0.2185 
Tuition Authority*Region Individual System Bd WICHE 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Region Individual System Bd No Affiliation 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Region Statewide Agency MHEC 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Region Statewide Agency NEBHE 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Region Statewide Agency SREB 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Region Statewide Agency WICHE 0.00000     
Tuition Authority*Region Governor / Leg SREB 0.00000     
 
In the final model, with all predictors set to zero, the initial value for net tuition 
was estimated at $7,593 per FTE (t1023=61.50, p<.0001).  The fixed effect for year was 
statistically significant [F(6, 2272)=32.69, p<.0001] indicating that, holding other factors 
constant, the rate of change in mean net tuition per FTE varied over time.  As shown in 
Figure 10, estimated growth rates for the overall population of institutions ranged from an 
average first-year growth of 7.1%, to an average overall rate of 25.2% by the end of the 
study period, controlling for other factors.  The compound growth rates for all years were 
statistically significant (see Table 18). 
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Figure 10: Conditional Growth in Mean Net Tuition per FTE 2003-2009 
In the final model, interactions between tuition authority and other institution- and 
state-level factors were statistically significant suggesting that, with other factors held 
constant, effect estimates for net tuition depended on level of tuition authority.   When 
tuition authority was combined with the effect of time and other predictors set to zero, the 
significance of the interaction term, year*tuition authority [F(30, 2230)=2.79, p<.0001] 
indicated that the rate of growth was not the same for all categories of tuition authority.  
Figure 11 provides visual evidence of the difference in the conditional estimates for net 
tuition starting and ending values across levels of tuition authority and year, controlling 
for other factors. 
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Figure 11: Effect Estimates for Net Tuition 2003 and 2009 by Tuition Authority 
To test the statistical significance of the interaction for each level of tuition 
authority and year, the least squares means tests of simple effects were conducted for the 
model-based estimates.  The results displayed in Table 19 indicate that the interaction 
was statistically significant at p<.001 for each level of year as well as tuition authority, 
with the exception of Strict Control institutions. 
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Table 19 
Simple Effect Comparisons Net Tuition, Year*Tuition Authority 
Effect Level Num DF Den DF F p 
Year 2009 5 486 4.37 0.0007 
Year 2008 5 501 4.53 0.0005 
Year 2007 5 500 3.83 0.0020 
Year 2006 5 483 4.20 0.0010 
Year 2005 5 481 4.98 0.0002 
Year 2004 5 481 4.42 0.0006 
Year 2003 5 482 3.29 0.0062 
Tuition Authority Institution - Full 6 2211 13.91 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Institution - Moderate 6 2200 24.68 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Institution - Strict 6 2260 1.19 0.3071 
Tuition Authority Individual System Board 6 2243 33.09 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Statewide Agency 6 2179 17.04 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Governor/Legislature 6 2204 11.80 <.0001 
 
As illustrated in Figure 12, controlling for factors other than tuition authority and 
year, institutions with the greatest tuition-setting authority had both the highest estimated 
initial values for net tuition as well as the highest estimated rates of growth for the seven-
year period.  Full Control institutions (N=33) [F(6,2211)=13.91, p<.0001] had the highest 
average overall growth rate at 29.6% followed by Moderate Control institutions (N=73) 
at 26.8% [F(6,2200)=24.68, p<.0001].  Net tuition per FTE at Governor/Legislature 
institutions (N=37) [F(6,2204)=11.80, p<.0001] grew an estimated 25.2% over the seven 
year period.  The average growth rates at Statewide Agency (N=140) [F(6,2179)=17.04, 
p<.0001] and Individual System Board institutions (N=106) [F(6,2243)=33.09, p<.0001] 
were 19.6% and 18.2%, respectively.  Although not statistically significant, Strict Control 
institutions (N=6) in this population had the lowest overall growth rate, 15.8% 
[F(6,2260)=1.19, p=.3071]. 
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Figure 12: Conditional 7-Year Growth Rates and Initial Values for Net Tuition by 
Tuition Authority 
 
Figure 13 provides visual support of the differences in growth trajectories across 
levels of tuition authority.  Particularly for Individual System Board institutions, from 
2003 to 2004 there was a significant increase in net tuition per FTE, holding other factors 
constant.  For these institutions, the average first-year growth of 10.0% accounted for 
more than half the overall mean growth for this category, 18.2%.  At Full Control 
institutions, from 2003 to 2007 the growth rate was about average when compared to the 
other categories; average net tuition at these institutions then rose sharply from 14.3% in 
2007 to 29.6% in 2009.  Governor/Legislature-controlled institutions followed a similar 
trend until 2007, but then slowed in 2008.  The cumulative rate of growth at these 
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institutions increased from 17.7% by 2008 to an overall rate of 25.2% one year later.  
Although not statistically significant, at Strict Control institutions in this population, 
following a first-year growth rate of 4.7%, average growth in net tuition at these 
institutions trailed all other categories of tuition authority throughout the remaining years 
of the study.  
 
 
Figure 13: Growth Trajectories 2003-2009 for Net Tuition by Tuition Authority 
The fixed effect for sector [F(2, 509)=9.23, p<.0001] was moderated by an 
interaction term, sector*tuition authority, suggesting that the differences in mean net 
tuition across sectors was conditional on the level of institutional autonomy.  Table 20 
shows the distribution of institutions by sector and level of tuition authority.  
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Table 20 
Distribution of Institutions by Sector and Tuition Authority 
  
Governor/ 
Legislature 
Individual 
System 
Board 
Statewide 
Agency 
Strict 
Control 
Inst 
Moderate 
Control 
Inst 
Full 
Control 
Inst 
Bachelors 7 23 23 0 21 2 
Masters 17 82 47 4 26 15 
Universities 13 35 36 2 26 16 
 
The significance of interaction term [F(9, 380)=3.94, p<.0001] suggested that 
variation in net tuition across sectors was related to differences in tuition authority, 
holding other factors constant.  However, as shown in Table 21, the least squares means 
tests of simple effects for the interaction term revealed mixed results for statistical 
significance of model-based estimates among levels for both effects. 
Table 21 
Simple Effect Comparisons Net Tuition, Sector*Tuition Authority 
Effect Level Num DF Den DF F p 
Sector Bachelors 4 360 2.00 0.0945 
Sector Masters 5 421 1.01 0.4101 
Sector University 5 489 10.70 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Institution – Full 2 314 1.69 0.1863 
Tuition Authority Institution – Moderate 2 321 28.77 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Institution – Strict 1 1605 0.64 0.4253 
Tuition Authority Individual System Board 2 333 1.38 0.2537 
Tuition Authority Statewide Agency 2 353 5.37 0.0050 
Tuition Authority Governor/Legislature 2 336 1.71 0.1831 
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Controlling for sector and tuition authority, only the effect estimates for the initial 
value of net tuition at universities and Moderate Control and Statewide Agency 
institutions were statistically significant as shown in Table 21.  However, as illustrated in 
Figure 14, for this population of institutions, there appeared to be observable variation in 
mean net tuition among sectors according to level of tuition authority.  Controlling for 
other factors, the range of initial values for net tuition at universities was $3,150.  Where 
university tuition was controlled by the Governor/Legislature, the estimated initial value 
was $7,594 per FTE.  Universities with the greatest autonomy had, on average, higher net 
tuition per FTE than Governor/Legislature universities; effect estimates for Full Control 
universities averaged 17.8% higher, followed by Moderate Control at 16.6% higher.  The 
remaining levels of tuition authority had estimated net tuition at universities that were 
lower than Governor/Legislature universities: Strict Control (-23.7%), Individual System 
Board (-8.6%), and Statewide Agency (-9.25%). 
Among masters institutions, controlling for factors other than sector and tuition 
authority, the range of initial values for net tuition across tuition authority categories 
increased to almost $3,700.  Masters institutions under Governor/Legislature control had 
the highest effect estimate of $8,267.  When compared to Governor/Legislature 
institutions, initial values at Full Control masters institutions were 3.0% lower and 
Statewide Agency masters institutions an estimated 16.1% lower.  Moderate Control and 
Individual System Board masters institutions had similar differences from the estimated 
mean at Governor/Legislature masters institutions, -18.5% and -19.8%, respectively.  
Starting values at Strict Control masters institutions were 44.3% lower than the 
Governor/Legislature masters institutions.  
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Among bachelor institutions, there was less variation than the other two sectors in 
estimated initial values, $1,770.  At Governor/Legislature bachelors institutions the 
starting value was an estimated $7,261, holding other factors constant.  The highest mean 
net tuition was at Full Control institutions, but conditional estimates were only 3.3% 
higher than the Governor/Legislature category.  Initial values at Individual System Board 
bachelors institutions were 12.4% lower, Statewide Agency institutions 17.0% lower, and  
Moderate Control bachelors institutions averaged 21.1% lower than Governor/Legislature 
institutions.  For this population, there were no bachelor institutions in the Strict Control 
category. 
 
 
Figure 14: Effect Estimates for Initial Value of Net Tuition by Sector and Tuition 
Authority 
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The remaining institutional-level parameters were examined to explain their 
relationship to the net tuition outcome.  The overall fixed effect for special institution 
status was significant indicating that variation in mean net tuition is significantly 
associated with differences in status [F(3,304) =10.27, p<.001].  Controlling for other 
factors, mean net tuition per FTE at Historically Black colleges and universities (N=35) 
was an average 15.6% lower (t307=-5.18, p<.0001) compared to institutions with no 
special status (N=308).  Although not statistically significant, the mean net tuition at 
Hispanic-speaking institutions in this population (N=12) averaged 3.8% lower (t294=-
0.67, p=.5064) and at flagship institutions (N=40) mean net tuition was an estimated 
5.7% higher (t316=1.56, p=.1205) compared to institutions with no special status.  The 
fixed effect for resource control was also statistically significant [F(1, 334)=6.82, p=.009].  
Holding other factors constant, where institutions control their own revenue, the mean net 
tuition was 7.3% higher (t334=2.61, p=.0094) than institutions where the state controls 
revenue.  
Of the six institution-level covariates included in the net tuition model, the fixed 
effects for out-of-state student enrollment [F(1,2512)=7.48, p=.0063], percent reliance on 
government support [F(1,2541)=111.03, p<.0001], and appropriations [F(1,2457)=5.84, 
p=.0158] were statistically significant.  Holding factors other than out-of-state enrollment 
constant, the conditional effect of a one unit increase was small; for every 1% increase in 
out-of-state enrollment, net tuition per FTE increased an average 0.09% (t2512=2.74, 
p=.0063).  
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There was a statistically significant inverse relationship between net tuition and 
the reliance on government funding, or publicness.  With the significant interaction of 
publicness and tuition authority, the variation in mean net tuition related to an 
institution’s reliance on state and local government funding was not the same for all 
levels of tuition authority [F(5,2480)=9.39, p<.0001].  Historically, the percent of 
government reliance for each level of tuition authority for this population is illustrated in 
Figure 15.  It should be noted that institutions with some measure of tuition authority – 
Strict, Moderate, and Full Control institutions – had, on average, less government support 
as a percent of total revenue per FTE than the other three categories; 
Governor/Legislature institutions had the highest ratio of government support over the 
seven-year study period.  For all categories of tuition authority, in 2009 the average ratio 
of state and local appropriations per FTE to total revenue was lower than 2003 levels, 
except for Strict Control institutions which ended relatively flat. 
 
Figure 15: Historical Reliance on State/Local Appropriations by Tuition Authority, 2003-
2009 
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Holding other factors constant, all institutions were likely to have a decrease in 
net tuition per FTE with increased reliance on government funding as shown in Table 22.  
Governor/Legislature institutions served as the comparison group with an average 1.79% 
decrease in mean net tuition with each 1% increase in publicness.  At institutions in other 
categories of tuition authority, the change in mean net tuition was significantly different 
from Governor/Legislature institutions, except for Statewide Agency institutions; the 
conditional estimate for Statewide Agency institutions was essentially the same as the 
Governor/Legislature category, -1.74% (p=.8021).  At Individual System Board 
institutions, for each 1% increase in reliance on government funding, mean net tuition 
was likely to decrease 1.13% (p=.0006).  Among institutions with some measure of 
tuition-setting autonomy, when reliance on government funding increased, the average 
decrease to net tuition was more modest than institutions with system- or state-level 
control.  At Full Control and Moderate Control institutions, for each 1% increase in 
reliance on public funding mean net tuition was likely to decrease an estimated 0.97% 
(p=.0009) and 0.89% (p<.0001), respectively.  Strict Control institutions had the smallest 
estimated decrease, 0.25%, for each 1% increase (p=.0061). 
Table 22 
Publicness Effect Estimates for Net Tuition by Tuition Authority 
Tuition Authority 
% Change in 
Net Tuition* DF t p 
Institution – Full Control -0.97% 2539 3.33 0.0009 
Institution – Moderate Control -0.89% 2506 4.40 <..0001 
Institution – Strict Control -0.25% 2548 2.74 0.0061 
Individual System Board -1.13% 2545 3.45 0.0006 
Statewide Agency -1.74% 2494 0.25 0.8021 
Governor / Legislature -1.79%    
*For each 1% increase in reliance on government funding 
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The relationship between appropriations per FTE and net tuition was significant 
and the interaction of appropriations and tuition authority [F(5,1995)=3.99, p=.0013] 
indicated that the variation in mean net tuition related to appropriations depended on the 
level of tuition authority. 
Over the seven-year study period, state and local funding on a per student basis 
was erratic and, as illustrated in Figure 16, average appropriations per FTE varied by 
level of tuition authority.  Appropriations among all categories declined from 2003 
through 2005.  Other than Governor/Legislature and Full Control institutions, funding 
levels then increased through 2008 when most categories of tuition authority regained, or 
slightly exceeded, 2003 levels.  For Governor/Legislature institutions, compared to other 
categories, average appropriations per FTE declined only slightly through 2006 before 
rising to much higher levels through 2008.  Appropriations at Full Control institutions 
declined through 2007 and, although increasing in 2008, were still well below the 2003 
level by more than 13%.  Between 2008 and 2009, average appropriations per FTE 
declined for all categories. 
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Figure 16: Historical Appropriations per FTE by Tuition Authority 2003-2009 
For each level of tuition authority, the estimated percent change in net tuition per 
FTE for each $1 increase in appropriations is displayed in Table 23.  Controlling for other 
factors, at Governor/Legislature institutions mean net tuition increased about 0.0024% 
(t1835=3.50, p=.0005) for each $1 increase in appropriations per FTE.  For example, with 
a $500 increase in appropriations per FTE at this type of institution, mean net tuition also 
increased an estimated 1.2%.  However, none of the estimates among the levels of tuition 
authority were statistically different from the Governor/Legislature level.  
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Table 23 
Appropriations Effect Estimates for Net Tuition by Tuition Authority 
Tuition Authority 
% Change in 
Net Tuition* DF t p 
Institution – Full Control 0.0019% 2086 -0.56 0.5747 
Institution – Moderate Control 0.0009% 1608 -1.84 0.0659 
Institution – Strict Control 0.0025% 2455 0.01 0.9915 
Individual System Board 0.0019% 1822 -0.70 0.4831 
Statewide Agency 0.0038% 1774 1.62 0.1048 
Governor / Legislature 0.0024%    
*Per $1 increase in appropriations per FTE 
 
The relationships of the remaining institution-level variables, E&G expense, 
percent of in-state enrollment, and size to net tuition were not statistically significant, and 
estimates for the study population were negligible.  
Examination of state level parameters revealed that the fixed effects for 
governance structure [F(2, 419)=11.86, p<.0001], membership in a regional compact [F(4, 
376)=10.47, p<.0001], prepaid plan [F(1, 394)=9.85, p=.002], and education attainment [F(1, 
2303)=13.2, p<.0001] were all significant.  Controlling for other factors, among 
governance structures, institutions in governing board states (N=127) served as the 
reference category with a conditional mean net tuition of $7,594 per FTE.  This estimate 
was significantly higher than institutions in coordinating board states (N=230).  Net 
tuition averaged 10.5% lower at these institutions, about $6,797 per FTE (t336=-2.04, 
p=.042).  In planning agency states (N=38), the average net tuition was highest: 11.8% 
higher than institutions in governing board states (t377=1.56, p=.119) and much higher 
than institutions in coordinating board states, about 20% [F(1,503)=19.02, p=.0005].    
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Conditional mean net tuition per FTE varied significantly according to 
membership in a regional compact [F(4, 371)=10.25, p<.001], controlling for all other 
predictors.  Effect estimates for net tuition among institutions in states affiliated with the 
New England Board of Higher Education (NEBHE) were 31.3% higher, on average, than 
institutions in unaffiliated states (t470=2.43, p=.0156).  Although not statistically 
significant, mean net tuition at Midwestern Higher Education Compact (MHEC) 
institutions in this population was likely 7.2% higher (t600=0.77, p=.4393) and Southern 
Regional Education Board (SREB) institutions averaged 13.0% lower (t605=-1.47, 
p=.1425) than unaffiliated institutions.  At institutions in the population affiliated with 
the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education (WICHE), mean net tuition 
averaged 2.7% lower than unaffiliated institutions (t744=-0.33, p=.7379).  
The main effect of region was moderated with the addition of an interaction term, 
region*tuition authority [F(7, 354)=6.41, p<.001].  The statistical significance indicated that 
the variation in mean net tuition among levels of region was conditional on level of 
tuition authority.  Table 24 shows the distribution of institutions across levels of tuition 
authority and region. 
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Table 24 
Distribution of Institutions by Region and Tuition Authority 
  
Governor/ 
Legislature 
Individual 
System 
Board 
Statewide 
Agency 
Strict 
Control 
Inst 
Moderate 
Control 
Inst 
Full 
Control 
Inst 
MHEC 0 26 33 0 13 25 
NEBHE  0 10 10 0 0 0 
SREB 37 33 28 0 60 3 
WICHE 0 30 35 6 0 1 
No Affiliation 0 41 0 0 0 4 
 
The least squares means test of simple effects was conducted to evaluate the 
statistical significance of model-based estimates for the interaction of each level of region 
and tuition authority.  The interaction effects for region were not significant for MHEC- 
and NEBHE-affiliated states.  All estimable levels of tuition authority were significant at 
p=.05 as shown in Table 25.  The Governor/Legislature and Strict Control levels could 
not be estimated; all institutions with Governor/Legislature control (N=37) are located in 
SREB-affiliated states.  Similarly, all institutions with Strict Control (N=6) are located in 
WICHE-affiliated states. 
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Table 25 
Simple Effect Comparisons Net Tuition, Region*Tuition Authority 
 Effect Level Num DF Den DF F p 
Region MHEC 3 338 1.59 0.1926 
Region NEBHE 1 309 1.94 0.1644 
Region SREB 4 345 17.17 <.0001 
Region WICHE 3 546 2.90 0.0344 
Region No Affiliation 1 336 7.02 0.0085 
Tuition Authority Institution – Full 3 353 8.65 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Institution - Moderate 1 323 4.05 0.0449 
Tuition Authority Institution – Strict 0    
Tuition Authority Individual System Board 4 446 3.63 0.0063 
Tuition Authority Statewide Agency 3 311 12.10 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Governor/Legislature 0       
 
With regional affiliation moderated by tuition authority and all other predictors 
set to zero, regional variations related to level of tuition authority are easily observed in 
Figure 17.   In SREB-affiliated states [F(4,345)=17.17, p<.0001], the estimated initial net 
tuition ranged from $6,609 per FTE at Governor/Legislature institutions (N=37) to 
$9,881 per FTE at Full Control institutions (N=3).  Controlling for other factors, among 
SREB-affiliated institutions except for Statewide Agency institutions, as tuition-setting 
authority increased, mean net tuition likely increased. 
The regional effect for MHEC-affiliated institutions was not significant (p=.193).  
Full Control institutions (N=25) are concentrated primarily in MHEC states.  Mean net 
tuition at these institutions averaged $6,604 in 2003 while the starting value for net 
tuition at Moderate Control institutions (N=13) averaged much higher at $8,747 per FTE.  
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The initial value at Individual System Board institutions (N=26) averaged $6,849 and 
Statewide Agency institutions (N=33) averaged $7,391 in MEHC-affiliated states. 
All Strict Control institutions (N=6) in this population are located in WICHE 
states (p=.034).  Controlling for other factors, initial net tuition at these institutions was 
$5,639 per FTE.   Among WICHE states, there are no Moderate Control institutions and 
only one Full Control institution where the estimated initial net tuition was $4,123 per 
FTE.  Initial values at Individual System Board institutions (N=30) averaged $6,758 and 
Statewide Agency institutions (N=35) averaged $6,709 in WICHE-affiliated states. 
The remaining region, NEBHE, had the fewest institutions as well as little 
variation in mean net tuition among levels of tuition authority (p=.164).  In NEBHE 
states, tuition is either controlled by an Individual System Board (N=10) or a Statewide 
Agency (N=10).  The initial mean estimates at NEBHE institutions were $8,833 and 
$9,052 per FTE, respectively.   
Two states, New York and Pennsylvania, have no affiliation with a regional 
compact.  The interaction effect was statistically significant at p=.008.  In these two 
states, at Individual System Board institutions (N=41) the initial estimate for mean net 
tuition was $6,941 per FTE.  At institutions with Full Control (N=4) the mean initial 
value was $8,943 per FTE. 
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Figure 17: Region Effect Estimates Initial Value Net Tuition by Tuition Authority 
Examination of the remaining state-level fixed effects revealed that the 
relationship of a prepaid tuition plan [F(1, 377)=10.72, p=.0012] and education attainment 
to net tuition were statistically significant [F(1, 2370)=13.27, p=.0003].  In states with no 
prepaid plan, net tuition in 2003 averaged 10.1% lower (t377=-3.27, p=.0012) than states 
with a prepaid plan, holding other factors constant.  Among states with higher levels of 
education, net tuition was likely higher.  For each 1% increase in a state’s population 
with at least a bachelors degree, mean net tuition averaged 0.56% higher (t2370=3.64, 
p=.0003).  The fixed effects for budget cycle and property, sales, and income tax 
collections were not significant. 
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Research Question 2: Operating Efficiency 
Do public four-year institutions with greater fiscal autonomy have higher education and 
general expenses than those in a more regulated environment? How do other institutional 
and state factors relate to education and general spending levels at public four-year 
institutions? 
During the iterative model-fitting process for the education and general (E&G) 
expense outcome, five variables were discarded: resource control (p=0.299), institutional 
size (p=0.294), governance structure (p=0.958), budget cycle (p=0.664), and education 
attainment (p=0.402).  However, there was no material change in the intra-class 
correlation across models, approximately 0.98.  As with net tuition, the fully 
parameterized model was selected as the best fit to explain the observed data according to 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) fit statistic.  Interaction effects were then tested 
but only one interaction, year*tuition authority, improved model fit.  See Table B2 in the 
Appendix for model fit statistics for this outcome measure.   
In this multilevel analysis of education and general expenses, the unconditional 
means model revealed the amount of variance related to the various components in the 
model.  As shown in Table 26, most of the variation in mean E&G spending (87.8%) was 
between institutions with less than 1% related to changes over time.  Spending was 
measured per full-time equivalent student (FTE) and expressed in 2009 constant dollars. 
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Table 26  
Unconditional Means Model LN E&G Expense (in log units) 
  Estimate % of Variance 
Intercept              9.7146   
Within Institutions              0.0012  0.71% 
Between Institutions              0.1476 87.80% 
Between States              0.0142  8.45% 
Residual              0.0051  3.03% 
 
The Level-1 growth model shown in Table 27 represents the average rate of 
change in education and general expense over the seven year period, unconditioned by 
either institution- or state-level moderating factors.   
E&G Expense = [Intercept + β01(Year) + Residual] 
Examination of the Level-1 unconditional estimates revealed that the E&G 
expense in 2003 averaged $16,027 per FTE (i.e., exp*9.6820).  Although falling about -
0.5% in 2004, on average, E&G expense per FTE grew about 7.6% between academic 
years 2002-03 to 2008-09.  
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Table 27  
Level-1 Unconditional Growth Model LN E&G Expense (in log units) 
 Effect Year Estimate SD DF t p 
Intercept   9.6820 0.0201 394 473.26 <.0001 
Year 2009 0.07399 0.0085 2357 8.66 <.0001 
Year 2008 0.07323 0.0078 2357 9.35 <.0001 
Year 2007 0.04366 0.0070 2357 6.21 <.0001 
Year 2006 0.01609 0.0062 2357 2.63 0.0085 
Year 2005 0.00225 0.0050 2357 0.45 0.6537 
Year 2004 -0.00471 0.0036 2357 -1.32 0.1858 
Year 2003 0.00000     
       
Covariance 
Parameter Subject Estimate SD Z p 
AR(1) unitid 0.9849 0.0011 888.51 <.0001 
Residual  0.1653 0.0113 14.68 <.0001 
 
Adding Level-2 institutional variables expanded the unconditional growth model 
to include factors posited to explain the amount of variation related to within- and 
between-institution characteristics.   
E&G Expense =  
[Intercept + β01(Year) + β10(Tuition Authority) + β20(Sector) + β30(Special 
Institution) + β40(Resource Control) + β50(Appropriations) + β60(Gross Tuition) + 
β70(Publicness) + β80(Size) + Residual] 
As shown in Table 28, with all predictors set to zero, the conditional mean for 
E&G expense in 2003 was estimated at $10,848 per FTE.  Holding other factors constant, 
the average change in E&G spending between 2003 and 2004 was estimated at -1.5%, 
with expense levels declining slightly until 2008.  With institution-level variables 
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included in the model, the overall growth rate for the seven-year period was estimated at 
only 2%.  The remaining institutional-level coefficients (in log units) represent the 
relationship of each factor to average E&G expense, controlling for other factors.  For 
each categorical factor, the last level listed is the reference level for that factor. 
Table 28 
Level-2 Sub-Model LN E&G Expense (in log units) including Institution-Level 
Parameters 
Effect Level Estimate SD DF t p 
Intercept  9.29176 0.04190 383 221.74 <.0001 
Year 2009 0.01990 0.00799 2351 2.49 0.0129 
Year 2008 0.00050 0.00723 2351 0.07 0.9448 
Year 2007 -0.01738 0.00660 2351 -2.63 0.0085 
Year 2006 -0.01580 0.00581 2351 -2.72 0.0066 
Year 2005 -0.01576 0.00489 2351 -3.22 0.0013 
Year 2004 -0.01524 0.00347 2351 -4.39 <.0001 
Year 2003 0.00000     
Tuition Authority Institution-Full 0.10738 0.03348 383 3.21 0.0015 
Tuition Authority Institution-Moderate 0.02151 0.02798 383 0.77 0.4424 
Tuition Authority Institution-Strict 0.20455 0.05930 383 3.45 0.0006 
Tuition Authority Individual System Bd 0.07567 0.02586 383 2.93 0.0036 
Tuition Authority Statewide Agency 0.09778 0.02644 383 3.70 0.0002 
Tuition Authority Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Sector Bachelors -0.23091 0.02383 383 -9.69 <.0001 
Sector Masters -0.22260 0.01970 383 -11.30 <.0001 
Sector University 0.00000     
Special Institution Flagship 0.13068 0.02639 383 4.95 <.0001 
Special Institution HBCU 0.17628 0.02433 383 7.25 <.0001 
Special Institution HSI 0.07105 0.04142 383 1.72 0.0871 
Special Institution None 0.00000     
Resource Control Institution 0.00082 0.01691 383 0.05 0.9613 
Resource Control State 0.00000     
Appropriations  0.00006 1.60E-06 2351 36.62 <.0001 
Gross Tuition  0.00004 2.38E-06 2351 14.78 <.0001 
Publicness  -0.00479 0.00043 2351 -11.08 <.0001 
Size  6.05E-07 0.00000 2351  <.0001 
 
  
Covariance 
Parameter Subject  Estimate SD Z p 
AR(1) Unitid 0.9132 0.0064 142.68 <.0001 
Residual   0.0225 0.0015 15.14 <.0001 
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The final interpretive model for the E&G expense outcome shown in Table 29 
included state-level factors and the interaction effect, year*tuition authority.    
E&G Expense =  
[Intercept + β01(Year) + β10(Tuition Authority) + β11(Year*Tuition Authority) + 
β20(Sector) + β30(Special Institution) + β40(Resource Control) + 
β50(Appropriations) + β60(Gross Tuition) + β70(Publicness) + β80(Size) + 
β90(Governance) + β100(Region) + β110(Budget) +β120(Property Tax) + β130(Sales 
Tax) + β140(Income Tax) + β150(Prepaid Plan) + β160(Education Attainment) + 
Residual] 
As with the net tuition outcome, not all fixed effects or levels within fixed effects, 
were statistically significant and caution should be used when extrapolating these results 
to other populations and time periods.  
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Table 29 
Final Model LN E&G Expense (in log units) including Institution- and State-Level 
Parameters 
Effect Level Interaction Estimate SD DF t p 
Intercept   9.19656 0.080 543 114.96 <.0001 
Year 2009  0.05653 0.023 2644 2.46 0.0139 
Year 2008  0.02486 0.022 2686 1.15 0.2488 
Year 2007  -0.02624 0.020 2686 -1.33 0.1841 
Year 2006  -0.02556 0.017 2584 -1.48 0.1382 
Year 2005  -0.01798 0.014 2439 -1.25 0.2097 
Year 2004  -0.03155 0.010 2242 -3.05 0.0023 
Year 2003  0.00000     
Tuition Authority Institution-Full  0.12841 0.049 429 2.61 0.0095 
Tuition Authority Institution-Moderate  -0.02175 0.036 467 -0.61 0.5421 
Tuition Authority Institution-Strict  0.24474 0.078 438 3.13 0.0019 
Tuition Authority Individual System Bd  0.07821 0.036 426 2.18 0.0300 
Tuition Authority Statewide Agency  0.10880 0.051 381 2.15 0.0322 
Tuition Authority Governor/Legislature  0.00000     
Sector Bachelors  -0.22021 0.024 319 -9.10 <.0001 
Sector Masters  -0.21325 0.020 338 -10.67 <.0001 
Sector University  0.00000     
Special Institution Flagship  0.15075 0.027 307 5.49 <.0001 
Special Institution HBCU  0.16843 0.025 294 6.68 <.0001 
Special Institution HSI  -0.00084 0.045 297 -0.02 0.9853 
Special Institution None  0.00000     
Resource Control Institution  0.02128 0.020 314 1.09 0.2777 
Resource Control State  0.00000     
Appropriations   0.00006 1.65E-06 2153 35.16 <.0001 
Gross Tuition   0.00004 2.52E-06 1952 14.73 <.0001 
Publicness   -0.00442 4.38E-04 2691 -10.09 <.0001 
Size   4.63E-07 0.000 0   
Governance Planning Agency  0.03370 0.054 341 0.62 0.5355 
Governance Coordinating Board  0.00237 0.038 319 0.06 0.9502 
Governance Governing Board  0.00000     
Region MHEC  0.07162 0.037 535 1.91 0.0566 
Region NEBHE  0.04737 0.047 398 1.01 0.3142 
Region SREB  0.11071 0.038 456 2.94 0.0034 
Region WICHE  0.14830 0.041 529 3.60 0.0003 
Region No Affiliation  0.00000     
Budget Annual  -0.00596 0.022 315 -0.27 0.7902 
Budget Biennial  0.00000     
Property Tax (Lag)   -4.35E-08 0.000 0   
Sales Tax (Lag)   -2.92E-09 0.000 0   
Income Tax (Lag)   5.27E-09 0.000 0   
Prepaid Plan N  -0.05455 0.022 370 -2.44 0.0150 
Prepaid Plan Y  0.00000     
Education Attainment   -0.00054 0.001 2486 -0.45 0.6553 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Institution-Full -0.05758 0.033 2658 -1.74 0.0815 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Institution-Moderate -0.03187 0.028 2658 -1.15 0.2519 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Institution-Strict -0.06599 0.060 2666 -1.10 0.2719 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Individual System Board -0.06386 0.026 2646 -2.46 0.0138 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Statewide Agency -0.06030 0.026 2656 -2.28 0.0226 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Institution-Full -0.03581 0.031 2691 -1.16 0.2473 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Institution-Moderate -0.00978 0.026 2691 -0.38 0.7072 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Institution-Strict -0.02907 0.056 2692 -0.52 0.6035 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Individual System Board -0.05495 0.024 2689 -2.27 0.0235 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Statewide Agency -0.04347 0.025 2690 -1.75 0.0798 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
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Table 29 (continued) 
Final Model LN E&G Expense (in log units) including Institution- and State-Level 
Parameters 
Effect Level Interaction Estimate SD DF t p 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Institution-Full 0.01102 0.028 2667 0.39 0.6960 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Institution-Moderate 0.02123 0.024 2672 0.89 0.3720 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Institution-Strict -0.01333 0.051 2652 -0.26 0.7942 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Individual System Board -0.01483 0.022 2675 -0.67 0.5010 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Statewide Agency 0.00709 0.023 2677 0.31 0.7546 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Institution-Full -0.00185 0.025 2554 -0.07 0.9404 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Institution-Moderate 0.03237 0.021 2559 1.55 0.1210 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Institution-Strict -0.01811 0.045 2545 -0.40 0.6886 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Individual System Board -0.00240 0.019 2565 -0.13 0.9003 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Statewide Agency 0.00631 0.020 2563 0.32 0.7501 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Institution-Full 0.02202 0.022 2508 1.02 0.3094 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Institution-Moderate 0.00854 0.017 2400 0.49 0.6237 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Institution-Strict -0.02023 0.038 2383 -0.54 0.5915 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Individual System Board 0.00524 0.016 2406 0.33 0.7427 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Statewide Agency 0.00198 0.017 2415 0.12 0.9050 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Institution-Full 0.05483 0.015 2301 3.55 0.0004 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Institution-Moderate 0.02735 0.013 2183 2.19 0.0288 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Institution-Strict 0.03093 0.027 2184 1.13 0.2571 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Individual System Board 0.01610 0.012 2203 1.40 0.1627 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Statewide Agency 0.01675 0.012 2187 1.41 0.1582 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Institution-Full 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Institution-Moderate 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Institution-Strict 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Individual System Board 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Statewide Agency 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
 
In the all-inclusive model, with all predictors set to zero, the conditional mean for 
E&G expense was $9,863 per FTE (t543=114.96, p<.0001).  Controlling for all factors 
other than year, the variation in the growth of E&G expense was statistically significant 
[F(6, 2265)=4.55, p=.0001].  Conditional estimates, illustrated in Figure 18, ranged from an 
average -3.11% change in spending from 2003 to 2004 (t2242=-3.05, p=.0023) to an 
average overall increase of 5.81% by the end of the seven-year study (t2644=2.46, 
p=.0139).   
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Figure 18: Conditional Growth in Mean E&G Spending 2003-2009 
The fixed effect for tuition authority was statistically significant [F(5,338)=4.56, 
p=.0005].  Holding other factors constant, variation in E&G spending was significantly 
associated with differences in level of tuition authority.  Institutions where tuition is 
controlled by the Governor/Legislature served as the reference level with average E&G 
expense in the first year equal to the intercept, $9,863 per FTE.  As illustrated in Figure 
19, E&G spending was highest at Strict Control institutions where estimates were 27.7% 
higher than Governor/Legislature institutions (t438=3.13, p=.0019).  Spending at Full 
Control institutions averaged 13.7% higher (t429=2.61, p=.0095) than the reference 
category.  Average E&G spending at Statewide Agency institutions was 6.4% higher 
(t381=2.15, p=.032) and at Individual System Board institutions average E&G spending 
was 8.1% higher (t426=2.18, p=.030) than the Governor/Legislature-controlled 
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institutions.  Institutions with Moderate Control had the lowest spending levels, 2.15% 
less than the Governor/Legislature category, however conditional estimates at these 
institutions was not statistically significant (t467=-0.61, p=.542).  See Table C1 in the 
Appendix for comparison of model-based estimates between all levels of tuition 
authority. 
The fixed effect for the year*tuition authority interaction was significant 
[F(30,2246)=2.39, p<.0001] indicating that the rate of growth in spending varied according 
to level of tuition authority.  To test the statistical significance for each level of the 
interaction effect, least squares means tests of the model-based estimates were conducted 
and all levels of year were found to be statistically significant as shown in Table 30.  
Among categories of tuition authority, the Strict Control and Statewide Agency levels 
were not significant.   
Table 30 
Simple Effects Comparison E&G Expense, Year*Tuition Authority 
Effect Level Num DF Den DF F p 
Year 2009 5 412 3.45 0.0046 
Year 2008 5 412 3.63 0.0032 
Year 2007 5 410 4.08 0.0013 
Year 2006 5 409 3.31 0.0061 
Year 2005 5 415 4.60 0.0004 
Year 2004 5 408 5.94 <.0001 
Year 2003 5 405 5.00 0.0002 
Tuition Authority Institution-Full 6 2289 2.64 0.0147 
Tuition Authority Institution-Moderate 6 2243 2.91 0.0079 
Tuition Authority Institution-Strict 6 2190 0.69 0.6573 
Tuition Authority Individual System Board 6 2345 7.14 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Statewide Agency 6 2240 1.94 0.0710 
Tuition Authority Governor/Legislature 6 2235 7.70 <.0001 
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Although not all levels of tuition authority were statistically significant, as 
illustrated in Figure 19, the variation in E&G spending among levels of tuition authority 
over time is apparent for this population of institutions.  At Governor/Legislature 
institutions, holding other factors constant, average growth was 5.8% over the seven-year 
period [F(6, 2235) = 7.70, p<.0001] followed by Moderate Control institutions at 2.5% [F(6, 
2243) = 2.91, p=.008].  Although the overall rate of growth for these two categories was 
higher than the other four groups, both had among the lowest initial estimates.  The other 
four groups had higher initial estimates but negative rates of growth rates for the seven-
year period.  Full Control and Individual System Board institutions had an average 
overall growth rate of -0.11% [F(6, 2289) = 2.64, p=.015] and -0.73% [F(6, 2345) = 7.14, 
p<.0001], respectively.  Institutions in the remaining two levels of tuition authority also 
experienced negative growth in E&G spending over the seven year period, although 
neither was statistically significant.  Holding other factors constant, Strict Control 
institutions in this population had the highest initial value, $12,598 per FTE, as well as 
the largest decline in spending over the study period, -0.94% [F(6, 2190) = 0.69, p=.6573].  
Statewide Agency institutions had an estimated decline in spending of -0.37% [F(6, 2240) = 
1.90, p=.0710]. 
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Figure 19: Average 7-Yr Growth in E&G Expense by Tuition Authority 
Visual examination of the profile plot in Figure 20 illustrates the complex growth 
trajectories for E&G spending according to level of tuition authority.  Controlling for 
other factors, during the first year, the change in average spending ranged from almost 
three percentage points above zero to three percentage points below zero [F(5, 408) = 5.94, 
p<.0001].  Between 2003 and 2004, the change in spending at Governor/Legislature 
institutions averaged -3.1%; at Full Control institutions the estimated year-over-year 
change was 2.4%.  In this first year, estimates for the remaining tuition authority 
categories fell within a much narrower range, between zero and -1.5%.  Over time, at Full 
Control institutions, E&G spending declined by an average -2.7% through 2006 and then 
gradually increased to end in 2009 at slightly less than the starting value, an overall 
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change of -0.11%.  At Governor/Legislature institutions, the rate of growth remained 
between -1.5% to -2.6% through 2007.  Growth in E&G spending at these institutions 
then outpaced the other levels of tuition authority, rising dramatically from an average -
2.6% four-year growth rate to an average seven-year growth rate of 5.8% [F(6, 2235) = 7.70, 
p<.0001].  E&G expense levels per FTE at Moderate Control institutions also fell slightly 
in the first two years, then rose to 0.68% through 2006, and ended with an overall growth 
rate of 2.5% through 2009 [F(6, 2243) = 2.91, p=.0079].   Institutions in the remaining 
categories of tuition authority had negative growth over the entire seven year period, 
although the difference in means was only significant for Individual System Board 
institutions [F(6, 2345) = 7.14, p<.0001]. 
 
 
Figure 20: Growth Trajectories E&G Expense 2003-2009 by Tuition Authority 
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Examination of other institutional-level parameters included in the final model 
revealed their relationships to E&G spending levels.  The fixed effect for sector was 
statistically significant [F(2, 314) = 60.93, p<.0001] indicating variations in education and 
general spending were associated with difference in sector.  Controlling for other factors, 
when compared to universities, average E&G spending at both bachelors (t319 = -9.10, 
p<.0001) and masters institutions (t3383= -10.67, p<.0001) was almost 20% lower,            
-19.8% and -19.2%, respectively. 
Variation in conditional mean E&G expense estimates were related to recognized 
special status [F(3, 299) = 23.91, p<.0001].  Holding other factors constant, average E&G 
spending at both flagship (t307 = 5.49, p<.0001) and Historically Black colleges and 
universities (t295 = 6.68, p<.0001) were higher than institutions with no special status, 
16.3% and 18.3%, respectively.  The estimate for Hispanic-speaking institutions was not 
significantly different from zero (t297 = -0.02, p=.985).  
The remaining institution-level covariates included in the E&G expense model 
were statistically significant except for resource control and institutional size.  There was 
a positive relationship of appropriations [F(1, 2153) = 1236.49, p<.0001) and gross tuition 
[F(1,1952) = 217.04, p<.0001) to E&G spending and both were statistically significant.  
Holding other factors constant, for every $1 increase in appropriations per FTE, the 
estimated increase in spending was 0.006% (t2153 = 35.16, p<.0001); with a $500 increase 
in appropriations per FTE, mean E&G spending was likely to increase an estimated 2.9%.  
Controlling for other factors, for every $1 increase in gross tuition per FTE, the estimated 
increase in spending was 0.004% (t1952 = 14.73, p<.0001); a $500 increase in gross 
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tuition per FTE would likely result in a 1.9% increase E&G spending per FTE.  There 
was an inverse relationship between E&G spending and the ratio of government funding 
to total revenue, or publicness, was significant as well [F(1, 2691)=101.72, p<.0001].  On 
average, for every 1% increase in reliance on public funding, E&G spending decreased 
an estimated 0.44% (t2691 = -10.09, p<.0001).  Unlike the net tuition outcome, there was 
no evidence that differences in the relationship of appropriations or publicness to E&G 
spending that was dependent on level of tuition authority. 
Among state-level factors, the fixed effect for affiliation with a regional compact 
was statistically significant [F(4,349) = 4.71, p=.01] suggesting that variation in mean 
education and general expense was associated with differences in region.  Controlling for 
all other predictors, institutions in states with no affiliation served as the reference 
category with an initial value of $9,863 per FTE which was the lowest among levels of 
region as illustrated in Figure 21.  Average E&G spending at institutions in WICHE 
states averaged 16.0% higher than institutions in unaffiliated states.  The average E&G 
expense at institutions in SREB states was 11.7% higher (t456=2.94, p=.0034) and 
MHEC-affiliated institutions (t535=1.91, p=.057) averaged 7.4% higher than institutions 
in unaffiliated states.  Although not statistically significant, NEBHE-affiliated institutions 
in this population had spending levels an estimated 4.9% higher (t398=1.01, p=.314) than 
institutions in unaffiliated states. 
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Figure 21: Region Effect Estimates Initial Value E&G Expense 
Results for the remaining state-level factors were mixed.  The fixed effect for 
prepaid tuition plan [F(1,370) = 5.97, p=.015] was statistically significant.  Controlling for 
other factors, E&G spending in states with a prepaid tuition plan averaged 5.3% higher 
than states without a prepaid plan.  Although the fixed effects for property, sales, and 
income tax collections were statistically significant, for each $1,000 increase in tax 
collections the relationship to E&G spending was de minimis and had little practical 
effect on the outcome.   The fixed effects for governance structure [F(2,385) = 0.33, 
p=.717], budget [F(1,315) = 0.07, p=.790], and education attainment [F(1,2486) = 0.20, 
p=.6550] were not significant.   
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Research Question 3: Minority Access 
Does minority student enrollment increase or decrease at public institutions with tuition-
setting authority? How do other institutional and state factors relate to minority student 
access at public four-year institutions? 
Model fitting for the natural log of minority enrollment was conducted in the 
same manner as the other two outcome variables.   Historically Black colleges and 
universities (HBCU) and Hispanic-speaking institutions (HSI) were excluded from this 
analysis.  Despite the fact that the fixed effects for most factors were not statistically 
significant, according to the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the fully 
parameterized model was selected as the best fit to explain the observed data.  Interaction 
effects were tested during the model fitting process and only one interaction, year*tuition 
authority, was included to improve model fit.  See Table B3 in the Appendix for the 
model fit statistics.   
In this multilevel analysis of minority enrollment, the unconditional means model 
revealed the amount of variance related to the various components in the model which is 
displayed in Table 31.  The amount of variation was similar for the between-institutions 
(49.8%) and between-states (48.9%) components.  The variation related to changes over 
time was less than 0.5%.  Minority enrollment was measured as a ratio of total enrollment 
of Black, Hispanic, and American Indian students to total student enrollment. 
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Table 31  
Unconditional Means Model LN Minority Enrollment (in log units) 
  Estimate % of Variance 
Intercept 2.3993  
Within Institutions 0.0040 0.46% 
Between Institutions 0.4407 49.77% 
Between States 0.4325 48.85% 
Residual 0.0082 0.93% 
The Level-1 growth model represents the average rate of change in minority 
enrollment over the study period, unconditioned by either institutional- or state-level 
moderating factors.  
Minority enrollment = [Intercept + β01(Year) + Residual] 
Examination of the Level-1 estimates in Table 32 reveal that, ignoring other 
predictors, the intercept, or ratio of minority to total enrollment in academic year 2002-
03, was 9.74% (i.e., exp*2.276).  On average, minority enrollment increased at a 
relatively steady rate each year with an overall growth rate of 20.9% over the seven-year 
study period. 
Table 32 
Level-1 Unconditional Growth Model LN Minority Enrollment (in log units) 
Effect Year Estimate SD DF t P 
Intercept   2.2763 0.0402 347 56.63 <.0001 
Year 2009 0.1900 0.0112 348 16.99 <.0001 
Year 2008 0.1599 0.0103 347 15.57 <.0001 
Year 2007 0.1324 0.0090 347 14.66 <.0001 
Year 2006 0.1000 0.0075 347 13.29 <.0001 
Year 2005 0.0651 0.0062 347 10.47 <.0001 
Year 2004 0.0275 0.0039 345 7.12 <.0001 
Year 2003 0.0000     
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Adding Level-2 institutional variables to the model, as detailed in Table 33, 
expanded the unconditional growth model by including factors posited to explain the 
amount of variation related to within- and between-institution characteristics. 
Minority Enrollment =  
[Intercept + β01(Year) + β10(Tuition Authority) + β20(Sector) + β30(Special 
Institution) + β40(Resource Control) + β50(Appropriations) + β60(E&G Expenses) 
+ β70(Student Services) + β80(Institutional Grants) + β90(Gross Tuition) + 
β100(Publicness) + β110(Size) + Residual] 
With inclusion of the institution-level variables, the conditional mean minority 
enrollment was estimated at 19.1%, with all predictors set to zero.  Minority enrollment 
grew to an average 19.7% of total enrollment in 2004, a one-year change of 3.3%, 
controlling for other factors.  By the end of the study period in 2009, the average ratio of 
minority to total enrollment was 23.4%, a seven-year change of 22.6%.  The remaining 
institution-level coefficients represent the nature and strength of the relationship of each 
factor (in log units) to the average percent of minority enrollment.  For each multilevel 
category, the last level listed in Table 33 is the reference level. 
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Table 33 
Level-2 Sub-Model LN Minority Enrollment (in log units) including Institution-Level 
Parameters 
Effect Level Estimate SD DF t p 
Intercept  2.94750 0.16130 413 18.27 <.0001 
Year 2009 0.20400 0.01186 582 15.28 <.0001 
Year 2008 0.17430 0.01045 543 14.70 <.0001 
Year 2007 0.14560 0.00868 549 13.94 <.0001 
Year 2006 0.11030 0.00724 545 12.71 <.0001 
Year 2005 0.07308 0.00454 558 10.10 <.0001 
Year 2004 0.03265 0.01316 561 7.19 <.0001 
Year 2003 0.00000     
Sector Bachelors -0.07365 0.11000 377 -0.67 0.5034 
Sector Masters -0.04198 0.09021 376 -0.47 0.6420 
Sector University 0.00000     
Tuition Authority Institution – Full -0.47480 0.16000 349 -2.97 0.0032 
Tuition Authority Institution – Moderate -0.40830 0.13670 343 -2.99 0.0030 
Tuition Authority Institution – Strict -0.56760 0.27550 337 -2.06 0.0401 
Tuition Authority Individual System Board -0.53100 0.12700 339 -4.18 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Statewide Agency -0.71760 0.13030 338 -5.51 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Special Institution Flagship -0.36480 0.12100 347 -3.02 0.0028 
Special Institution None 0.00000     
Resource Control Institution -0.04303 0.08157 337 -0.40 0.6883 
Resource Control State 0.00000     
Appropriations  -0.00001 0.00000 1655 -1.73 0.0840 
E&G Expense  -9.29E-07 0.00000 1463 -0.59 0.5581 
Student Services  0.00001 0.00001 1796 1.16 0.2461 
Institutional Grants  0.00001 0.00001 1803 1.97 0.0486 
Gross Tuition  -0.00001 0.00000 1896 -3.56 0.0004 
Publicness  -0.00003 0.00062 1630 -0.05 0.9614 
Size   3.54E-06 0.00000 572 2.41 0.0164 
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With the addition of the state-level factors and the year*tuition authority 
interaction effect, the final model shown in Table 34 was created for the minority 
enrollment outcome.    
Minority Enrollment =  
[Intercept + β01(Year) + β10(Tuition Authority) + Β11(Year*Tuition Authority) + 
β20(Sector) + β30(Special Institution) + β40(Resource Control) + 
β50(Appropriations) + β60(E&G Expenses) + β70(Student Services) + 
β80(Institutional Grants) + β90(Gross Tuition) + β100(Publicness) + β110(Size) + 
β120(Governance) + β130(Region) + β140(Budget) + β150(Property Tax) + β160(Sales 
Tax) + β170(Income Tax) + β180(Prepaid Plan) + β190(Education Attainment) + 
Residual] 
Including the additional factors resulted in substantially lower log unit estimates 
and changes in relationships to the outcome, suggesting that one or more state-level 
factors may be confounding the relationship of institution-level factors to the minority 
enrollment outcome.  Although the BIC fit statistic indicated a better model fit with the 
fully parameterized model, many of the fixed effects and levels within multilevel 
categories were not statistically significant and care should be taken in drawing 
inferences from the conditional estimates for this population.  
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Table 34 
Final Model LN Minority Enrollment (in log units) including Institution- and State-Level 
Parameters 
Effect Level Interaction Estimate       SD DF t p 
Intercept   2.28310 0.289 388 7.89 <.0001 
Year 2009  0.10821 0.038 368 2.86 0.0045 
Year 2008  0.08899 0.035 375 2.52 0.0120 
Year 2007  0.09707 0.031 384 3.09 0.0022 
Year 2006  0.08347 0.026 364 3.25 0.0013 
Year 2005  0.06380 0.021 360 3.04 0.0026 
Year 2004  0.02935 0.013 361 2.23 0.0263 
Year 2003  0.00000     
Tuition Authority Institution - Full  0.35011 0.200 369 1.75 0.0804 
Tuition Authority Institution - Moderate  -0.27114 0.144 350 -1.88 0.0611 
Tuition Authority Institution - Strict  -0.29818 0.306 352 -0.97 0.3306 
Tuition Authority Individual System Board  -0.21310 0.149 365 -1.43 0.1535 
Tuition Authority Statewide Agency  -0.25028 0.206 367 -1.22 0.2242 
Tuition Authority Governor/Legislature  0.00000     
Sector Bachelors  -0.09142 0.098 364 -0.94 0.3498 
Sector Masters  -0.07130 0.080 362 -0.89 0.3752 
Sector University  0.00000     
Resource Control Institution  -0.04303 0.080 330 -0.54 0.5890 
Resource Control State  0.00000     
Special Institution Flagship  -0.31241 0.109 339 -2.87 0.0044 
Special Institution None  0.00000     
Appropriations   -0.00001 2.78E-06 1662 -1.91 0.0564 
E&G Expense   -9.29E-07 1.35E-06 1460 -0.69 0.4905 
Student Services   0.00001 1.19E-05 1774 1.22 0.2211 
Institutional Grants   0.00001 6.80E-06 1802 1.89 0.0590 
Gross Tuition   -0.00001 4.49E-06 1882 -2.50 0.0126 
Publicness   0.00014 0.001 1596 0.23 0.8159 
Size   3.54E-06 1.47E-06 518 2.41 0.0161 
Governance Planning Agency  -0.29079 0.218 329 -1.33 0.1838 
Governance Coordinating Board  0.20178 0.155 337 1.30 0.1941 
Governance Governing Board  0.00000     
Region MHEC  -0.30259 0.132 364 -2.29 0.0228 
Region NEBH  -0.14268 0.175 351 -0.82 0.4154 
Region SREB  0.38462 0.139 356 2.76 0.0061 
Region WICHE  0.07167 0.142 373 0.51 0.6128 
Region No Affiliation  0.00000     
Budget Annual  0.24001 0.090 334 2.66 0.0083 
Budget Biennial  0.00000     
Property Tax (Lag)   2.75E-08 0.000 0   
Sales Tax (Lag)   1.69E-09 0.000 0   
Income Tax (Lag)   1.67E-10 0.000 0   
Prepaid Plan N  -0.03765 0.092 349 -0.41 0.6813 
Prepaid Plan Y  0.00000     
Education Attainment   -0.00026 0.002 838 -0.16 0.8762 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Institution-Full 0.01014 0.053 346 0.19 0.8484 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Institution-Moderate 0.03597 0.045 344 0.80 0.4267 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Institution-Strict 0.11311 0.091 333 1.24 0.2158 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Individual System Bd 0.12079 0.042 357 2.86 0.0045 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Statewide Agency 0.12794 0.043 350 3.00 0.0029 
Year*Tuition Authority 2009 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Institution-Full 0.01737 0.049 351 0.35 0.7246 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Institution-Moderate 0.04192 0.042 350 1.00 0.3194 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Institution-Strict 0.11932 0.084 332 1.41 0.1581 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Individual System Bd 0.10404 0.039 361 2.65 0.0083 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Statewide Agency 0.10613 0.040 358 2.67 0.0080 
Year*Tuition Authority 2008 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
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Table 34 (continued) 
Final Model LN Minority Enrollment (in log units) including Institution- and State-Level 
Parameters 
Effect Level Interaction Estimate      SD DF t p 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Institution-Full -0.01419 0.044 351 -0.33 0.7448 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Institution-Moderate 0.00602 0.037 353 0.16 0.8719 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Institution-Strict 0.06814 0.075 334 0.91 0.3617 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Individual System Bd 0.06261 0.035 356 1.81 0.0706 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Statewide Agency 0.06424 0.035 363 1.82 0.0699 
Year*Tuition Authority 2007 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Institution-Full -0.00250 0.036 341 -0.07 0.9443 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Institution-Moderate -0.01598 0.031 343 -0.52 0.6028 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Institution-Strict 0.03729 0.062 334 0.60 0.5481 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Individual System Bd 0.03764 0.028 345 1.33 0.1856 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Statewide Agency 0.03537 0.029 347 1.22 0.2221 
Year*Tuition Authority 2006 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Institution-Full -0.03252 0.031 399 -1.04 0.2975 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Institution-Moderate -0.03576 0.025 345 -1.42 0.1569 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Institution-Strict 0.00812 0.051 333 0.16 0.8732 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Individual System Bd 0.01414 0.023 346 0.61 0.5445 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Statewide Agency 0.02760 0.024 347 1.16 0.2461 
Year*Tuition Authority 2005 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Institution-Full -0.01296 0.019 396 -0.67 0.5053 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Institution-Moderate -0.01239 0.016 338 -0.79 0.4296 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Institution-Strict -0.02061 0.032 336 -0.65 0.5184 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Individual System Bd 0.00370 0.015 350 0.25 0.8011 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Statewide Agency 0.01011 0.015 336 0.69 0.4925 
Year*Tuition Authority 2004 Governor/Legislature 0.00000     
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Institution-Full      
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Institution-Moderate      
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Institution-Strict      
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Individual System Bd      
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Statewide Agency      
Year*Tuition Authority 2003 Governor/Legislature      
 
In the all-inclusive model, with all predictors set to zero, the conditional mean 
estimate for minority enrollment was 9.81% (t388=7.89, p<.0001).  This value represents 
the average minority enrollment at the reference level for each multi-level category.  The 
fixed effect for year was statistically significant [F(6, 383)=14.22, p<.0001].  Holding other 
factors constant, the rate of growth in minority enrollment in the population grew from an 
average increase of 3.0% in the first year (t361=2.23, p=.026) to an overall average 
growth rate of 11.4% for the seven-year period (t368=2.86, p=.005) as illustrated in Figure 
22.  
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Figure 22: Conditional Mean Growth Rate Minority Enrollment 2003-2009 
The fixed effect for tuition authority was statistically significant [F(5,352)=3.51, 
p=.004] indicating that variation in minority enrollment was significantly associated with 
differences in level of institutional autonomy.  Holding other factors constant, 
Governor/Legislature institutions served as the reference level with an average initial 
minority enrollment of 9.81%.  This estimate is markedly lower than the 19.1% 
conditional mean estimated without state level factors included in the model.  The p-
values for each level of tuition authority indicated that the conditional estimates for 
institutions in the other five categories were not significantly different from the 
Governor/Legislature group.  Accordingly, contrasts of model-based estimates between 
other levels were examined to determine where significant differences existed.  Only for 
Full Control institutions were estimates significantly different from the other levels of 
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tuition authority.  See Table C2 in the Appendix for comparison of minority enrollment 
model-based estimates among all levels of tuition authority. 
When controlling for other factors, average minority enrollment at Full Control 
institutions was 41.9% higher than Governor/Legislature institutions (t369=1.75, p=.080).  
For all other levels of tuition authority, conditional estimates of minority enrollment were 
lower than Governor/Legislature institutions.  Compared to the reference category, 
estimates ranged from 19.2% lower at Individual System Board institutions (t365=-1.43, 
p=.154) to 25.8% lower at Strict Control institutions (t352=-0.97, p=.331).  
The significance of the year*tuition authority interaction [F(30,910)=1.52, p=.0375] 
indicated that the rate of growth in minority enrollment depended on the level of tuition 
authority.  The statistical significance of each level of the interaction effect was examined 
using least squares means tests of simple effects of the model-based estimates as shown 
in Table 35.  All levels of year were found to be statistically significant.  Except for the 
Strict Control institutions, all levels of tuition authority were also statistically significant. 
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Table 35 
Simple Effect Comparisons for Minority Enrollment, Year*Tuition Authority 
Effect Level Num DF Den DF F p 
Year 2009 5 342 3.15 0.0086 
Year 2008 5 348 3.17 0.0082 
Year 2007 5 352 3.38 0.0057 
Year 2006 5 356 3.74 0.0026 
Year 2005 5 361 3.61 0.0033 
Year 2004 5 363 3.64 0.0032 
Year 2003 5 362 3.67 0.0030 
Tuition Authority Institution-Full 6 386 2.81 0.0109 
Tuition Authority Institution-Moderate 6 364 6.23 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Institution-Strict 6 335 1.46 0.1897 
Tuition Authority Individual System Board 6 418 18.42 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Statewide Agency 6 366 19.46 <.0001 
Tuition Authority Governor/Legislature 6 356 2.41 0.0272 
 
The variation in the average rate of growth in minority enrollment among levels 
of tuition authority, including conditional enrollment estimates for 2003, is illustrated in 
Figure 23.  Holding other predictors constant, the greatest change in enrollment was at 
Statewide Agency institutions (N=100) at 26.6% [F(6,366) = 19.46, p<.0001] followed 
closely by Individual System Board institutions (N=117) at 25.7% [F(6,418) = 18.42, 
p<.0001], and Strict Control institutions (N=6) at 24.8% [F(6, 335) = 1.46, p=.1897].  
Controlling for other factors, although these institutions had the highest rate of estimated 
growth over the study period, they also had among the lowest initial values, 7.6%, 7.9, 
and 7.3%, respectively. 
The smallest change over the study period was at institutions where the 
Governor/Legislature (N=31) set tuition levels [F(6,356) = 2.41, p=.0272].  Growth in 
minority enrollment at these institutions averaged only 11.4% over the seven-year period.  
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Full Control institutions (N=30) performed slightly better with an average 12.6% overall 
increase in minority enrollment [F(6, 386) = 2.81, p=.0109].  The seven-year growth rate at 
Moderate Control institutions (N=64) was 15.5% [F(6, 364) = 6.23, p=<.0001].   
 
 
Figure 23: Conditional Growth 2003-2009 and Initial Values for Minority Enrollment by 
Tuition Authority 
 
The profile plot in Figure 24 illustrates the difference in the growth trajectories by 
tuition authority for this population of institutions.  Between 2003 and 2004 [F(5, 363) = 
3.64, p=.003], the rate of growth for all categories fell within a very narrow range.  The 
smallest first-year change was among Strict Control institutions which averaged 0.9%; 
the largest first-year gain in minority enrollment was an average 4.0% at Statewide 
Agency institutions.  Statewide Agency, Individual System Board, and Strict Control 
institutions followed a fairly linear growth trajectory with seven-year change of about 
9
.8
%
 
7
.6
%
 
7
.9
%
 
7
.3
%
 
7
.5
%
 
1
3
.9
%
 
11.4% 
26.6% 
25.7% 
24.8% 
15.5% 
12.6% 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
0% 
2% 
4% 
6% 
8% 
10% 
12% 
14% 
16% 
Gov/Leg Statewide 
Agency 
Individual 
System Bd 
Strict 
Control Inst 
Moderate 
Control Inst 
Full Control 
Inst 
R
a
te
 o
f 
G
ro
w
th
 
%
 M
in
o
r
it
y
 E
n
r
o
ll
m
e
n
t 
2003 Enrollment 7-Yr Growth Rate 
  149 
25%.  Institutions with Full Control and Moderate Control as well as institutions where 
tuition is controlled by the Governor/Legislature also followed positive trends, but with a 
less linear, more gradual slope.  Seven-year growth rates at these three levels averaged 
between 11% and 15%. 
 
 
Figure 24: Growth Trajectories Minority Enrollment by Tuition Authority 2003-2009 
Other statistically significant institution-level fixed effects included special 
institution status [F(1,339) = 8.22, p=.004], gross tuition [F(1,1882) = 6.24, p=.013], and 
institutional size [F(1,518) = 5.83, p=.016].  Because Historically Black colleges and 
universities and Hispanic-speaking institutions were excluded from the analysis, there 
were only two levels for the special institution category.   Holding other factors constant, 
minority enrollment at flagship institutions was likely 26.8% lower than institutions with 
no special status (t339=-2.87, p=.004).  An inverse relationship of gross tuition to percent 
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of minority enrollment was significant with a 0.0011% decrease in percent of minority 
enrollment for each $1 increase in gross tuition per FTE; with a $500 increase in gross 
tuition per FTE, the ratio of minority to total enrollment decreased an estimated 0.6%.  
Although that relationship is modest, it supports student response research that suggests 
that low-income and minority populations are most sensitive to increases in tuition 
(Jackson, 1990; Heller, 1999; Zumeta, 2004; McPherson & Schapiro, 1999; Linsenmeier 
et al., 2002).  Institution size had a positive relationship to percent of minority enrollment 
with a 0.0004% increase in percent of minority enrollment for each additional full-time 
equivalent student. 
Institution-level factors, sector [F(2,348)=0.52, p=.595] and resource control 
[F(1,330)=0.29, p=.589], were not statistically significant.   Institutional covariates, 
appropriations [F(1,1662)=3.64, p=.056], E&G spending [F(1,1460)=0.48, p=.491], 
publicness [F(1,1596)=0.05, p=.816], student services spending [F(1,1774)=1.50, p=.221], and 
institutional grant spending [F(1,1802)=3.57, p=.059] were also not significant. 
At the state level, statistically significant fixed effects included governance 
structure [F(2,347) = 7.53, p=.0006], budget [F(1,334) = 7.05, p=.008], and membership in a 
regional compact [F(4,349) = 12.49, p<.0001].  Although the significance of governance 
structure indicated that variation in mean minority enrollment was associated with state-
level governance structure, differences in means among levels within the category were 
not significantly different from the reference level.  When compared to governing board 
states, at public institutions in planning agency states (t329=-1.33, p=.184) minority 
enrollment was an estimated 25.2% lower and, in coordinating board states (t337=1.30, 
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p=.194), about 22.4% higher than governing board states.   Contrast tests of model-based 
estimates revealed that minority enrollment at institutions in coordinating board states 
was significantly higher (6.4%) than institutions in planning agency states [t(1,355) = 12.39, 
p=.0005].  Institutions located in states with annual budget cycles (t334=2.66, p=.008) had 
an average minority enrollment about 27.1% higher than institutions in states with 
biennial budgets. 
For the relationship of regional membership to minority enrollment, institutions in 
states with no regional affiliation served as the reference level with mean minority 
enrollment estimated at 9.81%.  Holding other factors constant, minority enrollment at 
WICHE states averaged 7.4% higher than unaffiliated states, although the estimate for 
this level was not significant (t373=0.51, p=.6128).  Average minority enrollment at 
SREB states was 46.9% higher than the reference level (t356=2.76, p=.0061).  The 
average minority enrollment at MHEC (t364=-2.29, p=.0228) and NEBHE (t351=-0.82, 
p=.4154) states was lower than institutions in states with no affiliation, 26.1% and 
13.3%, respectively.   Figure 25 illustrates the estimated initial values of mean minority 
enrollment for levels of region, holding other factors constant. 
  152 
 
 
Figure 25: Region Effect Estimates Initial Values for Minority Enrollment 
Prior to incorporating the state-level factors into the model, with all predictors 
except tuition authority set to zero, the estimated initial value of minority enrollment was 
highest at Governor/Legislature institutions at 19.1%.  With the fully parameterized 
model and again controlling for factors other than tuition authority, estimated enrollment 
at these institutions dropped significantly to 9.81%, suggesting one or more state-level 
factors may be confounding the outcome.  The distribution of institutions by tuition 
authority and region used in this analysis is displayed in Table 36. 
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Table 36 
Distribution of Institutions by Region and Tuition Authority, excluding HBCU & HSI 
institutions 
  
Governor/ 
Legislature 
Individual 
System Bd 
Statewide 
Agency 
Strict 
Control 
Inst  
Moderate 
Control 
Inst 
Full 
Control 
Inst 
MHEC 0 24 33 0 12 24 
NEBHE  0 10 10 0 0 0 
No Affiliation 0 40 0 0 0 3 
SREB 31 23 22 0 52 2 
WICHE 0 20 35 6 0 1 
 
The distributions reveal that Governor/Legislature institutions in this population 
are concentrated solely in SREB states.  Based on the parameter estimates in the final 
model, the effect estimate for region was the highest among SREB institutions at 14.4%; 
the effect estimate for tuition authority at Governor/Legislature institutions was equal to 
the intercept, 9.81%.  This suggests that differences in mean minority enrollment at 
Governor/Legislature institutions are more likely related to regional factors than level of 
institutional tuition authority.  
The remaining state level factor, prepaid tuition plan, was not statistically 
significant [F(1,349) = 0.17, p=.681].  The covariates for education attainment, property, 
sales, and income tax collections were also not statistically significant nor were the effect 
estimates for this population particularly noteworthy. 
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Summary of Results 
 With institutional fiscal autonomy the primary focus of this study, three 
regulatory or political factors were included in each model: tuition authority, resource 
control, and state governance structure.   While critics have argued that reducing state 
oversight will result in increased tuition and spending levels (Berdahl, 1978; Sabloff, 
1997; Berdahl & MacTaggert, 2000), prior to this study there has been little empirical 
evidence that explains the nature and strength of the relationship of these factors to 
institutional outcomes.  
In the net tuition model, there were significant variations in the nature and 
strength of the relationship of five factors to net tuition estimates that depended on 
category of tuition authority: year, sector, appropriations, publicness, and region.  The 
other two political/regulatory factors, resource control and state governance structure, 
were also statistically significant.  While resource control was related to higher levels of 
net tuition, the results for state governance structure was mixed.  Institutions located in 
planning agency states, the least restrictive governance structure, were likely to have 
higher levels of net tuition than other institutions.  However, net tuition at institutions in 
Governor/Legislature states, perceived to be the most restrictive governance structure, 
was likely higher than institutions in coordinating board states.  Other important 
explanatory factors included level of appropriations, reliance on government support, and 
regional compact membership as well as special institution status and state level of 
education attainment.  The level of education and general spending was not an important 
factor in explaining tuition levels. 
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For education and general spending, of the three regulatory/political factors 
related to the institutional autonomy, only tuition authority was statistically significant.  
At Governor/Legislature institutions, assumed to be the most restrictive, the conditional 
estimate for education and general expense was lowest among all categories of tuition 
authority across all seven years.  However, among the other categories of tuition 
authority, there was no evidence to suggest that spending estimates increased relative to 
increasing levels of autonomy.  Although E&G spending estimates at Full Control 
institutions were among the highest, the conditional estimate for Strict Control 
institutions was even higher.  In addition, although the overall rate of growth in spending 
for the seven-year period was relatively flat for most levels of tuition authority, the 
conditional rate of growth in spending was highest at the Governor/Legislature 
institutions.  Similar to the net tuition outcome, level of appropriations, reliance on 
government support, and regional compact membership were important themes that 
emerged in relation to expense levels. Sector, special institution status, and gross tuition 
levels were also significantly related to education and general spending.   
 For the minority enrollment outcome, the fixed effects for most explanatory 
factors were not statistically significant.  However, among the three political/regulatory 
factors, variation in minority enrollment was associated with differences in tuition 
authority as well as governance structure although that relationship was not statistically 
significant for all levels of tuition authority or all levels of governance structure.  Unlike 
the other two outcome measures, state funding levels were not related to variation in 
minority enrollment.  However, the relationship of regional compact membership 
continued to provide some interesting results. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The primary goal of this study was to examine the relationship between outcomes 
at public institutions and their level of fiscal autonomy from state control.  The outcomes 
of interest, measured at the institution level, were posited to gauge success in the 
achievement of common state public policy goals of affordability, operating efficiency, 
and access.  Over a seven-year period, academic years 2002-03 to 2008-09, institutional 
performance was measured by changes in net tuition revenue, education and general 
spending, and minority student enrollment at 395 public four-year institutions across 
sectors in 43 states.  This final chapter reviews the research design and acknowledges the 
limitations encountered.  The major findings of the multilevel analysis are then discussed 
within the context of the results found in previous studies as well as selected themes 
suggested from the findings.  Finally, opportunities for future research are suggested to 
further investigate these questions. 
Review of the Research Design 
The design of this longitudinal correlation study incorporated both institution- and 
state-level data to address deficiencies in prior research that failed to account for changes 
over time and across sectors.  In addition, although multiple regression techniques are 
commonly used in higher education research, traditional methods generally aggregate 
data at the national or state level and do not allow differences to be preserved at the 
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institution level.  Given the variation in state systems, results based on aggregated group 
means may yield misleading results in explaining relationships between dependent and 
independent variables.  The multilevel modeling techniques used in this study 
disaggregate data to preserve the variation at the level of the institution. 
Data Sources: Institution-level data were collected primarily from two sources: 
the Delta Project on Postsecondary Education Costs, Productivity, and Accountability 
located in Washington, D.C. and the State Higher Education Executive Officers 
association located in Boulder, CO.  The Delta Project compiled technical state-reported 
accounting information extracted from the U.S. Department of Education’s Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System of annual surveys (IPEDS).  The SHEEO 
Triennial Surveys of State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies, 2002-03 and 
2005-06, provided state-reported data on institution- and state-level authority to establish 
undergraduate tuition and fees and control of tuition revenue.  All financial data were 
converted to 2009 constant dollars based on the Consumer Price Index.  State-level data 
were provided by a variety of sources, primarily the U.S. Census Bureau and Education 
Commission of the States.  A complete list of data sources and variable descriptions was 
provided in Chapter Three. 
Data Analysis: Each outcome of interest was analyzed separately using multilevel 
modeling techniques following the four-stage data analysis plan outlined in Chapter 
Three.  Data were examined for compliance with statistical assumptions and the outcome 
measures were transformed to natural log units to improve normality.  Using the SAS 
Mixed procedure, each mean model was specified and appropriate covariance structure 
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selected.  Model fitting was conducted in an iterative process that included evaluation of 
interaction effects and final models were selected according to the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) fit statistic. 
Delimitations 
The study population was bounded by public four-year postsecondary institutions 
characterized by their 2005 Carnegie classification.  Several classes of institutions were 
not included: those in the District of Columbia; the American territories; tribal colleges; 
technical and trade schools; and single discipline institutions, such as military and 
maritime academies.  These institutions have significant funding differences or are less-
complex with more narrowly-focused missions than typical public four-year institutions. 
Changes in tuition-setting policies during the study period were detected in five 
states: Indiana, Kentucky, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Texas and all institutions 
(N=63) were removed for these five states.  Additionally, all institutions in Colorado and 
Alaska were removed from the dataset.  Colorado initiated a unique funding arrangement 
in 2004 that effectively replaced direct state appropriations with tuition vouchers.  Alaska 
was eliminated because its sole institution, the University of Alaska, includes both two- 
and four-year campuses as well as trade and technical schools which are not within the 
scope of this study. 
For the minority enrollment outcome, formally-designated Historically Black 
colleges and universities (HBCU) and Hispanic-speaking institutions (HSI) were 
excluded from the analysis; the high concentration of minority students at these 
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institutions would likely produce misleading results.  Asian students were also excluded 
from the minority population for purposes of this study.  According to the 2000 U.S. 
census, 44% of the Asian population had attained at least a bachelor’s degree compared 
to 24% of the total U.S. population, and as such, these students are not considered an 
under-represented minority population.   
Limitations 
All research studies have design and data limitations.  Credible evaluation of 
institutional outcomes in a public policy environment must accommodate complex 
interactions in a longitudinal design.  The incorporation of multilevel modeling 
techniques was intended to mitigate at least some of these common research design 
problems.  Accordingly, the two primary limitations in this study were related to data 
measurement issues: reliability and validity of secondary data sources and missing data. 
  For the purposes of this study, tuition-setting authority, the primary focus, was the 
entity identified as having primary control based on responses from two waves of 
SHEEO survey data as well as other sources.  However, tuition-setting authority for 
public postsecondary institutions may or may not be formalized and the roles among 
decision-makers may vary widely by state, and in some cases, within states.  Even among 
states where responsibility is clearly defined by state policy or statute, there may be 
informal considerations that contribute to the decision-making process and the survey 
responses may not accurately measure the nuances this study intended to examine.  
Additionally, measurement issues are inherent in self-reported data and both the state-
level respondent and wording of the questions may have changed over time.   
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Missing data is also a concern, particularly when secondary data sources are used.  
Although participation in federal financial aid programs requires institutions to annually 
account to the IPEDS database, information is self-reported and values may be missing at 
random.  Missing values in typical repeated measures analysis can result in loss of 
subjects.  Commonly used regression methods arrange data in a wide format, one 
observation per subject, and omit the entire subject from analysis if any of the data 
included in the model are missing.  The SAS Mixed procedure used in this analysis 
arranges data in a long format where each observation corresponds to measures collected 
at a single point in time, resulting in multiple observations for each subject.   It analyzes 
all of the data that are present and when data are missing, only observations for that 
single point in time are omitted.   For the net tuition model, there were a number of 
observations with missing values, particularly among responses for in- and out-of-state 
student enrollment.  For this model only, of the total 2,763 observations, 115 were 
excluded, but the remaining observations with non-missing values for these institutions 
were retained for analysis.  For each the other two models, education and general 
expenses and minority enrollment, there were less than ten observations excluded from 
each analysis due to missing values in the dependent or explanatory variables. 
Finally, this design incorporated several multilevel categorical factors in each 
model.  For these factors, it is important to keep in mind that, although statistical 
significance of the main effect may mean there is a relationship to variation in the 
outcome, for one or more levels within the category, that correlation may not be 
significant.  When this occurs, care should be taken when drawing inference.  
  161 
Discussion of Key Findings 
To organize the data and highlight the relationship of important explanatory 
factors to the outcome measures, the major findings important to all three research 
questions will be discussed together.   The discussion is framed by the three predominant 
themes that emerged from the results detailed in Chapter Four: the relationships of the 
regulatory environment, state government funding, and regional influence.   
The Relationship of the Regulatory Environment to Institutional Outcomes 
Although the relationship of the postsecondary regulatory environment to 
institutional outcomes has been the subject of several studies, measurement of the 
political or regulatory environment within which public institutions operate has been 
inconsistent.  Characterizations have typically been at the state level and have included 
the type of postsecondary state board, the number of governing boards in the state, as 
well as the number of political appointees to boards of trustees.  In this multilevel 
analysis, three independent variables were selected to evaluate the relationship of both 
institution- and state-level regulatory control to institutional outcomes: at the institution 
level, tuition-setting authority and resource control, and the postsecondary governance 
structure at the state level. 
Tuition Authority 
  Tuition-setting authority at public postsecondary institutions typically resides at 
the state or system level:  the legislature, governor, statewide oversight agency, or system 
governing board.  Although some states allow institutional trustees to set tuition levels 
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(Jones, 2001; Badolato, 2008), critics have argued that active government intervention is 
necessary to manage costs and temper tuition increases (Paulsen, 2001; Winston, 2000; 
Perna, Steele, Woda, & Hibbert, 2005).  Little empirical research has measured autonomy 
at the institution level.  For this study, tuition authority at the institution level was 
classified according to state level responses to the State Higher Education Executive 
Officers Survey of State Tuition, Fees, and Financial Assistance Policies, 2002-03 
(Rasmussen, 2003) and 2005-06 (Boatman & L’Orange, 2006) as well as other sources4.   
Among the six categories of tuition authority, the nature and strength of the 
relationship to outcomes was mixed across models.  In addition, for all three outcomes 
there was a significant difference in the growth trajectories that was dependent on 
category of tuition authority
5
.  In the net tuition model, tuition authority also significantly 
moderated the strength of the relationships of other explanatory factors, including state 
funding measures and region, which will be discussed in later sections. With little prior 
research available, conditional estimates for tuition authority are discussed in the context 
of historical averages previously illustrated in Figures 7, 8, and 9 in Chapter Three.  
Comparing model results to historical trends may help understand if historic levels are 
related to level of tuition authority or to some other factor(s).  A brief review of the 
conceptual differences among entities with tuition-setting authority begins the discussion 
of the results for this factor. 
                                                 
4
 See Table A1 in the Appendix. 
5
 See Table C4 in the Appendix to review significance tests for model-based estimates for the 
interaction effects of year and tuition authority for all outcome variables.   
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Governor/Legislature: Although institutions in this category may have an 
advisory role in recommending tuition levels, the primary authority to set tuition rests 
with the same state-level political actors who control state appropriations and are most 
accountable for state public policy goals.  Assumed to be the most restrictive 
environment, when compared to other categories of tuition authority, historical averages 
for tuition and spending levels were markedly lower and enrollment of minority students 
was highest at these institutions. 
Statewide Agency and Individual System Board: Statewide agencies are typically 
state-level governing or coordinating bodies with responsibility to oversee multiple 
systems within a state while individual system boards typically have responsibility for a 
single system of institutions.  Levels of authority may vary and membership may be a 
combination of political appointment, popular election, and/or representation by 
associated institutions.   
For all three outcome measures, historical trends from 2003 to 2009 were very 
similar for institutions in these two categories of tuition authority.  At these institutions, 
both mean net tuition and education & general spending per FTE were higher than 
Governor/Legislature institutions and lower than Full Control, Moderate Control, and 
Strict Control institutions.  Minority enrollment was much lower among Statewide 
Agency and Individual System Board institutions than institutions in all other categories 
of tuition authority, except Strict Control institutions. 
 Strict Control: Although an institution may have primary control of tuition levels, 
the scope of that authority varies by institution and/or state.  Strict Control institutions are 
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only able to set undergraduate tuition levels within very specific limits set by the 
Legislature or other governing body.  There were only six institutions categorized as 
Strict Control institutions and all are located in a single region.  Both these issues 
represent challenges in the analysis for this category.  Accordingly, few of the effect 
estimates for this category were statistically significant and results cannot be generalized.  
However, there were notable differences for this category in this population of 
institutions.  Historical trends in Figures 7 through 9 reveal that mean net tuition and 
education and general spending among Strict Control institutions is among the highest, 
and minority enrollment is the lowest among of all levels of tuition authority.   
 Moderate Control: Moderate Control institutions are likely to have less restriction 
placed on their authority to determine tuition levels than Strict Control institutions.  For 
example, tuition limitations may be expressed as a percentage of instructional costs or 
institutions may be required to allocate some portion of tuition increases to institutional 
grant aid to assist low-income students in meeting rising tuition levels.  Historical trends 
for all three outcomes for Moderate Control institutions reveal consistent performance in 
the mid-range of categories of tuition authority. 
 Full Control: Institutions with full control have no external restrictions in setting 
tuition levels although that authority may not be formalized and subject to pressure from 
funding authorities.  With states having limited control of the institutions’ ability to raise 
tuition levels, critics argue that granting institutions autonomy in setting tuition will result 
in higher levels of tuition as well as higher expense levels when compared to other 
categories of tuition authority, an expectation that is apparent in historical trends.  
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Net Tuition: Examination of historical trends for net tuition from 2003 to 2009 
indicate that Full Control institutions had the highest net tuition and Governor/Legislature 
institutions had the lowest net tuition across categories.  Results of the net tuition model 
indicate that effect estimates support the relationship of tuition authority to historical 
levels at Full Control institutions when compared to other categories of tuition authority.  
However, for Governor/Legislature institutions, the relationship of tuition authority to the 
net tuition outcome did not support historical trends.  While historically net tuition at 
Governor/Legislature institutions was lowest among categories of tuition authority, the 
conditional estimates for these institutions was third highest among all categories and 
more in line with estimates for Full Control and Moderate Control institutions found at 
the other end of the autonomy spectrum.  Additionally, at Governor/Legislature 
institutions the overall rate of growth was well-above average at 25.2%, also more similar 
to Full and Moderate Control institutions than institutions in other state- or system-level 
categories. While tuition authority appears to be an important factor in explaining tuition 
levels at Full Control institutions, conditional estimates across all categories of tuition 
authority were considerably higher than historical results.  This disparity between actual 
and conditional estimates for net tuition suggests that the success in holding down student 
costs, particularly at Governor/Legislature institutions, is more likely related to other 
institution- and/or state-level factors than tuition authority. 
Education and General Expense: While prior research was unable to find a 
relationship between expenditures at public universities and campus autonomy 
(Volkwein, 1986a, 1989; DeGroot, McMahon, & Volkwein, 1991), this analysis found 
variation in conditional estimates for E&G spending that were significantly associated 
  166 
with differences in category of tuition authority.  For the tuition authority factor, although 
estimated initial values were low for all categories, the education and general spending 
model appeared to be the most effective of the three models in explaining the 
relationships among the different categories of tuition authority.  Historical trends 
illustrated in Figure 8 show that E&G spending was highest at Strict Control and Full 
Control institutions and lowest at Governor/Legislature institutions.  Compared to 
Governor/Legislature institutions, conditional E&G spending estimates were significantly 
higher for all levels of tuition authority, which mirrors the historical trends for all 
categories of tuition authority except for Moderate Control institutions, which was not 
significant.  
Minority Enrollment:  The historical trends for minority enrollment by tuition 
authority illustrated in Figure 9 show that average enrollment of minority students was 
highest at Governor/Legislature institutions across all seven years of the study period.  
Full Control and Moderate Control institutions followed with enrollment levels that fell 
in the middle of the range of values for all categories of tuition authority.   
Results of the model indicated that there was significant variation in minority 
enrollment among levels of tuition authority.  However, estimates at 
Governor/Legislature institutions, the reference group, were not statistically different 
from the other categories of tuition authority.  Only for Full Control institutions were 
conditional minority enrollment estimates statistically different from the remaining 
categories of tuition authority.  Model-based estimates for Full Control institutions were 
also significantly higher than estimates for other categories of tuition authority.  For 
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Governor/Legislature institutions, the lack of statistical significance for this effect 
suggests that, even though the actual levels of minority enrollment are highest at 
Governor/Legislature institutions in this population, that success is likely not related to 
the tuition authority factor. 
The conditional growth rate in minority enrollment also varied significantly 
among institutions depending on category of tuition authority.  Both Full Control 
institutions and Governor/Legislature institutions had the smallest rates of change over 
the seven-year period, about 12%.  The highest significant growth in minority enrollment, 
about 26%, was at Statewide Agency and Individual System Board institutions.  
Although at first glance it would appear that that increases in minority enrollment are 
improving at a faster rate at institutions where tuition is controlled by a non-legislative, 
state- or system-level entity, both historical levels and conditional estimates of minority 
enrollment at these institutions are far below other categories of tuition authority.  
Additional research would be required to determine if this growth is due to lower tuition 
levels at these institutions or special policies and/or incentives that target this particular 
student population. 
Resource Control 
One of the three factors that contribute to an organization’s autonomy is the 
extent of its discretion in allocating and using resources (Pfeffer & Salanik, 1978).  
Public institutions that have spending authority and retain control of collected tuition 
revenues have more control of their finances than institutions whose tuition revenue is 
controlled at the state-level or must abide by state-mandated line item budgets.  From 
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SHEEO survey data, institutions were classified as having either institutional- or state-
level control of revenue according to responses to survey questions.  While critics 
contend that removing state control might lead to increased spending (Berdahl, 1978; 
Sabloff, 1997; Berdahl & MacTaggert, 2000), the results of this analysis did not find a 
significant relationship between resource control and E&G spending.  However, there 
was a significant relationship found between this factor and net tuition levels.  Where 
institutions control their own tuition revenue, net tuition was an average 7.3% higher than 
at institutions where revenue is controlled at the state level. 
State Governance Structure 
An effective state governance structure provides a bridge and a buffer between the 
conflicting goals of the institution and the state (Berdahl, 1971; McLendon, 2003).  As a 
measure of state-level oversight, this study used the classification scheme developed by 
McGuinness (1997, 2002) to organize state governance structures into consolidated 
governing boards, coordinating boards, or planning agencies.  Considered highly 
regulated, governing boards consolidate control at the state level and coordinate higher 
education policy statewide and may also manage the operations of institutions under their 
authority.  Among coordinating boards, the predominant form of organization, state-level 
coordination is decentralized with separate institution or sector governing boards.  
Planning agencies, the least restrictive, serve only in an advisory capacity and rely on 
voluntary cooperation by state institutions.  The results indicated that differences in 
governance structure were related to variation in net tuition and minority enrollment.  For 
E&G spending, just as prior research was unable to find evidence to link the regulatory 
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environment to spending levels (Volkwien, 1986a, 1989; DeGroot et al., 1991), this study 
found no statistical relationship between level of education and general spending and 
state-level oversight.   
Net Tuition: Although prior studies of tuition pricing have produced conflicting 
results, differences were attributed to inconsistencies in unit of analysis, study 
populations, and measurement of state control.  Among universities, research has 
generally found higher tuition levels where state control was less restrictive (Lowry, 
2001a, 2001b; Knott & Payne, 2004).  Similarly, in this analysis across sectors, 
conditional estimates for net tuition at institutions in planning agency states, the least 
restrictive form of governance, was 11.8% higher than institutions in governing board 
states (although non-significant) and 20.0% higher than coordinating board states.  On the 
other hand, when conditional estimates for institutions in governing board states were 
compared to that of less restrictive coordinating board institutions, mean net tuition at 
governing board institutions was 10.5% higher than institutions in coordinating board 
states.  This latter finding supports research by Nicholson-Crotty & Meier (2003) who 
found tuition charges in governing board states 52% higher than coordinating board 
states.  Although the nature of the relationship was similar, the disparity in strength of the 
relationship may be due to the inclusion of two-year institutions in the Nicholson-Crotty 
& Meier study. 
Minority Access: There was a significant difference in the percent of minority 
enrollment at institutions in planning agency states when compared to coordinating board 
institutions where state oversight was more restrictive.  The conditional estimate for 
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minority enrollment at coordinating board state institutions was likely 6.4% higher than 
enrollment at institutions in planning agency states.  Although not statistically different 
from the other two categories, minority enrollment at governing board state institutions 
was likely 25.2% higher than planning agency state institutions but 22.4% lower than 
institutions in coordinating board states. 
The Relationship of State Funding to Institutional Outcomes 
To examine the relationship of state financial support to institutional outcomes, 
two independent variables related to state funding were included in this study: state and 
local appropriations per FTE, a measure of the level of government support; and 
publicness, the ratio of state appropriations to total revenue.  Both factors were found to 
have important statistically significant relationships to net tuition and E&G spending, 
however, neither was significantly associated with changes in minority enrollment. 
State and Local Appropriations 
During the last decade, the instability in economic conditions nationwide has been 
reflected in state and local government budgets.  According to the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, a period of expansion began late in 2001 after an eight-month 
recession, peaking in December 2007 (NBER, 2003).  While national GDP statistics and 
mean state tax revenues for this population of states followed the same general trend, 
adjustments to state appropriations to higher education appeared to lag these events.  
For this population of four-year institutions, average state and local appropriations 
per full-time equivalent student was erratic over the seven-year period and did not begin 
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to rise from historically low levels until the economic recovery was well underway
6
.   
Appropriations among all categories of tuition authority declined from 2003 through 
2005.  For other than Governor/Legislature and Full Control institutions, funding levels 
then increased through 2008 until most categories of tuition authority regained, or 
slightly exceeded, 2003 levels.  For Governor/Legislature institutions, average 
appropriations per FTE declined only slightly through 2006 before rising to much higher 
levels through 2008.  Appropriations for Full Control institutions declined through 2007 
and, although increasing in 2008, were still well below the 2003 level by more than 13%.  
Between 2008 and 2009, average appropriations per FTE declined for all categories, 
reverting back to 2005 levels. 
Net Tuition: Particularly among universities, prior research has suggested that 
state funding levels are the primary determinant of tuition pricing.  According to the 
literature, tuition levels tend to increase when states face budget shortfalls (Hauptman & 
Merisotis, 1997; Kane, 1994; Griswold & Marine, 1997; Zemsky, 2004; Jones, 2001; 
Rusk & Leslie, 1978; Lowry, 2001a, Koshal & Koshal, 2001).  Historically, net tuition 
levels across categories of tuition authority appeared to increase steadily over the study 
period despite erratic state funding levels
7
.  Although increases in tuition after the 2001 
recession were likely in response to cuts in state appropriations, tuition levels continued 
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 See Figure 16 in Chapter Four 
7
 See Figure 7 in Chapter Three 
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to rise, although more slowly, even when funding levels increased (Desrochers et al., 
2010). 
These observations in the data are supported by the results of this study that found 
a positive, but modest, relationship between the level of appropriations and net tuition per 
FTE.  With each $500 increase in appropriations per FTE, mean net tuition was an 
estimated 1.2% higher.  Although this average increase varied by category of tuition 
authority, the differences among categories were not statistically significant, ranging 
from 0.0009% to 0.0038% for each $1 increase in appropriations per FTE student.    
Although this result may be counterintuitive, increased funding per FTE student may 
indicate improvements in state revenue which could be an indicator of recovering 
economic conditions and related increases in household income.  In the SHEEO 2002-03 
survey, three respondents indicated that state per capita income was one of the top three 
most-influential factors used to set tuition levels for state residents (Rasmussen, 2003).  
To support this observation, there was a statistically significant, although modest, 
increase in net tuition related to education attainment, a variable that serves as a proxy for 
household income.   Accordingly, states and institutions may be unwilling to “roll back” 
tuition and, in fact, appear to institute small increases when economic conditions 
improve.  
 Education and General Expense: Critics of higher education spending have 
claimed that any increase in revenue at public institutions promotes cost inefficiencies 
and reductions in state appropriations do not effectively curtail spending (Bowen, 1980; 
Robst, 2001).  Significant increases in instructional spending have been found in the 
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literature among institutions where appropriations increased (McPherson & Schapiro, 
1993b).  At Governor/Legislature institutions, between 2006 and 2009, there was an 
increase in E&G spending at a time when expense levels among institutions in other 
categories remained relatively flat.  At the same time, average appropriations per FTE 
rose sharply at Governor/Legislature institutions, while other categories of tuition 
authority experienced only modest increases in state appropriations through 2008.  The 
results of the education and general expense model supported this observation by finding 
a positive relationship between level of appropriations and education and general expense 
levels per FTE.  A $500 increase in appropriations per FTE increased mean E&G 
spending an estimated 2.9% across categories of tuition authority.  At 
Governor/Legislature institutions where average E&G expenses per FTE was $16,142 in 
2008, a $500 increase in appropriations per FTE would result in a related $468 increase 
in spending. 
Reliance on Government Funding 
When measured by the second funding variable, the ratio of state appropriations 
to total revenue, there was a statistically significant inverse relationship between 
government support and tuition levels as well as E&G spending.  “Publicness” (Bozeman 
& Straussman, 1983, p. 81) is a measure of dependence on state government support and 
can be thought of as an institution’s need, ability, or expertise in diversifying its revenue 
stream, a strategy which can mitigate the unpredictability of state funding (Silver, 1993; 
Benson, 1975; Johnson, 1995).  There was no relationship found between the percent of 
reliance on government support and enrollment of minorities at public institutions. 
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Net Tuition: In comparing the historical trends in publicness
8
 to that of net 
tuition
9
, institutions that rely most on government funding as a percent of total revenue 
typically had lower levels of tuition.  Supporting this observation, the analysis found a 
significant inverse relationship between publicness and net tuition.  For every 1% 
increase in the ratio of state government funding to total revenue, net tuition was 
estimated 0.25% to 1.79% lower, depending on category of tuition authority.  At 
institutions with higher levels of reliance on government funding (Governor/Legislature, 
Statewide Agency, Individual System Board), with each 1% increase in publicness, mean 
net tuition was likely to be 1.13% to 1.79% lower.  Among Full Control institutions, there 
was an almost 1:1 relationship: an increase of 1% reliance on government funding 
decreased net tuition an estimated 0.97%.  Estimates for Moderate Control institutions 
were only slightly lower at -0.89%.  Strict Control institutions appeared to have the most 
modest relationship between publicness and net tuition; the decrease to mean net tuition 
was only 0.25% for every 1% increase in publicness. 
Overall, at institutions that rely more heavily on state appropriations to fund 
operations, net tuition is more likely to be lower.  While this observation could be a result 
of a state’s tuition philosophy or political pressure in budget negotiations, it could also be 
attributable to the distribution of institutions among sectors.  Unlike universities and even 
masters institutions, bachelors institutions generally have fewer external sources of 
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 See Figure 15 in Chapter Four. 
9
 See Figure 7 in Chapter Three. 
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revenue and are therefore likely to have greater reliance on state funding; these 
institutions also typically have lower tuition levels than the other two sectors. 
Education and General Expense: The level of education and general spending 
was also inversely related to the degree to which an institution is reliant on government 
support but there was no significant variation in the rate of change among levels of 
tuition authority.  Overall, with each 1% increase in publicness, conditional estimates for 
E&G spending per FTE were likely to be 0.441% lower.  Although Bowen (1980) posited 
that constraints in government funding did little to restrain institutional spending, it 
appears that reductions in government funding may constrict spending, but only at 
institutions that are unable to replace lost revenue with other revenue streams. 
The Relationship of Region to Institutional Outcomes 
Regional influence was measured by membership in a formally-organized higher 
education regional compact.  All but two states, New York and Pennsylvania, were 
affiliated with a regional compact.  Created by member state governments and supervised 
by gubernatorial-appointed representatives, the goal of these organizations is to increase 
collaboration among member states and facilitate sharing of resources (Axt, 1960).  
States in geographic proximity may have similar economic, demographic, and cultural 
characteristics and policymakers often look to neighboring states for innovative practices.  
Although any statistically significant relationship between membership in a regional 
compact and institutional outcomes may suggest that this collaboration influences policy 
diffusion and adoption, it may be difficult to determine whether this regional relationship 
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is related to competitive pressures, regional demographic and economic conditions, or 
political collusion. 
During the model-fitting process, analysis of the Level-2 sub-models that 
included only institution-level variables revealed that variation in means in all three 
outcome variables were significantly associated with differences in tuition authority and 
there was almost universal statistical significance in mean estimates across categories of 
tuition authority
10
.  With the introduction of the state parameters, there were significant 
changes to the outcome estimates suggesting that one or more state-level factors were 
moderating or confounding the relationship to institution-level outcomes.  Among the 
state factors included in the models, for all three outcomes there was significant variation 
in means associated with differences in region. 
Examination of the distribution of institutions among region and tuition authority 
in Tables 24 and 36 revealed that there appears to be some suggestion of regional 
political influence rather than regional factors related to economic or demographic 
conditions.  Only Individual System Board and Statewide Agency institutions are well-
represented across regions.  For the study population, all Strict Control institutions are 
located in states affiliated with the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education 
(WICHE) and all Governor/Legislature institutions are located in SREB-affiliated states.  
There is also a notable concentration of Full Control institutions in the MEHC region. 
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 See Tables 17, 28, and 33 in Chapter Four. 
  177 
Net Tuition: Review of the literature found some support for regional influence in 
tuition pricing (Rusk & Leslie, 1978; Koshal & Koshal, 2000).  The results of this 
analysis found significant variation in conditional net tuition estimates associated with 
membership or, lack of membership, in a regional compact.  This relationship was 
moderated by a significant interaction with tuition authority.  According to tests of 
model-based estimates, with the exception of the twenty NEBHE-affiliated institutions 
where tuition estimates were relatively consistent, there was significant variation in 
region effect estimates according to level of tuition authority for the remaining four levels 
of region.  At unaffiliated institutions as well as SREB- and WICHE-affiliated 
institutions, both the effects of regional membership and tuition authority were significant 
to the relationship.   Without further analysis it is difficult to identify whether a 
significant regional relationship to net tuition can be attributed to competitive, economic, 
or political influence.  At MHEC-affiliated institutions, the effect of region was not 
significant with most of the variation in net tuition related to the level of tuition authority; 
most of the Full Control institutions are located in states affiliated with the MEHC 
regional compact. 
Education and General Expense: For this outcome, variation in mean spending 
was significantly associated with differences in region.  Conditional E&G expense 
estimates were lowest at unaffiliated states.  However, only institutions in SREB and 
WICHE regions had effect estimates that were statistically significant, 11.7% and 16.0% 
higher, respectively, than institutions in unaffiliated states.  Although not statistically 
significant, at MHEC and NEBHE states in this population, spending was also higher 
than institutions in unaffiliated states. 
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Minority Access: Region was again statistically significant in explaining variation 
in percent of minority enrollment across institutions. Conditional estimates at SREB-
affiliated institutions were statistically significant with minority enrollment almost 47% 
higher than that of unaffiliated institutions.  Conversely, the conditional enrollment 
estimate for MHEC-affiliated institutions was 26% lower than unaffiliated institutions.  
Estimates for the remaining regions were non-significant: WICHE institutions averaged 
7.4% higher and NEBHE-affiliated institutions were 13.3% lower than unaffiliated 
institutions. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Complex analysis often raises more questions than it answers.  The use of 
quantitative statistical techniques that preserve differences at each level of analysis can be 
an effective means of clarifying the nature and strength of relationships.  While the 
results of this study may serve as a starting point for future research, both qualitative and 
quantitative methods should be considered in order to better understand the complex 
interplay between institutional and state factors. 
Qualitative case study analysis of notable institutions and/or states: The SAS 
Mixed procedure provides influence diagnostics that can serve as a quantitative screening 
process to identify institutions and/or states that under- or out-perform group means.  
Qualitative case studies can illuminate policy and practice at a level that cannot be 
achieved in quantitative analysis.  Given the difficulties in categorizing the nuances of 
postsecondary tuition-setting authority and resource control, case studies of institutions 
and states that have under- or out-performed their peers may help identify factors and 
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circumstances that can more richly explain the relationships that can influence outcomes.  
As Stake (1981, p. 47) suggested “previously unknown relationships and variables can be 
expected to emerge from case studies leading to a rethinking of the phenomenon being 
studied.  Insights into how things get to be the way they are can be expected to result 
from case studies” (as cited in Merriam, 1998).  Best practices may emerge from a more 
in-depth study of institutions that have been successful in balancing their fiscal 
responsibilities with public needs.   
Mixed methods case study of institutions/states excluded from analysis: 
Institutions from five states were excluded from the analysis due to changes in tuition-
setting authority during the study period.  Measuring selected outcomes at these 
institutions in an interrupted time series design could provide insight into changes in 
institutional outcomes that can be more closely related to changes in fiscal policy.  
Role of regional association in policy diffusion and adoption: One of the most 
interesting discoveries for this researcher was the nature of the relationship of each of the 
outcome variables to membership in a regional planning compact.   In conducting the 
literature review, research findings interpreted the effect of regional association in 
geographic, not political terms.   Although any relationship among neighboring states 
may be related to geographic competition or economic factors, there appears to be 
significant political influence in regional compact membership, particularly among 
institutions in WICHE-, SREB-, and MHEC-affiliated states.  The distribution of 
institutions according to level of tuition authority revealed that for this population of 
institutions, Governor/Legislature institutions are exclusive to SREB states, Strict Control 
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institutions are exclusive to WICHE-affiliated states, and Full Control institutions are 
concentrated primarily at MHEC-affiliated states.  Among these regional compacts, this 
evidence is suggestive of what Salanik & Pfeffer (1974) describe as horizontal power 
resulting from naturally-occurring coalitions.  The ability to understand the roles of 
regional organizations and national associations or advocacy groups in the diffusion of 
policy may provide new opportunities to leverage political processes to meet common 
policy goals.   
Conclusion 
The higher education enterprise has become integral to ensuring the financial 
security of individuals, and in doing so safeguard the global competitiveness of the 
nation.  Public institutions in the United States are under an implied social contract to 
support nationwide public policy goals of access, affordability, quality, and workforce 
development.  The purview of the states, government financing of these efforts has 
struggled in recent decades to keep pace with the demands of an increasingly diverse 
student population, accommodate new, ever-changing technology in a knowledge-driven 
economy, and manage the competing expectations of a growing number of external 
stakeholders.  With states struggling to finance competing priorities, public institutions 
look for ways to reduce dependency on state funding while state policymakers attempt to 
maintain enough control to motivate institutions to act in a manner that will further its 
public objectives.  The incorporation of steering mechanisms in state policy appears to be 
on the increase in both the United States and abroad as public institutions negotiate 
  181 
greater institutional autonomy in exchange for increased accountability to public needs 
(Jongbloed, 2003; Salmi, 2007).   
The study was designed to address deficiencies in prior research that failed to 
account for changes over time and across sectors in examining the relationship between 
measureable institutional outcomes and the institution’s level of fiscal autonomy from 
state control.  To accomplish that goal, multilevel modeling techniques were employed in 
a longitudinal design.  Through the analysis of within-institution change attributable to 
time as well as selected institution- and state-level variables to detect differences between 
institutions, this analysis was able to detect complex growth patterns that help clarify the 
relationship of explanatory factors that, over time, have shaped institutional outcomes. 
The analysis incorporated three factors that were related to an institution’s 
autonomy from state control: tuition-setting authority, resource control, and state 
governance structure.  The primary focus of this study was the institution’s tuition-setting 
ability.  Although there was evidence of a relationship between tuition authority and each 
institutional outcome the significance of that relationship varied by outcome measure as 
well as category of tuition authority.  The education and general spending model 
appeared to be the most effective of the three models in explaining the relationships 
among levels of tuition authority.  The ability to explain trends in E&G spending more 
accurately may be due to the lack of variance related to differences between states; 
according to the unconditional means model
11
 only 8.5% of the variance was related to 
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 See Table 26 in Chapter Four. 
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differences between states; more than 88% of the variance is related to within- and 
between-institution differences.  Across models, conditional estimates for tuition 
authority appear to be most effective in explaining differences in the relationship of 
outcomes for Full Control institutions to other categories of tuition authority.  Among all 
categories of tuition authority, particularly Governor/Legislature institutions, even when 
effect estimates were significantly different, the mixed success in relating tuition 
authority to historical trends suggests that other institution- or state-level factors may 
have a stronger relationship or may be confounding results. 
The study did not find any significant relationship between education and general 
spending and either governance structure or resource control, similar to earlier research.  
For both net tuition and minority enrollment, the relationship of state governance 
structure to outcomes provided mixed results.  Among governing board and coordinating 
board states, greater state-level influence in decision-making did not result in lower 
tuition levels or higher minority enrollment at public institutions as might be expected.  
Effect estimates were more in line with expectations when comparing institutions in 
planning agency states with both governing board and coordinating board states.  At 
institutions in planning agency states, where states serve only an advisory role, the 
conditional net tuition estimate was higher and minority enrollment was lower than other 
institutions.   
To examine the relationship of state financial support to institutional outcomes, 
two independent variables related to state funding were included: state and local 
appropriations per FTE, a measure of the level of government support, and publicness, 
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the ratio of state appropriations to total revenue.  Both factors were found to have a 
statistically significant and important relationship to net tuition and E&G spending.  
Greater reliance on government support resulted in lower tuition and spending levels 
while increased levels of appropriations was significantly associated with higher net 
tuition and E&G expenses.  Neither funding variable was significantly associated with 
changes in minority enrollment. 
Unexpected results came from the effect of region which was statistically 
significant across all three outcome measures, but there does not appear to be a consistent 
pattern for the nature and strength of the regional relationship; the significance among 
levels of region varied according to outcome.  For the net tuition outcome, regional 
influence appears to be more political given the distribution of institutions and for 
minority enrollment, regional differences are more likely driven by demographic 
differences than political influence.  For education and general expense, the regional 
relationship, although significant, was modest. 
The complexity of the results of this study is a reflection of the complexity of the 
enterprise.  The use of multilevel modeling techniques to examine these issues has 
brought this researcher a better understanding of the academy and the challenges facing 
not only the institution, but state policymakers as well, in meeting public policy goals in 
an unstable economic environment.  These techniques allow the complex, interrelated 
factors of institutional and state level data to be incorporated to better understand how 
each relates to measures of affordability, operating efficiency, and minority access.  Prior 
to this study, there was little empirical evidence to either support or counter claims that 
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reducing state oversight would lead to increases in tuition levels and increases in 
spending that could threaten access, particularly for low-income and minority 
populations.  Although results were mixed, this effort serves as a starting point for future 
research to better understand the dynamics of this complex enterprise and its contribution 
to public policy goals. 
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Table A1 
 Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 and 2005-06 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and 
Universities, Questions 4a, 4b, and 4 
STATE 
Survey 2002-03 
Tuition Auth 
2003 
Survey Response 2005-06 OTHER COMMENTS/SOURCES 
Q4a. Describe the role 
of individual 
institutions in 
establishing rates 
and/or policies in your 
state. 
Q4c. If 
institutions have 
primary [or  
some] authority 
what is the 
nature of their 
authority 
Q4b. Which of the 
entities (in Q4a) has 
primary authority for 
establishing tuition? 
Alabama "Recommends policy 
to Boards of Trustees" 
Moderate or 
limited authority 
Boards of Trustees 
[Institution] 
Moderate 
Control Inst 
Individual institutions; 
Moderate or limited 
authority 
SREB 2002-2008 "Boards of Trustees of individual institutions are solely 
empowered to establish tuition and fees. Legislation provides guidelines for 
common student classifications and requirements for non-resident tuition rates". 
Arizona "Advisory role"   Board of Regents  Statewide 
Agency 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
http://www.azregents.edu/abouttheboard/default.aspx 
Arkansas Decision-making Moderate or 
limited authority 
Institution Board of 
Trustees 
Moderate 
Control Inst 
Individual institutions; 
Moderate or limited 
authority 
SREB 2002-2008 "Board of Higher Education sets tuition and fee revenue 
expectations; institutions and local boards determine amount of tuition. Resident 
tuition target is 25-30% of instructional cost. " 
California No Response   [ See Other 
Comments ] 
Individual 
System Board 
[See Other Comments ] "The UC Board of Regents and CSU Board of Trustees have statutory authority to 
set fee levels for their respective segments"  (LAO, 2005)**"These powers are very 
specific and ONLY relate to campus-based fees [tuition]. NOT the regular system 
wide student fees. For what most of us consider traditional student fees, it's the Leg., 
Gov., and system wide governing bodies." 
Connecticut None; "System 
governing board sets 
tuition and fee rates" 
  System governing 
boards (constituent 
units)  
Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
Reorganized from Individual System Boards to consolidated governing board in 
2011; 
http://www.ccweek.com/news/templates/template.aspx?articleid=2659&zoneid=3 
Delaware Institutional governing 
boards by state statute 
exercise the sole 
authority for setting 
tuition and fees 
No external 
restrictions 
Individual institutions Full Control 
Inst 
Individual institutions; No 
external restrictions 
SREB 2002-2008 "Institutional boards of trustees are solely empowered to establish 
tuition and fees". 
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Table A1 (continued)  
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 and 2005-06 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and 
Universities, Questions 4a, 4b, and 4c 
STATE 
Survey 2002-03 
Tuition Auth 
2003 
Survey Response 2005-06 OTHER COMMENTS/SOURCES 
Q4a. Describe the role 
of individual 
institutions in 
establishing rates 
and/or policies in your 
state. 
Q4c. If 
institutions have 
primary [or  
some] authority 
what is the 
nature of their 
authority 
Q4b. Which of the 
entities (in Q4a) has 
primary authority for 
establishing tuition? 
Florida "Boards of Trustees …. 
have discretionary 
authority to adopt 
tuition rates within 
parameters established 
by the legislature". 
Very strict 
guidelines 
Legislature and local 
boards of trustees 
[for cc] 
Gov/Leg Legislature/Board of 
Governors - Ongoing 
litigation 
SREB 02/03-03/04 "Universities set tuition within limits established by the 
Legislature" Historically, in-state undergraduate tuition has been set at 25% of 
instruction with out-of-state students paying the full cost. There has been little 
variation in tuition and fees across universities because of system-wide limits set by 
the Legislature on tuition increases". SREB 04/05 "The Board of Governors has 
authority to set tuition and fees but has deferred to the Legislature and not yet 
exercised that authority".  SREB 05/06 "The Board of Governors has authority to set 
tuition and fees but has to this point stayed within the limits set by the Legislature in 
the annual appropriations bills. A statutory change was enacted by the 2006 
legislature that delegates all tuition authority to the Board of Governors, or its 
designee, except for resident undergraduate tuition". SREB 06/07 - 07/08 "The Board 
of Governors has asserted its authority to set tuition and fees but the Legislature has 
not conceded that authority. The issue is currently in litigation". 
Georgia None; "Board of 
Regents approves 
tuition increases every 
year" 
  Board of Regents  Statewide 
Agency 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
SREB 2002-2008 "Georgia Board of Regents.  [Resident} tuition rates generally are 
established such that the projected amount of revenue raised with approximately at 
least 25% of the total amount generated by the USG funding formula". 
Hawaii Recommends changes; 
"Board of Regents: 
decision-making" 
  Board of Regents 
(governing board) 
Statewide 
Agency 
Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems 
  
Idaho Makes 
recommendations to 
the governing board for 
non-instructional fees  
  State governing 
board  
Statewide 
Agency 
Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems 
  
Illinois Institutional governing 
boards by state statute 
exercise the sole 
authority for setting 
tuition and fees 
No external 
restrictions 
University and 
university system 
governing boards 
Full Control 
Inst 
Individual institutions; No 
external restrictions 
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Table A1 (continued)  
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 and 2005-06 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and 
Universities, Questions 4a, 4b, and 4c 
STATE 
Survey 2002-03 
Tuition Auth 
2003 
Survey Response 2005-06 OTHER COMMENTS/SOURCES 
Q4a. Describe the role 
of individual 
institutions in 
establishing rates 
and/or policies in your 
state. 
Q4c. If 
institutions have 
primary [or  
some] authority 
what is the 
nature of their 
authority 
Q4b. Which of the 
entities (in Q4a) has 
primary authority for 
establishing tuition? 
Indiana Decisions are made by 
trustees. In multi-
campus systems - 
Indiana University and 
Purdue University - 
system trustees make 
decisions for all 
campuses 
No external 
restrictions 
Institutional trustees Full Control 
Inst 
Individual institutions; 
Moderate or limited 
authority 
Pressure from the legislature to limit increases (Boatman & L'Orange, 2006) 
Iowa Not applicable; "The 
Board of Regents, State 
of Iowa, govern the 
three state universities 
and establish tuition 
policy and tuition and 
fees" 
  Board of Regents Statewide 
Agency 
Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems 
  
Kansas "Board of Regents sets 
tuition for state 
universities; Local 
board sets tuition for 
Washburn University, a 
municipal university" 
  See above [Q4a].  Statewide 
Agency 
Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems 
Washburn University = FULL 
Kentucky "[Individual 
institutions] set tuition 
rates consistent with 
coordinating agency 
guidelines" 
Moderate or 
limited authority 
Institutions Moderate 
Control Inst 
Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems 
SREB 02/03 "Individual institutions … set tuition within guidelines approved by the 
Council on Postsecondary Education"; SREB 03/04 - 07/08 "The Council has statutory 
responsibility for setting tuition. The Council allows individual universities … to set 
tuition within specific parameters approved by the Council on Postsecondary 
Education".   
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Table A1 (continued)  
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 and 2005-06 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and 
Universities, Questions 4a, 4b, and 4c 
STATE 
Survey 2002-03 
Tuition Auth 
2003 
Survey Response 2005-06 OTHER COMMENTS/SOURCES 
Q4a. Describe the 
role of individual 
institutions in 
establishing rates 
and/or policies in 
your state. 
Q4c. If 
institutions have 
primary [or  
some] authority 
what is the 
nature of their 
authority 
Q4b. Which of the 
entities (in Q4a) has 
primary authority for 
establishing tuition? 
Louisiana Propose to system 
board; System board 
decision-making 
authority subject to 
Legislative approval. 
  System board and 
legislature 
Gov/Leg Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
SREB 02/03 - 04/05 "Management boards for each system set tuition subject to 
approval by 2/3 of the legislature pursuant to state constitutional requirements. Act 
1117 of 2001 allows annual increases to 3% in tuition with approval of the Joint 
Committee in the Budget, this state policy is in effect until June 2005"; SREB 05/06 - 
07/08  "Board of Regents funding policy targets SREB average rates for both state 
support and tuition and mandatory fee support, by category of institution". 
Maine Requesters; System 
governing board 
decision-making. 
  Board of Trustees  Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems; Full decision 
making authority 
Sole institution consisting of 7 campuses governed by a single system board 
(http://www.maine.edu/) 
Maryland Presidents of 
institutions 
recommend tuition 
levels and governing 
boards [for individual 
systems - USM and 
MSU] approve them 
Moderate or 
limited authority 
Both presidents (i.e. 
individual 
institutions) and their 
governing boards 
Individual 
System Board 
No response; Q4a (2002-
03) inferred 
coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
SREB 02/03 - 07/08 "Individual institution governing boards"; See Berdahl (1996, 
1999) St. Mary's College of Maryland has full autonomy. 
Massachusetts Set fees; State 
coordinating/governi
ng board sets tuition 
  Board of Higher 
Education 
Statewide 
Agency 
Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems 
  
Michigan No response     Full Control 
Inst 
Individual institutions; No 
external restrictions 
Individual boards have the power to set tuition and to determine how their state 
appropriations will be spent http://www.capolicycenter.org/ michigan/michigan3.html 
Minnesota - UM Referred to Q1b. 
"The Board of 
Regents of the 
University of 
Minnesota and the 
board of trustees of 
the MN state colleges 
and universities shall 
each establish 
tuition." 
No external 
restrictions 
System boards Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
The Board of Regents alone is empowered to manage the university, except as 
qualified below. Case law prohibits either the legislative or executive branch from 
participating in internal management of the university. Cases especially reject broad 
legislative or executive branch control over university finances 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/clssumca.pdf 
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Table A1 (continued)  
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 and 2005-06 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and 
Universities, Questions 4a, 4b, and 4c 
STATE 
Survey 2002-03 
Tuition Auth 
2003 
Survey Response 2005-06 OTHER COMMENTS/SOURCES 
Q4a. Describe the 
role of individual 
institutions in 
establishing rates 
and/or policies in 
your state. 
Q4c. If 
institutions have 
primary [or  
some] authority 
what is the 
nature of their 
authority 
Q4b. Which of the 
entities (in Q4a) has 
primary authority for 
establishing tuition? 
Minnesota-
MnSCU 
MnSCU president 
hold consultations 
with students and 
then brings forth a 
recommendation to 
the Board of Trustees 
each year for 
approval 
  Governing boards Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
  
Mississippi Advisory roles to aid 
the State 
Coordinating IHL 
Board; Mississippi 
Board of Institution's 
of Higher Learning 
has ultimate 
decision-making 
authority 
  Mississippi Board of 
Institutions of Higher 
Learning 
Statewide 
Agency 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
SREB 02/03 - 07/08 "Board for Institutions of Higher Learning sets general tuition by 
level of institution". 
Missouri Based on actions and 
decisions of 
institutional 
governing boards 
Moderate or 
limited authority 
Institutional 
governing boards 
Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
  
Montana No response     Statewide 
Agency 
Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems 
Montana Board of Regents makes decisions on student tuition 
(http://www.mus.edu/data/briefs/Board_of_Regents_Authority-OnePager.pdf) 
Nebraska Advisory roles to 
their boards; System 
governing board 
decision-making 
authority 
  Governing boards Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
  
Nevada Not applicable; State 
Board of Regents has 
statutory authority 
and responsibility to 
set tuition and fees 
  State Board of 
Regents 
Statewide 
Agency 
Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems 
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Table A1 (continued)  
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 and 2005-06 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and 
Universities, Questions 4a, 4b, and 4c 
STATE 
Survey 2002-03 
Tuition Auth 
2003 
Survey Response 2005-06 OTHER COMMENTS/SOURCES 
Q4a. Describe the role of 
individual institutions in 
establishing rates and/or 
policies in your state. 
Q4c. If 
institutions 
have primary 
[or  some] 
authority what 
is the nature of 
their authority 
Q4b. Which of the 
entities (in Q4a) has 
primary authority for 
establishing tuition? 
New Hampshire The Board of Trustees 
for the Univ.System of 
New Hampshire sets 
appropriate tuition rates 
for all institutions, and 
each institutional 
president is a member of 
the Board 
  Individual system 
governing board  
Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems; Full decision 
making authority 
System consists of 4 four-year institutions; "Chartered by the Legislature in 1866 as a 
'body corporate and politic.' Under the broad powers granted to their trustees, UNH had 
evolved its own personnel, purchasing, design and construction, financial-record 
keeping, and other administrative and support systems independent of the state" 
(http://www.usnh.edu) 
New Jersey Decision-making 
authority 
Very strict 
guidelines 
Individual 
institutions 
(corrected response 
from 2005-06 survey 
); Qb3. " Tuition 
increases greater than 
10% threatened with 
special audit by 
Commission on 
Higher Education" 
Strict Control 
Inst 
Individual institutions; 
Moderate or limited 
authority 
2005-06 Survey:  "Governor and/or legislature can cap tuition levels.  The response in 
2002 should have been "Individual Institutions" 
New Mexico The Governing Board of 
New Mexico's public 
postsecondary 
institutions are, by 
Statute, designated the 
responsibility for setting 
tuition and fee charges at 
their respective 
institutions 
Very strict 
guidelines 
New Mexico 
Commission on 
Higher Education 
Statewide 
Agency 
Individual Institutions: 
Moderate or limited 
authority 
  
New York System governing board 
sets tuition based on 
available local, state, and 
federal funds 
  Board of Trustees of 
the university 
systems 
Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems; "The governing 
bodies for SUNY and 
CUNY propose a tuition 
rate and the legislature 
and governor must 
approve it"   
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Table A1 (continued)  
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 and 2005-06 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and 
Universities, Questions 4a, 4b, and 4c 
STATE 
Survey 2002-03 
Tuition Auth 
2003 
Survey Response 2005-06 OTHER COMMENTS/SOURCES 
Q4a. Describe the role of 
individual institutions in 
establishing rates and/or 
policies in your state. 
Q4c. If 
institutions 
have primary 
[or  some] 
authority what 
is the nature of 
their authority 
Q4b. Which of the 
entities (in Q4a) has 
primary authority for 
establishing tuition? 
North Carolina Each Chancellor and 
his/her senior staff works 
with their local Board of 
Trustees to put together 
tuition change proposals 
to be recommended for 
consideration by the 
UNC Board of 
Governors; Legislature 
considers 
recommendations made 
by the Governor & UNC 
Board and sets tuition 
rates as part of 
Appropriations bill 
  Board of Governors Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
SREB 02/03 - 07/08 "Tuition rates are set annually by the Board of Governors and 
reviewed/affirmed by the NC General Assembly when it adopts the state's budget. 
Recommendations for increases in resident tuition rates are made to the BOG through 
an extensive collaborative process involving all of the constituent institutions and a 
review of relevant external indices". 
North Dakota Yes, within 
guidelines/ranges set by 
the system governing 
board 
Moderate or 
limited 
authority 
Governing board Statewide 
Agency 
Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems 
  
Ohio Their (system) 
governing boards have 
the power;  
Moderate or 
limited 
authority 
Institutional 
governing boards 
Moderate 
Control Inst 
Individual institutions; 
Moderate or limited 
authority 
  
Oklahoma Not applicable; State 
coordinating/governing 
agency sets actual tuition 
and fee rates per 
Constitution 
  Legislature (See 
comments) 
Gov/Leg Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems 
SREB 02/03 "State Board of Regents [sets tuition] within limits set by the Legislature". 
Oregon No response     Statewide 
Agency 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
The Oregon Legislature (ORS 351.070) grants authority to the State Board of Higher 
Education to establish tuition and fees for enrollment at Oregon University System 
institutions 
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Table A1 (continued)  
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 and 2005-06 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and 
Universities, Questions 4a, 4b, and 4c 
 
STATE 
Survey 2002-03 
Tuition Auth 
2003 
Survey Response 2005-06 OTHER COMMENTS/SOURCES 
Q4a. Describe the role of 
individual institutions in 
establishing rates and/or 
policies in your state. 
Q4c. If 
institutions 
have primary 
[or  some] 
authority what 
is the nature of 
their authority 
Q4b. Which of the 
entities (in Q4a) has 
primary authority for 
establishing tuition? 
Pennsylvania 
Higher 
Education 
System 
The universities within 
the PASSHE have no 
role in tuition setting; 
System governing board 
has decision making 
authority for both 
establishing tuition 
policy and setting tuition 
rates 
  System governing 
board 
Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
  
Pennsylvania 
State-Related 
Institutions 
The state-related 
institutions have their 
own boards, which set 
their tuition 
No external 
restrictions 
Institutional 
governing boards 
Full Control 
Inst 
No Response   
Rhode Island Propose tuition rates to 
board during request 
process; System 
governing board makes 
final decision 
  Board Statewide 
Agency 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
  
South Carolina Decision making 
authority 
Moderate or 
limited 
authority 
Individual 
institutions' boards 
Moderate 
Control Inst 
Individual institutions; 
Moderate or limited 
authority 
SREB 02/03- 03/04: "Individual institution boards [set tuition]. However, for a number 
of years now the Legislature has adopted a proviso that any institution with fees above 
the average for its sector may not increase fees more than the HEPI + $250"; SREB 
04/05 - 07/08 "Individual institution boards [set tuition]". 
South Dakota Advisory/consultative 
role; State coordinating 
/governing agency has  
authority 
  Board of Regents Statewide 
Agency 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
  
South Carolina Decision making 
authority 
Moderate or 
limited 
authority 
Individual 
institutions' boards 
Moderate 
Control Inst 
Individual institutions; 
Moderate or limited 
authority 
SREB 02/03- 03/04: "Individual institution boards [set tuition]. However, for a number 
of years now the Legislature has adopted a proviso that any institution with fees above 
the average for its sector may not increase fees more than the HEPI + $250"; SREB 
04/05 - 07/08 "Individual institution boards [set tuition]". 
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Table A1 (continued)  
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 and 2005-06 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and 
Universities, Questions 4a, 4b, and 4c 
STATE 
Survey 2002-03 
Tuition Auth 
2003 
Survey Response 2005-06 OTHER COMMENTS/SOURCES 
Q4a. Describe the role of 
individual institutions in 
establishing rates and/or 
policies in your state. 
Q4c. If 
institutions 
have primary 
[or  some] 
authority what 
is the nature of 
their authority 
Q4b. Which of the 
entities (in Q4a) has 
primary authority for 
establishing tuition? 
South Dakota Advisory/consultative 
role; State 
coordinating/governing 
agency has decision 
making authority 
  Board of Regents Statewide 
Agency 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
  
Tennessee Provide informal input. 
No formal role; System 
governing board 
responsible for setting 
tuition levels 
  Governing boards Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
boards for individual 
systems; "Governing 
boards have sole authority 
for setting tuition and 
fees, rather than the 
coordinating board, 
THEC". 
SREB 02/03 - 07/08: "Individual boards using guidelines of Higher Education 
Commission. THEC policy states that resident tuition for undergraduates be set at 
40% of appropriations for 4-year institutions". 
Texas Some can set some fees 
under authority 
delegated by governing 
boards; System 
governing boards can set 
fees within boundaries 
set by Legislature.  
Very strict 
guidelines 
Legislature Gov/Leg Legislature for statutory 
base; 
Coordinating/governing 
boards for individual 
systems for designated 
tuition 
SREB 03/04 - 05/06: "Rates are set by the Texas Legislature. Beginning in January 
2004, the Legislature delegated to governing boards the authority to set rates for a 
portion of tuition known as designated tuition (deregulated)". SREB 06/07 - 07/08:  
"There are two types of tuition. Statutory tuition is currently set by the Legislature at 
$50 per credit hour. The Legislature delegated authority to the governing boards and 
boards of trustees of universities to level an optional charge for tuition, referred to as 
designated tuition starting in January 2004. Maximum designated tuition rates were 
previously limited by the Legislature to the rate ... for statutory tuition". Texas 
Education Code, Sec. 54.051.  "The governing board [of each institution], under the 
terms the governing board considers appropriate, may charge any student an amount 
designated as tuition that the governing board considers necessary for the effective 
operation of the institution. 
Utah Advisory/consultative.  
However, institutions 
have taken an increasing 
role in proposing 
second-tier and 
differential increases. 
Final approval of all 
tuition increases rests 
with the State Board of 
Regents 
  State governing 
board 
Statewide 
Agency 
Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems 
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Table A1 (continued)  
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 and 2005-06 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and 
Universities, Questions 4a, 4b, and 4c 
STATE 
Survey 2002-03 
Tuition Auth 
2003 
Survey Response 2005-06 OTHER COMMENTS/SOURCES 
Q4a. Describe the role of 
individual institutions in 
establishing rates and/or 
policies in your state. 
Q4c. If 
institutions 
have primary 
[or  some] 
authority what 
is the nature of 
their authority 
Q4b. Which of the 
entities (in Q4a) has 
primary authority for 
establishing tuition? 
Vermont-UVM Tuition rates established 
by University of 
Vermont Board of 
Trustees 
Moderate or 
limited 
authority 
University of 
Vermont Board of 
Trustees 
Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
http://www.uvm.edu/trustees/policymanual/II%204%20Resolution%20and%20Chart%
20regarding%20Board%20Delegation%20and%20Retention%20of%20Authority.pdf 
Vermont-VSC None   Board of Trustees Individual 
System Board 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
System governing board has complete authority 
Virginia The determination of 
proper tuition, fees, and 
charges is made by 
individual boards of 
visitors within the 
policies established by 
the General Assembly 
Moderate or 
limited 
authority 
Institutional boards Moderate 
Control Inst 
Individual institutions; 
Moderate or limited 
authority 
SREB 02/03: "Appropriations Act stated the General Assembly's expectation that the 
increase in tuition and mandatory education and general fees for in-state 
undergraduates for 2002-03 not exceed 9%. However, this is not a firm cap"; SREB 
03/04: "... for 2003-04 not exceed 5% over the original 2002-03 rate plus annualized 
mid-year tuition increase in Spring 2003"; SREB 04/05 - 06/07: "Boards of Visitors at 
individual institutions [have the authority to set tuition and fee rates]. Appropriations 
Act states that the board of visitors may set tuition and fee charges at the levels they 
deem to be appropriate for all student groups based on, but not limited to competitive 
market rates"; SREB 07/08: "Virginia has a 63/37 fund share policy in funding 
institutions' base operations. Institutions can set the tuition increases based on its share 
of the estimated needs. In addition, in order to made college affordable, the General 
Assembly required institutions to limit the tuition increases to in-state undergraduate 
students to no more than 6% in 2007-08. Institutions are allowed to exceed this limit if 
the additional revenue is used solely for in-state undergraduate financial aid". 
Washington Makes decision on 
tuition, usually increases 
it up to the maximum 
allowed 
Very strict 
guidelines 
Each 4-year 
institution separately 
Strict Control 
Inst 
Individual institutions The legislature set the maximum increase for resident undergraduate tuition 
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Table A1 (continued)  
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 and 2005-06 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and 
Universities, Questions 4a, 4b, and 4c 
STATE 
Survey 2002-03 
Tuition Auth 
2003 
Survey Response 2005-06 OTHER COMMENTS/SOURCES 
Q4a. Describe the role of 
individual institutions in 
establishing rates and/or 
policies in your state. 
Q4c. If 
institutions 
have primary 
[or  some] 
authority what 
is the nature of 
their authority 
Q4b. Which of the 
entities (in Q4a) has 
primary authority for 
establishing tuition? 
West Virginia For the Governing 
Boards of individual 
institutions: Rates - 
Decision-making 
authority. Policy - 
Advisory; Legislature 
has policy decision-
making authority 
Moderate or 
limited 
authority 
Policy - 
recommended by 
State Policy 
Commission and 
approved by 
Legislature. Rates - 
set by individual 
institution governing 
boards and approved 
for compliance with 
policy by state 
Higher Education 
Policy Commission 
Moderate 
Control Inst 
Statewide Agency for 
multiple systems; All 
institutional governing 
boards except WVU and 
Marshall University 
require statewide board 
approval 
SREB 02/03 - 07/08: "Institutional governing boards [has the authority to set tuition 
and fee rates] with final approval of the WV Higher Education Policy Commission. 
Each institutional governing board reviews student tuition and fees relying on 
comparisons of peer group institutions in SREB and contiguous states. Fees set are 
dependent on budgetary needs of institutions, level of state support, and fee levels of 
comparable institutions. Resident undergraduate rates are tied to median SREB 
tuition rates for peer institutions". 
Wisconsin May propose differential 
tuition for Board 
Approval and may set 
tuition rates for Distance 
Education offerings; UW 
System Board of 
Regents have statutory 
authority to set tuition 
    Statewide 
Agency 
Coordinating/governing 
board for individual 
systems 
  
Wyoming Not applicable; State 
coordinating/governing 
agency approves tuition 
and sets policy  
  Coordinating board 
[Sole institution] 
Full Control 
Inst 
Individual institutions; No 
external restrictions 
State has a single four year institution governed by Board of Trustees with authority 
to set student charges (http://www.uwyo.edu/generalcounsel/_files/docs/UW-Reg-8-
1.pdf) 
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Table A2 
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies 
for Public Colleges and Universities, Question 6 
Question 6. Indicate which of the following tuition revenue appropriation policies are in place in your state 
A. Tuition revenues are controlled and retained by an institution or campus 
B. Tuition revenues are deposited into separate state tuition accounts from which all funds must be 
appropriated prior to expenditure for higher education purposes 
C. Tuition revenues are retained at the state level but under the direct control of a state governing or 
coordinating board 
D. Tuition revenues are deposited into state general funds, with their return to higher education only inferred 
E. Other 
State A B C D E Comments 
Alabama X      
Alaska       
Arizona  X     
Arkansas X      
California       
Colorado       
Connecticut      
Tuition revenues are retained and controlled by individual 
Governing Boards (constituent units) 
Delaware X      
Florida X      
Georgia X    X Determined by the state’s funding formula 
Hawaii  X    
Tuition revenues are deposited into separate university tuition 
accounts 
Idaho  X     
Illinois X       
Indiana X      
Iowa X      
Kansas     X 
For state universities, tuition is deposited in the state treasury and 
appropriated without limit to the institutions; in that regard, the 
institutions have control over the use of the tuition. At all other 
public institutions, tuition is fully controlled at the campus 
Kentucky X      
Louisiana X      
Maine X      
Maryland X      
Massachusetts     X 
Tuition revenues are deposited into state general funds with no 
return to higher education 
       
Michigan       
Minnesota - UM X      
Minnesota-MnSCU X      
Mississippi X      
Missouri X      
Montana       
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Table A2 (continued) 
Survey Responses SHEEO 2002-03 State Tuition, Fee, and Financial Assistance Policies 
for Public Colleges and Universities, Question 6 
State A B C D E Comments 
Nebraska X      
Nevada X X   X 
Respondent 1: Student fees are divided-part going to the state 
supported budget where they reduce state support and part to the 
institution for capital needs, financial aid, student government, and 
other campus or program improvements. The Board of Regents 
determines this division. Respondent 2: Tuition revenues, estate tax 
credits, and appropriations from the State General Fund are used to 
support the budget for each institution 
New Hampshire X      
New Jersey X      
New Mexico X      
New York X      
North Carolina    X   
North Dakota X      
Ohio X      
Oklahoma X      
Oregon       
Pennsylvania X      
Rhode Island X      
South Carolina X      
South Dakota   X    
Tennessee X      
Texas X      
Utah 
    X 
Records of tuition collections are made in the State financial 
system, but the tuition dollars are controlled at the institution 
Vermont-UVM X      
Vermont-VSC X      
Virginia  X     
Washington X      
West Virginia 
    X 
Tuition revenues are controlled and retained by the campuses for 
the most part. The collection and expenditure by type of tuition is 
controlled by a very detailed legislative code for most individual 
fee categories. Tuition revenue needed for system-wide debt service 
and Higher Education Policy Commission support funds are 
assessed to the institutions by the State Policy Commission 
Wisconsin 
    X 
Tuition revenues are deposited in the state general fund, but the 
University of Wisconsin has legislative authority to expend them as 
they are received. Spending above legislative appropriation levels, 
while allowed, must be reported to the state 
Wyoming X      
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Table B1 
Model Fit Statistics LN Net Tuition 
Parameters 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  
Final Model-
REML 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value  
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
Institution Level Variables:                
Year 84.72 < .001 84.25 < .001 84.77 < .001 85.42 < .001 85.27 < .001 33.46 < .001  32.69 < .001 
Sector 11.28 < .001 11.03 < .001 11.26 < .001 10.82 < .001 14.45 < .001 10.32 < .001  9.23 < .001 
Tuition Authority 24.17 < .001 27.18 < .001 27.18 < .001 27.12 < .001 28.71 < .001 .07 0.996  0.06 0.998 
Special Institution 7.61 < .001 7.94 < .001 7.80 < .001 7.98 < .001 7.56 < .001 11.64 < .001  10.27 < .001 
Resource Control 1.15 0.284 1.04 0.308 1.11 0.293     7.16 < .01  6.82 < .01 
Appropriations 89.09 < .001 95.18 < .001 97.58 < .001 94.85 < .001 94.54 < .001 6.15 < .05  5.84 <.05 
E&G Expenses (Lag) 0.24 0.628         1.22 0.269  1.22 0.269 
Publicness 547.72 < .001 571.65 < .001 567.80 < .001 582.20 < .001 592.51 < .001 125.86 < .001  118.03 < .001 
In State Enrollment 4.03 < .05 3.95 < .05 4.06 < .05 3.97 < .05 3.94 < .05 2.51 0.113  2.60 0.107 
Out of State Enrollment 8.97 < .01 9.69 < .01 8.89 < .01 9.73 < .01 9.60 < .01 9.40 < .01  7.48 < .01 
Size 0.00 0.962         0.12 0.732  0.02 0.897 
                
State Level Variables:                
Governance 11.89 < .001 11.55 < .001 11.87 < .001 11.41 < .001 14.62 < .001 13.81 < .001  12.69 < .001 
Region 6.63 < .001 6.80 < .001 6.71 < .001 6.59 < .001 6.26 < .001 11.21 < .001  10.25 < .001 
Budget 4.04 < .05 4.19 < .05 4.08 < .05 2.68 0.102 4.84 < .05 <.01 0.978  0.00 0.983 
Property Tax (Lag) 3.35 < .10 2.71 0.100 3.38 < .10 3.73 < .10 3.09 < .10 0.06 0.802  0.22 0.640 
Sales Tax (Lag) 13.57 < .001 13.57 < .001 13.99 < .001 13.40 < .001 18.60 < .001 1.46 0.227  2.61 0.106 
Income Tax (Lag) 10.73 < .01 11.05 < .01 11.18 < .001 11.84 < .001 17.03 < .001 0.18 0.671  0.37 0.542 
Prepaid Plan 2.28 0.132 2.44 0.120 2.25 0.134 2.22 0.137   12.91 < .001  10.72 < .01 
Education Attainment 11.85 < .001 12.24 < .001 11.68 < .001 11.42 < .001 11.49 < .001 16.24 < .001  13.27 < .001 
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Table B1 (continued) 
Model Fit Statistics LN Net Tuition 
Parameters 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  
Final Model-
REML 
F 
Statistic p-value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value  
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
Interactions:                
Year*Tuition Authority 
 
          3.01 < .001  2.79 < .001 
Sector*Tuition Authority           3.25 < .001  3.94 < .001 
Region*Tuition Authority           7.40 < .001  6.41 < .001 
Publicness*Tuition Authority           9.94 <.001  9.39 <.001 
 Appropriations*Tuition Authority          4.28 <.001  3.99 <.01 
 
Fit Indices:           
-2 Log Likelihood -5365.8 -5365.8 -5367.9 -5348.6 -5346.3 -5567.9  --4761.4 
AIC -5289.8 -5291.8 -5265.9 -5278.6 -5278.3 -5379.9  -4757.4 
AICC -5288.7 -5290.7 -5294.8 -5277.6 -5277.4 -5372.9  -4757.4 
BIC -5138.9 -5144.8 -5152.9 -5139.6 -5143.3 -5006.6  -4749.5 
 
Covariance Parameters Estimate Z Estimate Z Estimate Z Estimate Z Estimate Z Estimate Z   Estimate Z 
AR(1) - Institution 0.9153 154.91 0.9153 155.78 0.9151 155.77 0.9153 155.90 0.9159 157.22 0.9043 133.23  0.9153 144.18 
Residual 0.0361 15.87 0.0361 15.94 0.0360 15.97 0.0361 15.95 0.0363 15.96 0.0308 15.72  0.0345 14.72 
 ICC 0.9621  0.9621  0.9621  0.9621  0.9618  0.9671   0.9637  
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Table B2 
Model Fit Statistics LN E&G Expense 
Parameters 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  
Final Model - 
REML 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
F 
Statistic 
p-
value  
F 
Statistic 
p-
value 
Institution Level Variables:                 
Year 11.02 < .001 11.01 < .001 10.99 < .001 11.16 < .001 11.17 < .001 11.27 < .001 4.68 < .001  4.55 < .001 
Tuition Authority 4.89 < .001 6.96 < .001 6.94 < .001 6.80 < .001 6.96 < .001 6.92 < .001 4.85 < .001  4.56 < .01 
Sector 62.49 < .001 62.56 < .001 63.25 < .001 63.61 < .001 63.60 < .001 75.99 < .001 63.41 < .001  60.93 < .001 
Special Institution 25.09 < .001 25.18 < .001 25.15 < .001 25.46 < .001 25.49 < .001 25.41 < .001 25.36 < .001  23.93 < .001 
Resource Control 0.86 0.354 0.96 0.327 0.81 0.369 1.08 0.299     1.29 0.257  1.18 0.28 
Appropriations 1339.21 < .001 1357.78 < .001 1356.95 < .001 1356.66 < .001 1352.36 < .001 1343.80 < .001 1303.41 < .001  1236.49 < .001 
Gross Tuition 240.43 < .001 249.26 < .001 249.14 < .001 248.48 < .001 250.39 < .001 248.91 < .001 227.43 < .001  217.04 < .001 
Publicness 119.90 < .001 119.99 < .001 119.79 < .001 119.62 < .001 121.35 < .001 120.81 < .001 108.86 < .001  101.72 < .001 
Size 1.22 0.271 1.21 0.272 1.18 0.278 1.15 0.284 1.10 0.294   1.13 0.289  0.93 0.34 
                  
State Level Variables:                  
Governance 0.04 0.9579           0.37 0.693  0.33 0.717 
Region 4.13 < .01 4.71 < .01 4.71 <.01 4.89 < .001 4.63 < .01 4.53 < .01 4.99 < .001  4.71 < .01 
Budget 0.26 0.608 0.19 0.664         0.09 0.770  0.07 0.790 
Property Tax (Lag) 5.06 < .05 5.76 < .05 6.31 < .05 5.95 < .05 5.70 < .05 5.83 < .05 10.73 < .01  10.35 < .01 
Sales Tax (Lag) 6.43 < .05 6.57 < .05 6.87 < .01 6.86 < .01 6.94 < .01 6.53 < .05 4.21 < .05  4.30 < .05 
Income Tax (Lag) 35.99 < .001 40.49 < .001 40.29 < .001 39.62 < .001 39.01 < .001 39.11 < .001 36.71 < .001  35.65 < .001 
Prepaid Plan 6.38 < .05 8.70 < .01 8.55 < .01 8.37 < .01 8.33 < .01 8.32 < .01 6.20 < .05  5.97 < .05 
Education Attainment 0.77 0.380 0.76 0.383 0.70 0.402       0.20 0.652  0.200 0.656 
                  
Interactions:                  
Year*Tuition Auth             2.42 < .001  2.39 < .001 
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Table B2 (continued) 
Model Fit Statistics LN E&G Expense 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  
Final Model - 
REML 
Fit Indices:                  
-2 Log Likelihood -6932.7 -6932.7 -6932.5 -6931.8 -6930.7 -6929.6 -7004.4  -6400.7 
AIC -6860.7 -6864.7 -6866.5 -6867.8 -6868.7 -6869.6 -6872.4  -6396.7 
AICC -6859.8 -6863.8 -6865.6 -6867.0 -6868.0 -6868.9 -6869.1  -6396.7 
BIC -6717.5 -6729.4 -6735.2 -6740.4 -6745.3 -6750.2 -6609.8  -6388.8 
                  
Covariance Parameters Estimate Z Estimate Z Estimate Z Estimate Z Estimate Z Estimate Z Estimate Z  Estimate Z 
AR(1) - Institution 0.9061 132.72 0.9061 132.92 0.9063 133.24 0.9063 133.37 0.9066 133.79 0.9074 135.30 0.9098 137.78  0.9141 140.80 
Residual 0.0207 15.37 0.0207 15.39 0.0207 15.39 0.0207 15.41 0.0208 15.40 0.0209 15.41 0.0208 15.25  0.0222 14.70 
 ICC 0.9777  0.9777  0.9777  0.9777  0.9776  0.9775  0.9776   0.9763  
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Table B3 
 
Model Fit Statistics LN Minority Enrollment 
Parameters 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
F Statistic 
p-
value F Statistic 
p-
value F Statistic 
p-
value F Statistic 
p-
value F Statistic 
p-
value F Statistic 
p-
value F Statistic 
p-
value 
Institution Level Variables:               
Year 32.46 < .001 32.48 < .001 32.44 < .001 32.41 < .001 32.24 < .001 32.23 < .001 36.52 < .001 
Sector 0.52 0.593 0.52 0.595 0.51 0.602         
Tuition Authority 2.87 0.015 2.87 0.015 2.84 0.016 2.89 0.014 2.84 0.016 2.82 0.016 2.84 0.016 
Special Institution 8.23 0.004 8.24 0.004 8.39 0.004 7.49 0.007 7.77 0.006 8.63 0.004 8.57 0.004 
Resource Control 0.17 0.680 0.17 0.678           
Appropriations 3.45 0.063 4.50 0.034 4.45 0.035 4.36 0.037 4.43 0.036 7.20 0.007 7.68 0.006 
E&G Expenses (Lag) 0.75 0.388 0.78 0.379 0.78 0.377 0.55 0.457 0.53 0.466     
Student Services 1.55 0.214 1.55 0.213 1.54 0.215 1.37 0.242 1.43 0.232 1.09 0.296 1.30 0.254 
Institution Grant 3.08 0.079 3.25 0.071 3.23 0.072 3.25 0.072 3.21 0.073 3.14 0.077 3.48 0.062 
Gross Tuition 8.19 0.004 9.06 0.003 9.07 0.003 8.51 0.004 8.44 0.004 9.62 0.002 11.08 0.001 
Publicness 0.01 0.909             
Size 6.91 0.009 6.92 0.009 6.97 0.009 9.78 0.002 10.26 0.001 10.15 0.002 10.18 0.002 
               
State Level Variables:               
Governance 6.70 0.001 6.70 0.001 6.68 0.001 6.55 0.002 6.35 0.002 6.37 0.002 7.18 0.001 
Region 13.04 < .001 13.04 < .001 13.26 < .001 13.09 < .001 14.43 < .001 14.37 < .001 14.33 < .001 
Budget 7.96 0.005 7.95 0.005 7.77 0.006 7.72 0.006 7.28 0.007 7.27 0.007 7.44 0.007 
Property Tax (Lag) 0.99 0.319 0.99 0.320 1.00 0.318 1.03 0.312 0.98 0.323 1.03 0.311 1.35 0.245 
Sales Tax (Lag) 0.45 0.505 0.45 0.505 0.47 0.493 0.56 0.454 0.72 0.395 0.79 0.374 1.67 0.197 
Income Tax (Lag) 0.90 0.343 0.90 0.342 0.96 0.327 1.05 0.306 0.87 0.350 0.78 0.378   
Prepaid Plan 0.25 0.618 0.25 0.621 0.28 0.595 0.45 0.501       
Education Attainment 1.08 0.299 1.08 0.299 1.13 0.288 1.11 0.291 1.10 0.294 1.15 0.285 1.14 0.285 
               
Interactions:               
Year*Tuition Authority               
Fit Indices:                             
-2 Log Likelihood -4466.5  -4466.5  -4466.3  -4465.3  -4464.8  -4464.2  -4463.5  
AIC -4340.5  -4342.5  -4344.3  -4347.3  -4348.8  -4350.2  -4351.5  
AICC -4337.1  -4339.2  -4341.1  -4344.3  -4345.9  -4347.5  -4348.8  
BIC -4097.8  -4103.6  -4109.3  -4120.0  -4125.4  -4130.7  -4135.7  
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Table B3 (continued) 
Model Fit Statistics LN Minority Enrollment 
 
  
Parameters 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12  Final-REML 
F Statistic p-value F Statistic p-value F Statistic p-value F Statistic p-value F Statistic p-value  F Statistic p-value 
Institution Level Variables:              
Year 36.74 < .001 37.53 < .001 37.42 < .001 40.75 < .001 14.33 < .001  14.22 < .001 
Sector         0.51 0.600  0.52 0.595 
Tuition Authority 2.96 0.013 2.97 0.012 2.96 0.013 3.17 0.008 3.49 0.004  3.51 0.004 
Special Institution 8.69 0.003 8.84 0.003 8.81 0.003 9.57 0.002 8.37 0.004  8.22 0.004 
Resource Control         0.29 0.590  0.29 0.589 
Appropriations 7.57 0.006 6.55 0.011 6.45 0.011 5.56 0.019 3.27 0.071  3.64 0.056 
E&G Expenses (Lag)         0.49 0.484  0.48 0.491 
Student Services 1.25 0.264       1.44 0.230  1.50 0.221 
Institution Grant 3.43 0.064 3.34 0.068 3.31 0.069 3.04 0.082 3.62 0.057  3.57 0.059 
Gross Tuition 10.85 0.001 10.07 0.002 10.55 0.001 10.14 0.002 6.21 0.013  6.24 0.013 
Publicness         0.06 0.804  0.05 0.816 
Size 10.26 0.001 9.80 0.002 9.79 0.002 10.72 0.001 5.91 0.015  5.83 0.016 
              
State Level Variables:              
Governance 7.62 0.001 7.71 0.001 7.42 0.001 7.97 0.000 7.29 0.001  7.53 0.001 
Region 14.50 < .001 14.40 < .001 14.38 < .001 14.12 < .001 12.48 < .001  12.49 < .001 
Budget 7.06 0.008 7.07 0.008 7.52 0.006 8.23 0.004 6.91 0.009  7.05 0.008 
Property Tax (Lag) 1.22 0.270 1.17 0.279     2.08 0.150  1.99 0.158 
Sales Tax (Lag) 1.63 0.201 1.63 0.203 1.81 0.179   0.38 0.537  0.37 0.545 
Income Tax (Lag)         0.01 0.914  0.01 0.904 
Prepaid Plan         0.19 0.661  0.17 0.681 
Education Attainment         0.02 0.901  0.02 0.876 
              
Interactions:              
Year*Tuition Authority         1.51 0.040  1.52 0.038 
Fit Indices:                          
-2 Log Likelihood -4462.4  -4461.1  -4459.9  -4458.1  -3932.5   -3927.1  
AIC -4352.4  -4353.1  -4353.9  -4354.1  -3876.5   -3871.1  
AICC -4349.8  -4350.6  -4351.5  -4351.8  -3785.8   -3870.4  
BIC -4140.5  -4145.1  -4149.7  -4153.8  -3768.6   -3763.3  
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APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table C1 
Comparison of Model-Based E&G Expense Estimates by Tuition Authority (in log units) 
Tuition Authority Estimate SE DF t p 
 Full Control vs Moderate Control 0.1423 0.0407 330 3.49 0.0005 
 Full Control vs Strict Control -0.1008 0.0748 349 -1.35 0.1783 
 Full Control vs Individual System Board 0.0655 0.0359 303 1.83 0.0688 
 Full Control vs Statewide Agency 0.0288 0.0447 301 0.64 0.5195 
 Full Control vs Governor/Legislature 0.1274 0.0474 365 2.68 0.0076 
 Moderate Control vs Strict Control -0.2431 0.0683 360 -3.56 0.0004 
 Moderate Control vs Individual System Board -0.0767 0.0303 336 -2.54 0.0117 
 Moderate Control vs Statewide Agency -0.1135 0.0452 327 -2.51 0.0124 
 Moderate Control vs Governor/Legislature -0.0149 0.0342 384 -0.44 0.6626 
 Strict Control vs Individual System Board 0.1664 0.0691 354 2.41 0.0165 
 Strict Control vs Statewide Agency 0.1296 0.0760 366 1.71 0.0888 
 Strict Control vs Governor/Legislature 0.2282 0.0737 349 3.10 0.0021 
 Individual System Board vs Statewide Agency -0.0367 0.0328 315 -1.12 0.2628 
 Individual System Board vs Governor/Legislature 0.0618 0.0350 370 1.77 0.0780 
 Statewide Agency vs Governor/Legislature 0.0986 0.0499 352 1.98 0.0488 
 
 
Table C2 
Comparison of Model-Based Minority Enrollment Estimates by Tuition Authority (in log 
units) 
Tuition Authority Estimate SE DF t p 
 Full Control vs Moderate Control 0.6135 0.1700 349 3.61 0.0004 
 Full Control vs Strict Control 0.5969 0.2966 344 2.01 0.0450 
 Full Control vs Individual System Board 0.5093 0.1553 343 3.28 0.0011 
 Full Control vs Statewide Agency 0.5424 0.1882 345 2.88 0.0042 
 Full Control vs Governor/Legislature 0.3452 0.1936 357 1.78 0.0755 
 Moderate Control vs Strict Control -0.0166 0.2689 343 -0.06 0.9508 
 Moderate Control vs Individual System Board -0.1042 0.1271 359 -0.82 0.4129 
 Moderate Control vs Statewide Agency -0.0711 0.1855 341 -0.38 0.7018 
 Moderate Control vs Governor/Legislature -0.2683 0.1384 353 -1.94 0.0533 
 Strict Control vs Individual System Board -0.0876 0.2721 347 -0.32 0.7477 
 Strict Control vs Statewide Agency -0.0545 0.2976 350 -0.18 0.8548 
 Strict Control vs Governor/Legislature -0.2517 0.2933 346 -0.86 0.3915 
 Individual System Board vs Statewide Agency 0.0331 0.1336 355 0.25 0.8044 
 Individual System Board vs Governor/Legislature -0.1641 0.1442 357 -1.14 0.2558 
 Statewide Agency vs Governor/Legislature -0.1972 0.2020 353 -0.98 0.3296 
  *Excludes HBCU and HSI institutions 
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Table C3 
Simple Effect Comparisons Year*Tuition Authority 
Dependent Variable Year Tuition Authority Num DF Den DF F p 
Net Tuition 2009  5 486 4.37 0.0007 
Net Tuition 2008  5 501 4.53 0.0005 
Net Tuition 2007  5 500 3.83 0.0020 
Net Tuition 2006  5 483 4.20 0.0010 
Net Tuition 2005  5 481 4.98 0.0002 
Net Tuition 2004  5 481 4.42 0.0006 
Net Tuition 2003  5 482 3.29 0.0062 
Net Tuition  Institution - Full 6 2211 13.91 <.0001 
Net Tuition  Institution - Moderate 6 2200 24.68 <.0001 
Net Tuition  Institution - Strict 6 2260 1.19 0.3071 
Net Tuition  Individual System Board 6 2243 33.09 <.0001 
Net Tuition  Statewide Agency 6 2179 17.04 <.0001 
Net Tuition  Governor/Legislature 6 2204 11.80 <.0001 
E&G Expense 2009  5 412 3.45 0.0046 
E&G Expense 2008  5 412 3.63 0.0032 
E&G Expense 2007  5 410 4.08 0.0013 
E&G Expense 2006  5 409 3.31 0.0061 
E&G Expense 2005  5 415 4.60 0.0004 
E&G Expense 2004  5 408 5.94 <.0001 
E&G Expense 2003  5 405 5.00 0.0002 
E&G Expense  Institution - Full 6 2289 2.64 0.0147 
E&G Expense  Institution - Moderate 6 2243 2.91 0.0079 
E&G Expense  Institution - Strict 6 2190 0.69 0.6573 
E&G Expense  Individual System Board 6 2345 7.14 <.0001 
E&G Expense  Statewide Agency 6 2240 1.94 0.0710 
E&G Expense  Governor/Legislature 6 2235 7.70 <.0001 
Minority Enrollment 2009  5 342 3.15 0.0086 
Minority Enrollment 2008  5 348 3.17 0.0082 
Minority Enrollment 2007  5 352 3.35 0.0057 
Minority Enrollment 2006  5 356 3.74 0.0026 
Minority Enrollment 2005  5 361 3.61 0.0033 
Minority Enrollment 2004  5 363 3.64 0.0032 
Minority Enrollment 2003  5 362 3.67 0.0030 
Minority Enrollment  Institution - Full 6 386 2.81 0.0109 
Minority Enrollment  Institution - Moderate 6 364 6.23 <.0001 
Minority Enrollment  Institution - Strict 6 335 1.46 0.1897 
Minority Enrollment  Individual System Board 6 418 18.42 <.0001 
Minority Enrollment  Statewide Agency 6 366 19.46 <.0001 
Minority Enrollment  Governor/Legislature 6 356 2.41 0.0272 
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Table C4 
Comparison of Model-Based Net Tuition Estimates by Tuition Authority (in log units) 
Tuition Authority Estimate SE DF t p 
 Full Control vs Moderate Control 0.0082 0.0535 371 0.15 0.8780 
 Full Control vs Strict Control 0.0259 0.0970 392 0.27 0.7895 
 Full Control vs Individual System Board 0.0255 0.0471 342 0.54 0.5877 
 Full Control vs Statewide Agency 0.1309 0.0584 338 2.24 0.0257 
 Full Control vs Governor/Legislature 0.2451 0.0617 410 3.97 0.0001 
 Moderate Control vs Strict Control 0.0177 0.0884 406 0.20 0.8414 
 Moderate Control vs Individual System Bd 0.0173 0.0392 379 0.44 0.6592 
 Moderate Control vs Statewide Agency 0.1226 0.0584 367 2.10 0.0364 
 Moderate Control vs Governor/Legislature 0.2369 0.0436 423 5.43 <.0001 
 Strict Control vs Individual System Board -0.0004 0.0893 400 0.00 0.9966 
 Strict Control vs Statewide Agency 0.1049 0.0982 412 1.07 0.2860 
 Strict Control vs Governor/Legislature 0.2192 0.0952 393 2.30 0.0219 
 Individual System Bd vs Statewide Agency 0.1053 0.0423 353 2.49 0.0133 
 Individual System Bd vs Governor/Legislature 0.2195 0.0450 415 4.88 <.0001 
 Statewide Agency vs Governor/Legislature 0.1142 0.0644 398 1.77 <.0001 
 
 
